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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the relationship of democracy promotion to national security in US 
strategy through an examination of the influence of geopolitical, bureaucratic and 
organisational considerations on the effort to create a coherent strategic approach fusing 
democracy promotion and national security under the Reagan administration.  
This process highlighted geopolitical and organisational tensions between democracy 
promotion and US national security. Groups within the administration, Congress and the 
private sphere disagreed over whether US geopolitical interests required the limited 
deployment of democracy promotion against Soviet Communism or a more expansive effort 
aimed at both Communist and pro-US dictatorships. These debates were linked to clashes 
over the credibility and effectiveness of competing state-centred or privately-implemented 
organisational frameworks.   
The organisational resolution was the National Endowment for Democracy, which intervened 
on a tactical basis in dictatorships, with US assistance, to safeguard US national security by 
supporting pro-US democratic groups. However the concept of privately-implemented 
democracy promotion blocked agreement on geopolitical objectives and the creation of a 
coherent strategy reconciling democracy promotion and US national security. Tensions 
between these two imperatives continue to recur and can be resolved only on a case-by-case 
basis rather than at the strategic level.   
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INTRODUCTION 
US policy-makers have often claimed that the US has a special mission to protect and support 
the spread of democracy.
1
 However, US actions such as support for dictatorships and hostility 
to democratic regimes indicate that the place of democracy in US foreign policy practice has 
been much more ambiguous. This ambiguity has spurred a constant and continuing academic 
debate between those who see the promotion of democracy as a key element of US strategy 
and a more critical group of scholars who argue that in practice, democratic rhetoric has been 
used as a tool to legitimate the pursuit of other goals. 
 The democracy-centred narrative of US foreign policy has been expounded most 
often by scholars working within a Liberal or Neoconservative framework. The most 
comprehensive statement of the importance of democracy in US national security policy 
within a Liberal framework was made by Tony Smith, who argued that “the most consistent 
tradition in American foreign policy…has been the belief that the nation‟s security is best 
protected by the expansion of democracy worldwide”2 and that this had been “the greatest 
ambition of United States foreign policy over the past century”.3 Smith cites the creation of 
democratic institutions in the Philippines during its period of American rule, the foreign 
policy of Woodrow Wilson, the democratisation of Germany and Japan under the Truman 
administration, the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and Ronald Reagan‟s crusade for 
                                                 
1
 Numerous examples of Presidential rhetoric covering over a century could be cited. See Wilson‟s argument 
that the US was entering World War One in order to make the world safe for democracy in Woodrow Wilson,  
“War Message to Congress”, 2nd April 1917, accessed 4th June 2010,  
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson%27s_War_Message_to_Congress; see Harry S. Truman‟s contention 
that “it must be the policy of the United States to…assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their 
own way” , used to justify US aid to the governments of Greece and Turkey in support of containment in 1947, 
in “Address before a joint session of Congress”, 12th March 1947, accessed 20th February 2013,  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp; and John F. Kennedy‟s promise that “we shall pay any 
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival 
and the success of liberty” in “Inaugural Address”, accessed 16th March 2013, 
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres56.html. 
2
 Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the 
Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 10. 
3
 Smith, America’s Mission, 4. 
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democracy against Soviet Communism in support of his argument.
4
 Smith is not alone in 
making this argument, as the neoconservative Joshua Muravchik claims that the US has been 
“the engine of [the] transformation”5 of much of the world in a more democratic direction, 
while liberal scholar G. John Ikenberry sees the promotion of democracy as one component 
of a US liberal grand strategy which also included the creation of international institutions 
and an open world economy after World War Two.
6
 These scholars argue that in democracy 
promotion idealism and pragmatism are joined in an “evolving, sophisticated understanding 
of how to create a stable international political order”.7 In this conception, democracy and 
national security are mutually reinforcing policy goals. 
However, this perspective fails to engage fully with the contradictions in US practice 
by minimising the anti-democratic actions often taken by the United States. Thus, while 
Smith celebrates democratic policy initiatives undertaken by Wilson, Truman, Kennedy and 
Reagan he devotes far less space to Presidents such as Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon, who 
overthrew democratic governments.
8
 Similarly, Henry Nau argues that even though the US 
undermined democratic governments during the Cold War in countries such as Guatemala 
and Chile, by containing the Soviet Union, “[i]t  played the key role in defending and 
strengthening democracy.”9 While these scholars do not ignore the contradiction between 
democratic rhetoric and anti-democratic foreign policy behaviour, they characterise such 
                                                 
4
 See Smith p40-49; 84-111; 146-176; 214-236; and 266-307. 
5
Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny, (Washington DC: American 
Enterprise Institute, 1991), 221. 
6
 See G. John Ikenberry, “America‟s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War 
Era,” in American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John 
Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 103.  
7
 Ikenberry, 104. 
8
 Smith devotes a chapter to the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations, and does discuss the overthrow of 
democratic or democratizing governments in Iran, Guatemala and Chile. He also discusses Johnson‟s 
intervention against the Constitutionalist pro-Bosch uprising in the Dominican Republic. However, these facts 
are placed within a general framework which is focussed on the linkage he perceives between national security 
and democracy promotion and do not affect the general thrust of his argument. See Smith, 178-213 and 228-
232. 
9
 Henry Nau, “America's Identity, Democracy Promotion and National Interests: Beyond Realism, Beyond 
Idealism” in American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John 
Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 143. 
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actions as unfortunate deviations from an overarching policy framework based on the 
promotion of democracy rather than enquiring more deeply into the connection between 
democracy and national security. 
 In contrast to the democracy-focussed narrative outlined above, academics working 
within a Leftist/Progressive or Conservative/Realist framework argue that democracy 
promotion has not had a significant impact on US foreign policy practice except at the 
rhetorical level. The use of democratic rhetoric by policy-makers is seen as a way to 
legitimate the pursuit of goals unconnected with democracy overseas or even antithetical to it. 
The use of this rhetorical tool is of key importance as “[f]or a democracy like the United 
States, naked power alone – even if it represents the national interest – will not suffice to 
mobilize domestic forces and resources”.10 The use of such rhetoric acts as a smokescreen 
which cloaks US objectives in an acceptable rhetorical guise, both domestically and on the 
international stage, as an element of US “soft power”. However, in reality democracy has 
been subordinated to other foreign policy considerations. William Appleman Williams, 
Gabriel Kolko and Noam Chomsky argue that US foreign policy has been largely driven by 
the need to secure foreign markets, investment opportunities and supplies of raw materials, 
not democracy;
11
 Kolko comments that ideological declarations “were all too often scarcely 
more than public-relations exercises.
12
 David Ryan and David Schmitz broaden this 
economic argument to include other factors such as security. Ryan argues that democracy has 
often been secondary to other US interests such as stability, order and the exercise of 
                                                 
10
 Amos Perlmutter, Making the World Safe for Democracy: a Century of Wilsonianism and its Totalitarian 
Challengers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 8. 
11
 Williams claims that “the philosophy and practice of…imperialism….became the central feature of American 
foreign policy in the twentieth century”. See William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
(New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959), 59. Economic motivations also form the framework of 
Gabriel Kolko, The US Confronts the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1988). Noam Chomsky states that “the factors that have typically driven policy in the postwar 
period are the need to impose or maintain a global system that will serve state power.” See Noam Chomsky, 
Deterring Democracy (London: Verso, 1991), 2. 
12
 Kolko, 12. 
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hegemony,
13
 while Schmitz contends that US rhetoric on democracy and human rights has 
been belied by support of authoritarian regimes as a more expedient method of containing 
Marxist forces, ensuring that key countries pursued a pro-US foreign policy and creating a 
supportive environment for US business interests abroad.
14
 Stephen Kinzer goes further; 
noting that during the Cold War the US actively opposed foreign democrats who did not 
serve US interests, overthrowing democratic or constitutional governments in Iran, 
Guatemala and Chile.
15
 Thus, as the realist and conservative Amos Perlmutter argues, “the 
Wilsonian legacy of democracy and self-determination…is rooted more in philosophy than in 
action”.16  
 An important factor preventing a clear analysis of the role of democracy in US foreign 
policy is the tendency of both of these groups of scholars to focus narrowly on the cases 
which support their theoretical frameworks. The fact that many of the works which champion 
a connection between democracy promotion and national security were aimed at prescribing 
future policy in these terms by providing retrospective justification for such a framework in 
terms of past practice has often led scholars such as Smith and Muravchik to highlight those 
cases in which they believed democracy and US national security had reinforced each other 
in the past, while minimising discussion of counter-examples. Similarly, works by scholars 
such as Williams, Kolko and Chomsky tend to minimise discussion of those cases in which 
the US has promoted democracy, or to treat democracy promotion as a rationale for policy 
rather than an element of it.  
                                                 
13
 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2000), 53 
14
 David F. Schimitz, Thank God They’re On Our Side: The United States & Right-wing Dictatorships 1921-
1965 (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 3-5.See also David F. Schmitz, 
The United States and Right-wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
15
 See Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: 
Times Books, 2006); chapters 5, 6 and 8 for information on the US role in the coups in these countries and 196 
for Kinzer‟s point on democracy and dictatorship. 
16
Perlmutter, 134. 
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This problem can be approached from a different perspective by examining how the 
promotion of democracy was conceived within the US government and the wider foreign 
policy elite at the strategic level, rather than at the level of cases or specific regions. As 
democracy promotion has never occupied the position of a dominant and over-riding 
imperative in US foreign policy, a complete analysis of the role of democracy in US foreign 
policy would need to consider how it was meshed with other US goals such as national 
security in order to produce a coherent strategic approach. Decisions at this strategic level 
inevitably affect the choice of tactics to implement new strategies, which further translate into 
decisions on what organisational forms are the most effective tools to implement these 
approaches.  
These strategic, tactical and organisational decisions do not emerge from a neutral and 
objective process of decision-making. Instead, they are affected and modified by struggles 
over the goals and control of the implementation of democratisation policies at two levels: 
bureaucratic struggle within the US government between departments with differing strategic 
and tactical objectives; and the tensions between Executive agencies and US private groups 
interested in the pursuit of democratisation overseas concerning the level of autonomy such 
groups should be given. These dimensions of decision-making will also need to be 
considered. Finally, such an analysis will need to examine how these factions conceived of 
and implemented political reform overseas in relation to US national security objectives in 
order to examine whether the pursuit of these other objectives imposed significant limitations 
on the geographical targeting, form and depth of reform. 
The Origins of Democracy Promotion as a research area 
The debates over democracy promotion which occurred in the early 80s constitute a case 
study which can be used to examine the conception and operationalisation of democracy as 
6 
 
an element of national security strategy. The concept of democracy promotion differed from 
previous attempts to intervene in the politics of foreign countries and shape the development 
of foreign nations carried out through previous methods such as covert CIA operations, 
policies of nation-building informed by Modernisation theory and the campaign for Human 
Rights. Support for foreign groups given by the CIA had focussed on strengthening and co-
opting foreign civil society groups to wage an ideological battle against Communism. 
Policies of Modernisation had aimed to create modern and anti-communist nation-states in 
the rapidly-decolonizing Third World through a wide range of measures which aimed at 
socioeconomic transformations as pre-conditions to democratic reform. The Human Rights 
campaign had been based on a diffuse concept of reform which included social and economic 
rights and civil liberties and had been most commonly operationalised in the form of attempts 
to pressure sitting governments to scale back their most repressive practices. In contrast to 
these previous tactics and paradigms, democracy promotion was focussed on the creation of 
democratic systems overseas through an attempt to effect narrowly political change through 
the support of political groups overseas. These former policies had also often been concerned 
with the place of democracy in the US approach towards a particular case or region, and had 
often been imperfectly co-ordinated with other national security interests. In contrast, the 
debates over democracy promotion represented a unique moment of reassessment of the 
relationship between democracy promotion and US national security at the strategic level.  
The need for such a reassessment was spurred by two trends which had developed 
over the 1970s: the appearance of a more threatening strategic environment for the US due to 
the rising power of the Soviet Union and the wave of Third World revolutions which had 
occurred during and after the Vietnam War; and a lack of consensus within the US foreign 
policy-making elite over how to confront this due to a shattering of the ideological consensus 
which had previously legitimated an activist foreign policy as the defence of democracy. 
7 
 
These trends culminated in importance during the early Reagan administration, which found 
its attempts to legitimate its activist national security strategy as the projection of democracy 
versus communism hampered by internal divisions and domestic criticism from other factions 
of the elite over how democracy related to US interests in specific cases.  
It was the generation of the new vision of democracy promotion by a network of US 
private groups and individuals which made a resolution of these tensions possible.  Rather 
than taking a case-by-case approach, this network presented the administration with the 
element which it lacked - a strategic framework which could subsume and integrate these 
problematic cases into a much wider vision which meshed democracy promotion and national 
security at the strategic level. The process of debate and negotiation which followed 
constituted the first serious attempt by US policy-makers and private groups and to take a 
strategic approach to the promotion of democracy in the interests of national security. This 
process also resulted in the deployment of new tactical approaches to democracy promotion 
and a new organisational dynamic between the state and private groups interested in political 
intervention overseas, which was institutionalised in an organisation focussed on the 
promotion of democracy overseas as its primary mission: the National Endowment for 
Democracy.
17
 Although this formative period has been largely neglected by scholars 
examining US democracy promotion in favour of concentration on the Endowment‟s actions 
after its creation in 1983,
18
 it is an important case study for the examination of the 
                                                 
17
 The NED is no longer the only institution which pursues democracy promotion. The post-Cold War 
administration of Bill Clinton saw the institutionalization of democracy promotion beyond the Endowment, as 
USAID took on democracy promotion as part of its mission and further bureaucratic structures were created in 
the State Department and Department of Defense to push the strategy forward. See William I. Robinson, 
Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 100. The George W. Bush administration administration created further democracy promotion programs, 
such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative. For discussion of MEPI see Katerina Dalacoura, “US Democracy 
Promotion in the Arab Middle East Since 11 September 2001: A Critique”   International Affairs 85, no. 1 
(2005):964-66. However, as noted, it remains the only single institution devoted to democracy promotion as its 
core mission. However, the NED is still the only organisation which undertakes the most controversial task of 
providing direct support to political parties and groups such as trade unions. 
18
 These analyses, much like the debate over the relationship between democracy and other interests in US 
foreign policy in general, has been polarised between those who see the NED and post-83 US democracy 
8 
 
relationship between democracy and national security in US foreign policy which allows 
examination of the strategic, tactical and bureaucratic/organisational dimensions of the 
problem. 
The role of private forces in this process also presents an opportunity to expand the 
enquiry and to engage with scholarship connected to the “state-private network” and the role 
of elites in US foreign policy formation. The “state-private network” refers to the joint 
prosecution of political operations overseas by the US government and private groups, in 
which the government provides funding and overall direction, while the private groups 
supply the credibility and plausible deniability necessary to engage with groups overseas who 
would be unlikely to engage directly with the US state. This concept is applicable to the 
NED, which is legally controlled by private forces but which receives funding from the US 
government. However, the bulk of the academic studies on the “state-private network” have 
concentrated on the series of ad hoc covert alliances the CIA developed with US civil society 
groups to wage anti-communist propaganda operations in Western Europe and the Third 
World from the late 1940s to 1967.
19
 These studies usually terminate in 1967, often 
                                                                                                                                                        
promotion policies as engines of democratisation and those who see them as aimed at ensuring US national 
power and national security. For an assessment that is critical over organisational issues but broadly supportive 
of the NED and the concept behind it, see Thomas Carothers, “The NED at 10,” Foreign Policy 95 (1994). The 
democracy promotion operations of the NED and the US state in the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua and Haiti in 
the late 80s and early 90s were critically examined by William Robinson as an element in what the author sees 
as a wider strategic shift towards the promotion of democracy by the US in William I. Robinson, Promoting 
Polyarchy: Globalization, US intervention and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
Critical analyses of US democracy promotion in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union such as Gerald 
Sussman (2010), Branding Democracy: US Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2010) and Michael J. Barker, “Taking the risk out of civil society: harnessing social movements and 
regulating revolutions” (refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, 
University of Newcastle, 2006). 
19A sizeable body of academic literature on these covert relationships now exists on this early Cold War “state-
private network” which has progressed from merely chronicling its existence to theorising on the relationships 
of control, autonomy and ideological convergence/divergence between the state and private groups which 
characterised it. See Frank Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: US foreign policy and cultural relations, 1938-
1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)  for information on how the state and private cultural 
groups converged into an overt and covert network over the course of World War Two and the early Cold War; 
Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge Mass & London: Harvard 
University Press, 2008) for a history of the CIA‟s covert network from its inception to collapse; Scott Lucas, 
Freedom’s War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union 1945-56 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999) for state-private co-operation in the early Cold War; Anthony Carew, “The American Labor Movement in 
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conceptualised as the end-point of the “state-private network” due to its public exposure and 
the subsequent proscription of such covert relationships by the Johnson administration. Study 
of the NED from a “state-private network” perspective would extend this field 
chronologically, while also allowing examination of state-private relationships which go 
beyond the previous “state-private network”‟s narrowly conceived mission of opposing the 
ideological spread of communism to focus on state-private interaction in the broader mission 
of promoting the creation of democratic political structures overseas, a goal more deeply 
rooted in US political culture.  
However, the largest difference between the two networks is that, whereas in the 
1950s and 60s groups were recruited on an ad hoc basis by the CIA to carry out strategic and 
tactical decisions already decided upon by officials, during the late 70s and early 80s the 
private forces participated in the process of shaping the strategy and network they were to 
participate in. This opens up a second, wider question: whether a faction of the US elite set 
the agenda for democracy promotion, triumphing over the Reagan administration‟s concept 
of a political/propaganda campaign based around a narrow anti-Sovietism.
20
 Such a 
perspective would be in keeping with elite theories of how power is exercised in the US, 
which postulate that the strategic, long-term options for US foreign policy are set by an elite-
dominated network of foundations, policy discussion groups, think tanks and corporate 
institutions, leaving the “proximate policy-makers” in a particular administration to make 
purely tactical choices on how they will be implemented.
21
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Fizzland: The Free Trade Union Committee and the CIA” Labor History 39, no. 1 (1998)  for the role of labour 
unions; and the articles in The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: the State-Private Network, 
ed. Helen Laville & Hugh Wilford (London: Routledge, 2006). 
20
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 76-78 
21
 See Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie 
Foundations in the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 4-6, 65-96, 221-255 
and 256-7 for information on the influence of elite-dominated foundations on setting the direction of US foreign 
policy in the 30s, 40s and post-Cold War World; see Thomas R. Dye, “ Oligarchic Tendencies in National 
Policy-Making: the Role of the Private Policy-Planning Organizations”  The Journal of Politics 40, no:2 (1978): 
10 
 
Finally, an examination of the NED‟s origins presents an opportunity to engage with 
the academic debate over whether the political reform the US promotes overseas has been 
limited by competing US interests. A number of scholars have argued that US democracy 
promotion has resulted in “low intensity democracies” in which effective power is exercised 
by elites and socioeconomic reforms, such as land reform, are not pursued. However, they 
differ over whether this is a deliberate strategy rooted in the subordination of democracy to 
other US interests or whether it represents an unreflective export of US models of 
democracy.
22
 The present study examines this question by investigating what form the 
architects of democracy promotion in the 1980s expected political reform overseas to take 
and how far they believed it could be prosecuted in conformity with US national interests.  
Plan of the thesis 
The outcome of the debates did not result in a clear victory for any contending faction, as the 
Reagan administration and the private forces associated with the push for a strategic approach 
to democracy promotion were unable to generate a unified and coherent blueprint which 
reconciled competing strategic and ideological perspectives. Instead, the process produced a 
hybrid solution in which liberal political methods and structures were to be promoted to 
reform problematic regimes, consonant with US national security interests, on a tactical case-
by-case basis through an organisation linked to the US government but not controlled by it on 
a day-to-day basis. This line of argument is pursued through the chapters that follow.  
                                                                                                                                                        
311-312 and 328-330 for the differing roles of elite-dominated private policy organisations and governmental 
proximate policy-makers in the policy-making process; and G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? A 
View for the 80s (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 84-115 and 143-5 for the role of elite organisations in 
policy-making. 
22
 The first position is argued in Barry Gills & Joel Rocamora, “Low Intensity Democracy”, Third World 
Quarterly 13:3 (1992): 501-523; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 4-6; and Steve Smith, “Democracy 
Promotion: Critical Questions”, in American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts, ed. 
Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry & Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 73-75. The 
second is argued in Jason G. Ralph, “„High Stakes‟ and „Low‐Intensity Democracy‟: Understanding America's 
Policy of Promoting Democracy,” in Cox, Ikenberry & Inoguchi, 213-215. 
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Chapter One examines the origins of democracy promotion during the 1970s as a 
privately-generated response to the crisis of US power triggered by the rise of a more 
threatening international situation linked to a perceived rise in the political-military power of 
Soviet Communism and the erosion of the domestic legitimacy of US political intervention 
overseas. In a period in which the US state apparatus seemed to be unable to generate a 
legitimate and effective foreign policy which reconciled interests and ideals, private sector 
academics and political organisers generated a concept of “democracy promotion” to be 
implemented by US private groups in the Third World to resolve some of these problems.  
 Chapters Two and Three examine the foreign policy of the early Reagan 
administration and private attempts to lobby the administration to accept differing narrow or 
more expansive blueprints for democracy promotion in its first year. It argues that democratic 
ideology was deployed by the administration early on as a tool of legitimation and as an 
ideological weapon to achieve a number of short term goals grounded in US national security 
rather than as an element in an integrated strategy. However, the administration chose at this 
stage to limit democracy promotion to specific cases and regions rather than to embark on a 
wider campaign. 
 Chapters Four, Five and Six consider the strategic, bureaucratic and ideological 
pressures which affected the efforts of the administration to create an overt democracy 
promotion organisation capable of mobilising private groups in the national interest. This 
debate emerged from its previous narrow focus on specific cases to take on a global 
dimension in early 1982. The strategic dimension of this debate concerned whether to pursue 
a universal campaign of democracy promotion aimed at friendly and hostile dictatorships, or 
whether to deploy democracy promotion in a limited campaign against Soviet Communism. 
However, the difficulties involved in solving tactical problems and in creating an 
organisation which could mobilise private forces subsumed the strategic debates and meant 
12 
 
that these remained unresolved. Increasing pressure on the administration, due to resistance 
from Congress, meant that the National Endowment for Democracy emerged as the ad hoc 
vehicle for the campaign. This jerry-built solution was presented as a fulfilment of America‟s 
mission to promote democracy and thus was able to engineer the consensus necessary for the 
creation of a new, overt state-private network aimed at political operations overseas. 
Nevertheless, the organisation suffered from strategic and tactical incoherence and an unclear 
relationship with the Executive. 
 Chapter Seven examines the resolution of this process, as the final details of NED‟s 
approach and relations with the government were settled on an ad hoc basis during its first 
few years of operation. It argues that while continuing Congressional pressure solidified the 
Endowment‟s commitment to support forces which were pro-democratic rather than merely 
anti-communist, the NED‟s ties to the administration meant that the Endowment was unlikely 
to prioritise democracy promotion in cases where this could undermine US interests. Rather 
than following a grand strategic design the Endowment intervened on a case-by-case basis in 
key states where US national security goals could be achieved through democracy promotion. 
The Endowment‟s interventions supported democratic groups friendly to the US while 
limiting the extent of political reform by blocking more radical change incompatible with US 
interests. While democratic ideology served to ease and rationalise state-private co-operation, 
national security was the key driver of these operations. 
Conclusions 
The concept of democracy promotion which emerged from the debates of the 1980s 
generated a new consensus which legitimated US intervention in foreign political processes 
and eased the co-operation of state and private forces in such operations. However, the 
process was a disjointed and incoherent one that was not guided by a clear strategic concept. 
13 
 
The high degree of negotiation and renegotiation involved in the process of generating the 
NED casts doubt on the theory that US foreign policy in general, and democracy promotion 
in particular, has been designed by a single and unified elite. Instead, the process represented 
a struggle between differing elites and factions, some of whom prioritised democratic change, 
some a narrow ideological anti-Sovietism, some the US national security interest in pre-
empting radical change in Third World states. The concept of democracy promotion acted as 
a rallying factor for these different factions; an idea which was deeply rooted in US political 
culture and thus acceptable to all, but sufficiently fuzzy to allow different groups to see it as a 
method for securing their interests.  
While the concept of democracy promotion successfully subsumed these differing 
perspectives and interests and eased co-operation between factions within the administration 
and private groups, it also blocked resolution of the strategic debates, with the result that 
there was no clear victor in the process. The final outcome of these debates was not a 
strategic approach which finally resolved the tensions in US foreign policy between the 
promotion of democracy and other US interests, but the creation of a new structure which 
could promote political reform on a tactical basis when it was seen to be useful for the pursuit 
of pre-existing security interests.  
The failure of this attempt to take a strategic approach to democracy promotion 
indicates that the relationship between democracy and national security in US foreign policy 
is one which requires constant negotiation and renegotiation depending on the strength of 
various factions within the US government and the wider foreign policy elite, the perception 
of US interests by policy-makers and the external political-military balance of forces. 
Theoretical approaches which posit a resolution of the tension between democracy and 
national security, either in favour of a focus on democracy promotion or on US national 
14 
 
security interests legitimated by democratic rhetoric, thus do not capture the continuing clash 
between these imperatives which has continued to affect and shape US foreign policy.  
The fundamental problem which animates this continuing tension is that while the US 
gains a measure of strategic and ideological power from its invocation of democracy and its 
pursuit of some types of political reform in some states, it cannot be certain that democratic 
change will always be consistent with concrete US national security interests. The persistence 
of both the US‟ rhetorical commitment to democracy and its concrete goals of ensuring its 
national security and economic advantage, which often require undemocratic behaviour or 
accommodation with undemocratic regimes, means that this tension cannot be resolved and 
thus continues to recur in US foreign policy.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: FROM COVERT OPERATIONS 
AND MODERNISATION TO PARTY-BUILDING 
The blueprint for democracy promotion emerged during the 1970s from a small number of 
academics and political organisers outside the US national security bureaucracy. The idea 
drew on previous modes of political intervention such as the state-private network and 
modernising reforms but tied these tools to a more strategic approach to the spread of 
democracy. 
 The opportunity to design and promote this new conception was created by the 
collapse of these previous modes of political intervention in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Before this crisis the state-private network and Modernisation policies had been deployed 
within an overarching framework of containment which meshed US national security and 
democratic ideology. However, the frequent clash between the expansion of democracy and 
US interests culminated in a rupture between the state and the private civil society groups 
which were allied to it and a downgrading of Modernisation as a US policy aim.  
 This rupture cleared the ground for the conception of democracy promotion, allowing 
private figures unconnected with the previous network to reformulate elements of the 
Modernisation paradigm and the state-private network. The failure of the administrations of 
the 1970s to regenerate an effective US capability for the reform of political structures 
overseas, coupled with a rise in political instability in the Third World, opened up a window 
of opportunity for these private figures to develop different organisational and strategic 
elements of the new concept. In contrast to the pre-1967 situation, when private groups had 
been deployed on a tactical, case-by-case basis within a strategic framework generated by the 
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national security bureaucracy, however, the rising network generated its own strategic 
framework which deployed these reformulated organisational and tactical concepts as 
elements of a program of democratisation which was far wider and more coherent than 
previously implemented by the US government. By 1980 these figures had coalesced into a 
loose network which was preparing to lobby the US government for funding to implement 
their ideas.  
Pre-existing tensions between democracy and national security in US foreign policy 
The decline of containment and the instruments and strategies associated with its 
implementation opened up space from 1967 onwards for new paradigms of US foreign policy, 
including democracy promotion, to rise in importance. The core of the strategy was the 
prevention of political change which might increase the power of the USSR or harm US 
security and economic interests in other ways. Geopolitically containment, as it evolved, had 
to face three problems: the rise of Soviet power; the weakness of Western Europe in the face 
of this power; and, particularly after the initial phase of the Cold War in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, the power vacuum in the Third World which appeared due to the decline of the 
European colonial empires. This final development brought greater instability in the Third 
World and increased the threat that independent nationalist leaders would pursue foreign and 
domestic policies not compatible with US interests.
1
   
Containment‟s strength as a framework for US foreign policy was its construction and 
explanation of this geopolitical and anti-communist strategy as a defence of freedom against a 
totalitarian slave state.
2
 This public explanation of the doctrine eased its acceptance by the 
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wider foreign policy elite and US civil society by tapping into long-standing traditions of US 
nationalism which conflated the fate and power of the United States with the fate and 
expansion of democracy, as both a political doctrine and a form of government, and saw the 
US as the “the project of mankind”.3 Democratic ideology thus consolidated containment as a 
framework for perceiving US foreign policy practice and goals by “translating its objectives 
into an understandable and compelling reflection of the domestic society‟s dominant norms.”4 
The equation of US national security with the defence and spread of democracy was not 
cynically deployed by US officials and national security bureaucrats to legitimate a policy 
shaped wholly by realist security and economic concerns, however. Rather, the US‟ pre-
existing liberal democratic ideology functioned as a filter through which policy-makers 
perceived the threat from the USSR in terms of ideology as well as security.
5
 Thus, ideology 
and security concerns fused in the construction of the containment framework.
6
   
The practical result of this fusion was the construction of a liberal foreign policy elite 
which supported a US foreign policy it saw as aimed at safeguarding both US national 
security and freedom. This elite consensus extended into US civil society and included the 
leaders and members of US civil society groups which co-operated with the CIA to project 
                                                                                                                                                        
Security, Federation of American Scientists, 14
th
 April 1950, accessed 27
th
 May 2013, 
https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm .  
3
 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2000), 28. 
4
Richard Melanson, American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: the Search for Consensus from Nixon to 
Clinton (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 32.  
5
 Hunt comments that “Ideology defined for the advocates of containment the issue at stake: survival of freedom 
around the world. That ideology also defined the chief threat to freedom: Soviet communism”.  See Michael H. 
Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 153. See Adam 
Quinn, US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2010), 114-139, and especially 119-136 for the influence of policy-makers‟ ideological 
conceptions on the formation of containment as a national security framework. Dueck also discusses the 
ideological assumptions which partially formed US policy-makers‟ conception of the Cold War and the 
influence of ideological factors on the decision to choose a national security strategy of containment rather than a 
spheres-of-influence approach towards the USSR. See Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and 
Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 89-90 and 98-100.  
6
 This conception of the role of ideology in containment is indebted to the ideas advanced in Douglas J. 
Macdonald, “Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis” in Reviewing the 
Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory ed. Odd Arne Westad, 180-207 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 
particularly 185-6. 
18 
 
democratic ideology and the academics who advised US policy-makers on designs for 
political reform in the Third World. However, while democracy may have meshed with 
national security concerns at the ideological level, support for or construction of democracy 
did not serve the national security goal of containment consistently in pragmatic terms. US 
policy-makers were forced to recognise early in the Cold War that while it was possible to 
broadcast propaganda into the Soviet bloc, little could be done in practical terms to “liberate” 
it due to the strong political control exercised by the governments of the USSR and its Eastern 
European satellites.
7
 In the Third World, democratic processes did not always produce leaders 
who were willing to de-emphasis the interests of their own countries and populations in 
favour of US national interests.
8
 This meant that the application of democracy to national 
security policy produced tensions at the strategic level which were then replicated at the 
organisational and tactical levels in the projection of democratic ideology by the state-private 
network, and in the US attitude to democratising reforms in Third World dictatorships. 
The tension between democracy and national security at the organisational level 
occurred in attempts to project democratic ideology through US civil society groups funded 
and managed by the CIA: the state-private network. This network consisted of civil society 
groups such as anti-Soviet committees and radio stations staffed by Eastern European 
émigrés, intellectuals, women‟s groups, African-American groups, students and trade unions9  
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receiving “covert guidance and ...assistance from the Government”10, usually the CIA. These 
groups were involved in distributing anti-Soviet propaganda and in political training and the 
education of their counterparts in other countries
11
. This was a tactical alliance in which 
private groups lacking a clear strategic plan which transcended a commitment to democratic 
ideology or the needs of their particular section of civil society deployed their political skills 
within a strategic framework created by the state. State agencies thus acted as a co-ordinating 
hub for a constellation of private groups who did not function as members of a wider network 
independent of these agencies and did not possess a clear strategic framework of their own. 
This network was used in Western Europe to contain the political influence of Communist 
forces in Western Europe and to solidify European commitment to the NATO alliance by 
promoting a common Western democratic ideology. In the Soviet bloc, the network‟s 
projection of democratic ideology was aimed at complicating the Soviets‟ control of Eastern 
Europe and their own population. During the later 1950s and 60s the network expanded its 
operations to include key countries and areas in the Third World.  
The role of the state in the network gave rise to ideological and organisational 
tensions, however. The state sought to use the democratic nature of the groups to present 
freedom as an attractive alternative to totalitarianism through providing examples of 
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democracy in action.
12
  Within the network, democratic ideology also performed an important 
function in rationalizing and easing the convergence between private idealists and national 
security managers in the bureaucracy; thus, the conflation of democracy and US national 
security at the strategic level was replicated at the organisational level and created the 
consensus which bound the state and private forces together. However, the covert role of state 
organisations as co-ordinators was not congruent with the democratic ideology which held it 
together.  
This meshing of state organisations and civil society groups also produced an 
organisational tension. The private façade of the groups was the key to their operational 
effectiveness overseas. Their actions were “plausibly deniable” and could be disclaimed by 
the US government due to their covert funding, while the groups also possessed more 
credibility than the US government with their counterparts abroad, who were more likely to 
co-operate with an American representative of their own civil society group than a US 
government official. However, a measure of state guidance was necessary to ensure that the 
groups‟ actions were consistent with the US‟ anti-communist foreign policy and constituted a 
coherent part of this wider strategy.
13
  Without such a guidance function, the effort ran the 
risk of degenerating into a dispersed and incoherent series of private programs led by private 
interests or democratic ideology rather than more narrow state goals, or of proceeding beyond 
national security policy due to ideological fervour.
14
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This fear created an autonomy/control dilemma for the state: a measure of government 
control was necessary to manage clashes between ideology, sectional interest and national 
security policy; however, too much obvious government control of these groups would call 
into question their status as private entities, thus destroying their usefulness to the state. This 
tension was never fully resolved while the state-private network existed. The state was forced 
to rely on “long strings of control” that did not risk compromising its private allies such as co-
opting group officials, infiltrating its own agents into the groups and maintaining control of 
funding by dispensing it in small amounts or tying it directly to specific projects and 
demanding audits and accounts.
15
  
These tactics did not aim at controlling all the actions of a particular private group; 
rather, it produced a “ringed autonomy”16 in which group personnel were free to act within 
certain defined limits but pushing this autonomy to the point where it conflicted with US 
national security interests could lead to consequences such as withdrawal of funding.
17
 While 
this control function was not obvious to casual observers, the private groups resented the 
limits put on their freedom of action and often clashed with covert action managers over 
strategy and tactics.
18
 The clash between democratic ideology and more particular national 
security goals present in US foreign policy at the strategic level was thus replicated in the 
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state‟s efforts to guard against rogue private actions which may have been consistent 
ideologically but inconsistent or harmful strategically. 
Although the tensions inherent in the deployment of private civil society groups to 
project democratic ideology within the context of a national security were formidable, a set of 
more potentially damaging tensions between democracy and geopolitics were present in the 
Third World as decolonisation opened up a new arena of US-Soviet competition composed of 
new states with weak political structures. Decolonisation triggered growing demands for 
social, economic and political participation throughout the Third World
19
 which the US saw 
as being at risk of capture not merely from communists but also nationalists and populists.
20
 
These conditions led to successive waves of revolutions spearheaded by radical and 
nationalist forces allied to the Soviet Union which challenged the US and its allies.
21
 
Successful revolutions could lead to changes in the Cold War balance of power, as the 
defection of a Third World country which was important strategically due to its location or 
resources could materially damage US national security. This situation led to a mismatch 
between a containment policy focussed on preventing change hostile to US interests and the 
democratic ideological basis of the policy, as it was unclear whether support of democratic 
political change or democratic regimes in the Third World would produce governments 
aligned to the United States.  
These realities faced US policy-makers with two decisions. The first was whether 
support of Third World anti-communist dictators in order to block Soviet or radical influence 
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or the promotion of a degree of political reform in pro-US states in order to undercut demands 
for more radical change was most likely to guard US security interests more effectively. In 
situations where the US decided to follow the path of political reform, policy-makers also had 
to decide how far such reforms could be pursued before they began to undermine the security 
and economic interests they sought to protect by destabilising friendly states or open paths to 
power for more radical elements. This was not merely a matter of making a choice between 
basing policy primarily on ideology or national security; instead, the question was whether 
constructing democratic systems would assist the US in strategic terms by containing 
revolutionary forces. 
The US made no definite decision on these questions before 1967 and was not able to 
produce an overarching policy framework towards the Third World which reconciled national 
security objectives and ideology definitively at the strategic level. Instead, it oscillated 
between support for dictators and support for reform, employing different tools and tactics in 
different regions and in different periods on a case-by-case basis. A policy of relying on 
friendly authoritarians to guard US strategic and economic interests by blocking political 
change calmed policy-makers‟ fears that “whenever a dictator was replaced, communists 
gained.”22 The contradiction this created with the ideological justification for containment 
was elided through the argument that by supporting authoritarians in order to keep 
totalitarians from seizing power, the US was defending the space in which liberty might 
develop in the future.
23
 However, these governments tended to lack legitimacy, which made 
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their long-term stability doubtful. Support for dictatorships thus tended to open up a long-term 
strategic vulnerability, as when such regimes collapsed they were often replaced by 
revolutionary forces hostile to the US. President Kennedy articulated this link in 1963, 
commenting that “Dictatorships are the seedbed from which communism ultimately springs 
up.”24 
The alternative policy of fostering Modernisation was based on the idea that gradual 
reform could bring developing countries into a state of political, social and economic 
modernity without triggering major upheavals which would disturb the geopolitical balance of 
power and provide an alternative to radical revolutions.
25
 The end-point of a democratic 
society specified in models of Modernisation was also congruent with the desire of policy-
makers to demonstrate to Third World populations that “man‟s unsatisfied aspiration for 
economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a 
framework of democratic institutions”,26 and thus represented an attempt to align geopolitical 
and ideological frameworks. This policy of reform was never deployed consistently as a 
coherent framework for US policy towards the Third World. However, it was deployed in 
countries and areas where there was thought to be a high risk of successful radical revolution, 
such as Latin America after Castro‟s seizure of power in Cuba. This approach derived from 
Modernisation theory, which held that by emulating the stages of development followed by 
the US and Western Europe, Third World states could transform themselves into modern, 
democratic societies. These stages were set out by Walt Rostow, an influential development 
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theorist and adviser to President Kennedy, as; traditional society, the preconditions for take-
off, take-off, the drive to maturity and the age of high mass consumption.
27
  
This drive to Modernisation envisaged far-reaching social and economic 
transformations which could not be achieved through a state-private network model of 
political intervention based on projecting democratic ideology and strengthening pro-US civil 
society groups within the target country, although such programs were also mounted in the 
Third World in this period, several of them as an adjunct to Modernisation projects.
28
 Instead, 
the required transformation would be implemented through deploying US foreign aid and the 
services of US technocrats to implement socioeconomic reforms, such as land reform, tax 
reform, the strengthening of institutions and advanced technical training,
29
 which would, in 
turn, lead to the emergence of a strong middle class who would inevitably press for US-style 
democracy.
30
 .  
The process of establishing such democratic regimes in the areas targeted proved to be 
problematic, however, due to both the paradigm of reform the US followed and clashes with 
short-term national security considerations. The channelling of many elements of reform 
programs through existing political and social structures meant that their implementation 
often depended on the co-operation of indigenous ruling elites, who feared dilution of their 
power through large-scale socioeconomic transformations and thus resisted them.
31
 The US 
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focus on structures also neglected the role of agency in the middle class-led political 
transformations the US hoped would result. The lack of an integrated effort to strengthen the 
political forces the US wished to place in power in existing dictatorships meant that the 
reform processes and the accompanying short-term destabilisation which accompanied 
Modernisation could result in the rise of more independent-minded and radical reformers who 
did not share the US agenda for their societies. Thus, while the end-point of Modernisation 
was more consonant with the wider ideological framework for US foreign policy, in the short-
term its pursuit created tensions with geopolitical aims. This tension was often resolved 
through a return to support for authoritarian governments as a barrier against further 
radicalism.
32
 There were 16 coups in Latin America during the US‟ modernising effort in the 
1960s, while Latin American economies grew at only 2%.
33
 
From the state-private network and Modernisation to private democratisation 
Before 1967 the imperfect co-ordination of democratic ideology and US national security 
goals within containment, both at the strategic level and at the operational level, had been 
underpinned by an ideological and strategic consensus among the foreign policy elite which 
accepted the equation of US national security strategy with the defence of freedom from 
Communist totalitarianism. This consensus failed to hold from 1967 onwards due to rising 
disillusionment with political intervention overseas. The flash point for rising criticism of US 
foreign policy was the conduct of the Vietnam War, which exposed the tensions inherent in a 
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Cold War strategy waged in the name of democracy.
34
 Concerns were not limited to Vietnam 
but also included other factors such as US policy in Latin America and the actions of the CIA. 
However, the war acted as a focal point for these disparate concerns. The resulting lack of 
consensus within the elite, both in governmental institutions and in civil society, translated 
into damage to the two key tools of political intervention and reform: the state-private 
network and modernising reforms. This process opened up a tactical and organisational gap in 
US national security policy which could be filled by other paradigms and actors. 
The exposure of supposedly private groups projecting democracy as recipients of CIA 
funding by Ramparts magazine in 1967 brought the organisational contradiction between the 
projection of democratic ideology and the state‟s need to manipulate and direct these impulses 
in the service of defined national security goals into the open. This exposure resulted in the 
destruction of large parts of the network due to Johnson‟s subsequent ban on covert funding 
for US civil society groups.
35
 In reality the civil society groups and the US government had 
been drawing apart ideologically due to the impact of Vietnam before the exposure of the 
network; more liberal members of the network had engaged in criticism of war
 
and the 
leadership of the National Students‟ Association, a key organisation in the network, had been 
quietly working to sever its CIA connection and locate alternative sources of funding.
36
 This 
rift paralleled splits within the foreign policy establishment, as hawks and doves divided over 
military escalation in Vietnam after 1965.
37
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The exposure itself was also a product of the loss of consensus produced by the war, 
as Ramparts magazine in its contemporary form was a product of the anti-war mood,
38
 and it 
is unlikely that the story would have had such an impact if the wider consensus had still been 
effective.
39
 Structurally, this loss of cohesion produced a political climate in which the state-
private network, which depended on the existence of a cohesive civil society bound by anti-
communist ideology and a cohesive elite in the state willing to fund it,
40
 could not have 
continued in its current form. However, the problem was deeper than a short-term lack of 
cohesion between elites.  The outcome was a product of the inherent fragility of the covert 
“state-private network” structure, because Americans did not see covert government subsidies 
to private groups engaged in promoting democratic ideology as legitimate. As Ninkovich 
points out, “there was a huge gap between the needed propaganda instrumentality and the 
possibility of its social acceptance.”41Thus, the structure collapsed when it was revealed to the 
public.  
The 1967 scandal left an organisational gap in the US state‟s capacity to project 
democratic ideology which the Executive attempted to correct initially by resurrecting a state-
private network system devoted to the ideological projection of democracy in an overt form 
less vulnerable to the type of shock which had damaged the previous set of relationships.  The 
chief of the CIA‟s International Organisations Division, Cord Meyer, who was the highest-
ranking government official with direct responsibility for the state-private network, suggested 
the creation of an overt endowment to replace the CIA
42
 several months before the scandal 
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broke. A similar suggestion was made several days after the story broke by Assistant 
Secretary of State for Cultural and Educational Affairs Charles Frankel, who argued that 
placing the responsibility for such programs under a semi-autonomous foundation governed 
by a Board of prominent citizens would “eliminate the cloud of suspicion” surrounding 
government activities in the field while “allowing us to pursue long-range objectives free 
from immediate political pressures.”43 The Katzenbach Commission, which had been set up to 
provide recommendations on how to proceed after the scandal over CIA funding of private 
groups erupted, also favoured such a solution, recommending the creation of a “public-private 
mechanism” for funding US private organisations in its report in April 1967.44 The common 
theme in these proposals was that making the state-private funding relationship overt would 
render it more acceptable: relationships which were already public and accepted could not be 
destroyed through exposure.  
The deliberations of the Committee on Overseas Voluntary Activities, chaired by 
Dean Rusk and set up to devise ways of implementing the recommendations of the 
Katzenbach Committee, took a different turn, however. Rather than aiming merely at the 
resurrection of a capability for ideological warfare, the committee staff argued that in the 
future the most significant operational task would be “the support of private organizations 
helping to build political, social and economic institutions in key areas of developing 
countries”.45 These recommendations implied a transition in state-private network operations 
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from ideological projection to a greater level of involvement in projects of modernising and 
democratising reform than had previously been the case.
46
 The Committee argued that such 
state-private network-implemented reform plans could be best funded through an Executive 
branch body reporting directly to the President.
47
 However, the poor relations between the 
administration and Congress which had developed due to the 1967 scandal meant the 
legislation was not presented during Johnson‟s term due to fears that it would not pass.48 
Although Rusk argued that it would be better to let a new administration attempt to 
implement such legislation,
49
 the collapse of elite consensus in favour of Modernisation as a 
paradigm of preventive socioeconomic reform which also occurred at this time made this 
difficult. The paradigm‟s influence was damaged by splits within the academic community 
which had promoted it to policy-makers, and within the policy-making elite. In Vietnam, US 
aid and Modernisation programs had not produced a “showcase for democracy” in Vietnam, 
as Eisenhower and Kennedy had argued they would;
50
 rather, US policy had led to 
dictatorship. The Modernisation paradigm also suffered from its links with US military 
tactics: Rostow, Modernisation‟s most visible exponent, also came to be perceived as a major 
architect of policies such as the bombing of North Vietnam through his position as National 
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Security Advisor to President Johnson.
51
 The idea was also attacked from the political left in 
academia as the influence of counter-paradigms such as dependency theory grew.
52
  
More conservative scholars and policy-makers turned away from the paradigm due to 
its failure to secure US national security goals. Influential political scientist Samuel 
Huntington launched a scholarly attack on it from the right in the later 60s and earlier 70s, 
arguing that preserving political stability in Third World societies took precedence over fuzzy 
and ill-conceived schemes of too-rapid transformation.
53
 This line of argument had been 
foreshadowed in Huntington‟s criticism of Modernisation policies in Vietnam under the 
Johnson administration.
54
 In Latin America the paradigm suffered what Taffet refers to as a 
slow slide into irrelevance,
55
 as the Nixon administration elevated the preservation of political 
stability over reform, preferring to wager that authoritarian governments would be able to 
contain revolutionaries in the Third World.
56
 By 1971 Nixon‟s NSC had concluded that the 
Modernisation effort in Latin America had been oversold as a possible method of promoting 
development and democracy.
57
  Nixon‟s overall solution to the problem of meshing 
democracy with US national security strategy, ideologically and strategically, was to abandon 
democracy in favour of negotiating with the totalitarian Soviet regime while relying on anti-
communist authoritarians in the Third World to defend American security interests.
58
 This 
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represented a de-universalising of the US‟ democratic commitment, not merely in terms of 
cases but at the level of national security strategy. 
 Splits in the foreign policy elite and the severing of links between the state and liberal 
anti-communists in civil society provoked by Vietnam thus led to the decline of the state-
private network and the Modernisation paradigm. This loss of elite cohesion, within the state 
and outside it, placed formidable barriers to the reconstitution of a state-private network based 
on a policy of ideological warfare and to the generation of a new network more devoted to 
Modernisation. It also prevented the resolution of the tensions involved in state deployment of 
private groups and in the pursuit of democratising reforms in the Third World.  
Due to these blockages it was extremely difficult for the state apparatus to produce a 
framework reconciling containment in the Third World with democracy without sacrificing 
US national security considerations. Instead, that framework was proposed by a private 
individual. William A. Douglas, a political development academic, in his 1972 study, 
Developing Democracy, set out a framework for a democracy campaign which applied to the 
whole of the Third World and would be pursued through new private organisations. Douglas‟ 
ideas set a strategic goal for private action which transcended the tactical, case-by-case 
approach implemented through the state-private network.  
 In Douglas‟ view the creation of Third World democratic regimes was more in line 
with Western strategic interests than support of authoritarians. In contrast to authoritarian 
regimes, democracies had mechanisms which could incorporate new political groups into the 
existing system without revolutionary upheavals and a clear succession mechanism: 
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elections.
59
 Support for the creation of democracies would create more stable and legitimate 
Third World governments able to contain or defuse Communist movements more efficiently 
than authoritarian governments. This was clearly in the Western strategic interest, as the 
accession to power of Communist or pro-Soviet regimes in Third World countries could lead 
to the West being cut off from access to supplies of vital raw materials such as oil and 
uranium.
60
 Support of democracies would allow the West to “meet the Communists on their 
own chosen ground of modern politics” 61 and obviate the need to prop up politically weak 
reactionary regimes through military intervention, as had occurred in Vietnam.
62
 This 
argument was not ideological; rather, it was based on the utility of constructing Third World 
democracies in strategic terms. This scheme took in the whole of the non-communist Third 
World and was thus more comprehensive than Modernisation policies pursued in Latin 
America or Vietnam in the service of containment. 
 To create these Third World democracies, Douglas called for a new tactic which 
would break decisively with former modes of Western intervention such as propaganda 
programs, ideological projection of democracy by civil society groups, CIA operations 
economic aid, which had failed to build durable political structures.
63
 Instead, he conjoined 
state-private network methods of organisation and operation with a reformulated 
Modernisation approach which abandoned nation-building in favour of a new strategy of 
party-building. In this scheme, socioeconomic change would not lead to political change; 
rather, it would precede it and create the conditions for it. Socioeconomic development would 
be carried out and traditional Third World populations organised and mobilised to carry out 
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this development by regimes of “regimented democracy”64 led by modernised Third World 
elites.
65
 These “regimented democracies” would be based on strong, mass democratic parties66 
which would be built through training promising democratic party leaders in techniques of 
organisation and party-building while also giving them the skills necessary to cope with the 
political tactics of extremist and anti-democratic movements.
67
  
 These parties would be built with the help of aid delivered through a new private 
network focussed on political parties rather than civil society organisations. Private 
implementation was necessary because the programs would have to be carried out in areas of 
former Western colonialism. In this situation, privately-implemented programs would have 
far more credibility with Third World nationalists and democrats, who would fear that 
programs implemented by Western governments merely aimed at the control and 
manipulation of indigenous democratic movements.
68
 In addition private groups would be 
plausibly deniable, preventing the support of democratic opposition movements in a Third 
World country from damaging diplomatic relations between the US and the government in 
power.
69
 However, rather than defaulting to a state-private network model of organisation in 
which the state would provide the funding and strategic framework for operations and private 
groups would supply their political skills, Douglas aimed to divorce the programs from 
government by conducting them through an International League for Democracy composed of 
both Western democratic parties and mass democratic Third World parties.
70
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This organisation would provide financial and technical support to regional and 
national party schools which would teach Third World party activists the democratic theory 
and party-building skills required to turn Douglas‟ vision into a reality.71 Rather than turning 
to governments for on-going funding that would be needed for these programs,
 72
  with the 
loss of credibility and attempts at government control of the programs this might entail,
73
 
Douglas hoped that the financial problem could be solved by governments making a one-time 
contribution which could then be invested by the League for Democracy to support its 
activities.
74
 This arrangement would have given contributors no continuing control over the 
League. He also hoped that money could be raised from private donors such as the Ford, 
Carnegie or Rockefeller Foundations,
75
 and that governments could pass laws making private 
donations to the League tax-deductible.
76
 In the US these donations could be channelled 
through a bipartisan foundation of Democrats and Republicans, which would then transfer 
them to the international organisation.
77
  
 Douglas‟ ideas are of key importance in the shift to democracy promotion, as he 
articulated a cogent strategic rationale for the promotion of democracy. He also suggested the 
modification of previous modes of political intervention to implement this vision by altering 
the focus of his Modernisation project from a socioeconomic, government-to-government 
approach to an approach focussed on working with political parties inside target states. 
Organisationally, he proposed the creation of a new network based on political parties rather 
than a resurrection of the previous state-private network of unions, intellectual circles, student 
groups and women‟s organisations. Douglas believed that this effort would benefit the West 
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in the Cold War, but that it would also benefit Third World populations by constructing 
democratic regimes capable of building modern societies. Most significantly, Douglas‟ ideas 
constituted an overarching strategic framework for private action independent of the state‟s 
strategy for the first time. This independence was replicated at the organisational level, as 
Douglas‟ International League for Democracy would not rely on state agencies to provide a 
co-ordinating function for its campaign or to identify strategic priorities. 
However, although these ideas had an important impact on US national security policy 
eventually, they had little impact at the time. While the collapse of the state-private network 
and waning enthusiasm for modernising reforms had opened up a space for new ideas to be 
proposed, the split between the state and private elites which had produced this situation made 
it more difficult for such ideas to be operationalised. Douglas‟ lack of interest in continuing 
state sponsorship for his network provided little room for reaching an agreement with the US 
or other governments who could support it. In addition, Developing Democracy was 
published in 1972, during the Nixon administration, which had staked the prevention of 
revolution on the support of authoritarian regimes, not on democratisation of any type. There 
also seems to have been little immediate interest from private forces or factions of the foreign 
policy elite, possibly because Douglas had couched his recommendations in purely 
developmental and strategic terms, rather than using democracy promotion as an ideological 
rallying cry. The project would have to wait for the issue of how democracy related to US 
national security interests in the Third World to rise in importance, and for the organisational 
question of how democratising reforms could be implemented and by whom to progress. 
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Human Rights and democracy promotion 
The rise of Human Rights as a new foreign policy approach in the latter half of the 1970s re-
legitimised US intervention in political structures overseas by placing it once again in a moral 
context. This new approach rose in the context of strategic and organisational disarray in US 
policy towards the Third World. From 1974-79, 13 Third World states fell to radical forces or 
substantially radicalised their governments from 1974-79.
78
 These included Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia in South-east Asia and the Portuguese colonies in Africa, which fell to 
indigenous Marxist movements, the downfall of the monarchy in Ethiopia, the radicalisation 
of African states such as Benin and Madagascar, and the fall of pro-US regimes in Iran and 
Nicaragua at the end of the decade.
79
 This new wave of instability indicated the need for US 
intervention, but such intervention was difficult to engineer through the usual paradigms and 
tactics due to the eclipse of Modernisation Theory and the restrictions placed on the CIA in 
the wake of the Church Committee‟s investigations into the agency‟s covert actions, which 
placed sharp limits on covert paramilitary intervention
80
 and further eroded US organisational 
capacity to act overseas. This disenchantment with previous modes of intervention provided a 
more congenial political atmosphere for projects linked to the reform of foreign political 
structures, whether couched in terms of Human Rights or democracy promotion. It was the 
failure of the Carter administration to generate a coherent strategy and an effective 
organisational framework for the promotion of Human Rights which created a further space 
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for private forces interested in democracy promotion to move into by creating an independent 
democracy promotion organisation.  
 The disenchantment with previous modes of political intervention overseas was the 
product of a cultural/ideological shift in US society which also generated a new conceptual 
framework for the legitimation of US intervention in other societies – Human Rights. While 
the Carter administration embraced Human Rights, commitment to it in sectors of the elite 
pre-dated his election and was never limited to the administration. The turn towards Human 
Rights occurred from 1973-8 and was spurred by a backlash against the Vietnam War and the 
amoral policies of the Nixon administration. The number of private groups involved in 
Human Rights grew to 200 by the end of the decade, while prestigious institutions such as the 
Ford Foundation began funding human rights work in 1973. Congress also became interested, 
holding hearings on the area in 1973 and passing legislation in 1975 and 1976 which made it 
possible to halt US economic assistance to countries which violated Human Rights.
81
 This, 
together with the signing of the Helsinki Accords, which mandated Soviet compliance with 
basic Human Rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe,
82
 placed the issue on the foreign policy 
agenda. 
The Carter administration engaged with this shift and embraced the issue for a number 
of pragmatic political reasons. Human Rights was expected to provide domestic political 
benefits by unifying liberal Democrats concerned with abuses in anti-communist authoritarian 
states in the Third world and Cold Warriors who wanted to use Human Rights to criticise the 
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Soviet Union
83
 around a foreign policy concept which was universal enough to include 
criticism of both types of regime. The concept of Human Rights was also expected to provide 
benefits beyond domestic consensus-building, however. It was hoped that pressure on 
Communist regimes to observe Human Rights would promote the growth of more open 
societies.
84
 The inclusion of Human Rights in Basket III of the Helsinki Accords, signed by 
the Soviet Union in 1975, gave the United States a legal mechanism to pressure the Soviet 
Union to undertake gradual internal reforms which would open up its society. The creation of 
a new US joint Executive-Legislative body, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, headed by Democratic Congressman Dante Fascell, under the Ford administration 
had put organisational machinery in place to pursue this goal.
85
  
In the Third World, it was hoped that pressuring dictators to reduce Human Rights 
violations would remove popular incentives to join revolutionary movements and thus 
increase stability.
86
 The policy would be carried on a government-to-government basis, as 
modernising reforms had been, but by denying US military and economic aid to regimes 
which abused Human Rights rather than investing in socioeconomic transformation. It would 
thus perform a similar function to Modernisation by instituting pre-emptive reforms which 
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could defuse revolutionary movements. However, the Carter administration resolved the 
trade-off between supporting authoritarians to block revolution or supporting democratising 
reforms by pressuring authoritarians to reform their worst practices rather than by seeking to 
alter political systems. PRM-28, the administration‟s principal study of Human Rights policy 
stated that “we do not seek to change governments or remake societies.”87  
The key weakness of the administration‟s Human Rights policy was its failure to 
produce a clear strategic framework which reconciled the promotion of Human Rights with 
competing US interests such as economics and security. The tensions between Human Rights 
and security interests which resulted from the absence of their co-ordination at the strategic 
level was also replicated at the organisational level within the national security bureaucracy, 
as the administration‟s decision to take a case-by-case process to the implementation of the 
policy produced bureaucratic turf wars. The split between Human Rights and other 
imperatives was institutionalised at the bureaucratic level in the vesting of responsibility for 
the Human Rights policy in distinct bodies such as the State Department‟s Bureau of Human 
Rights, headed by Patricia Derian, and the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign 
Assistance, headed by Warren Christopher, which was to review military, security and 
economic assistance in light of Human Rights considerations.
88
 This resulted in the 
Departments of Commerce, Treasury and the State Department‟s Bureau for Security 
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Assistance successfully lobbying to have programs within their purview removed from the 
Interagency Group,
89
 thus protecting their own bureaucratic turf.  
The Bureau of Human Rights also found itself locked in bureaucratic battles against 
the State Departments regional bureaux. These conflicts arose because as a functional bureau, 
the Bureau of Human Rights did not often consider its policy recommendations in the light of 
competing security concerns, whereas the regional bureaux did. It is no accident that the most 
bitter clashes occurred with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, which oversaw 
policy towards regimes such as the Philippines, which abused Human Rights but were critical 
to the US strategic position in the Pacific.
90
 Thus, the effect of proceeding on a case-by-case 
basis was bureaucratic struggle which resulted in authoritarian regimes important to US 
security such as the Philippines, China, Pakistan and a host of others being provided with 
aid.
91
  
It is possible that the administration could have implemented more positive initiatives 
through developing a state-private network, which would have had more flexibility to act in 
support of Human Rights through non-governmental channels, even in the absence of a 
coherent overarching framework. However, while he gave consistent support to the US 
division of Helsinki Watch, formed by US private citizens with government encouragement to 
liaise with Human Rights campaigners in the Soviet bloc,
92
 Carter did not give his support to 
a proposal for an independent but government-sponsored Human Rights foundation supported 
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by Democratic Congressmen such as Dante Fascell and Donald Fraser, and by the NSC.
93
 
Instead, Congressmen and aides supportive of Human Rights moved to fill the organisational 
gap in the administration‟s implementation machinery. As a result, they created the bipartisan 
political party committee that William Douglas had called for to co-ordinate US private 
democracy promotion projects in 1972. They also moved beyond the administration‟s goal of 
ensuring respect for Human Rights to focus on promoting democracy. 
The idea for the creation of this committee did not derive from Douglas‟ work, but 
from observation of a real case of political foundations working to contain a revolutionary 
upheaval and create a democratic government. After the 1974 collapse of the Salazar-Caetano 
dictatorship in Portugal, the homeland did not suffer the radical takeovers which had affected 
its colonies, even though in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the dictatorship the 
Portuguese Communists had seemed to be the best-organised political force. Instead, Western 
European Social Democratic parties channelled funding political training to the Portuguese 
Socialist Party, which then inflicted a decisive electoral defeat on the Communists.
94
 
The Portuguese crisis
95
 provided an example of an instrumentality which could 
mobilise political parties to combat the spread of Communism, thus filling the organisational 
gap created by the collapse of the state-private network and the restriction of the CIA‟s covert 
action capability. Most of the aid passed to non-Communist Portuguese political parties was 
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donated, and all of it co-ordinated, by the West German Party Foundations.
96
 These four non-
governmental political foundations were each connected to one of the four major German 
political parties and although they received funding from the West German government for 
their foreign activities, the foundations were legally independent from it.
97
 All four 
foundations were active worldwide, providing a new model for political intervention which 
superseded both military intervention and covert action. US political leaders could not fail to 
be interested in developing such a useful instrument for their own use and thus making good 
the organisational gap in US capabilities created by the eclipse of the CIA‟s capability to 
intervene politically abroad.
98
 
The movement to create a similar US organisation was first pressed by liberal 
Democrats interested in promoting the idea of Human Rights. In February 1977 Democratic 
Congressman Donald Fraser proposed creating an International Department for the 
Democratic Party to contact other democratic parties and party internationals.
99
 Fraser, a 
liberal from Minneapolis, had served in Congress from 1962 and had been intensely 
concerned with Human Rights and democratic development during his political career. In 
1966 he had proposed the Title IX Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which called 
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for AID to provide assistance to democratic civil society organisations in the Third World.
100
 
As Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organisations he 
had also held the first Congressional hearings on Human Rights in 1973, which did much to 
raise the profile of the issue as a legitimate foreign policy consideration for the US.
101
  
Fraser was intrigued by the example the West German party foundations offered of 
how private groups could wield political influence over foreign political actors. The practical 
effect of the aid and political training dispensed to ideologically acceptable recipients in the 
Third World by each foundation was the spread of the ideology of the West German parties to 
political movements in the developing world and to strengthen the influence of the West 
German government overseas.
102
 Fraser was influenced by the argument that US party 
foundations could replace the declining CIA s conduits of US political influence
103
 and 
proposed that one staff member of the DNC be given responsibility for international contacts 
and to promote Democratic Party attendance at party international meetings and co-operation 
with international political movements to fill this organisational gap.
104
 The International 
Department would be a private instrument of political influence which would be under the 
control of the parties, rather than the national security bureaucracy.  
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The project was pushed forward by a Democratic Party colleague of Fraser‟s, George 
Agree, a former Congressional aide to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who also concurred that 
transnational party networks could replace previous covert methods of political influence.
105
 
However, there was a crucial ideological difference in the visions of the two men. Fraser had 
kept his proposal within the Carter administration‟s foreign policy framework by proposing 
that the new International Department should work in support of the Carter administration‟s 
Human Rights policy;
106
 however, Agree went beyond the administration policy by stating 
that transnational party contacts could also help to defend democracy and to construct it in 
non-democratic states.
107
 Agree clearly aimed at deeper reform of foreign political systems 
than the Carter administration contemplated.  
However, before the question of conformity with state goals arose, a functioning 
foreign outreach organisation for the parties had to be created. There were two main obstacles 
to US parties participating in transnational political networks on the same terms as European 
parties. Firstly, the two US parties were much more ideologically diverse, making it more 
difficult for them to take a consistent line on policy questions than parties who identified 
themselves as proponents of one political ideology.
108
 The second obstacle to creating 
International Departments for the US parties was financial. Agree calculated that the annual 
cost of one full-time international officer would be $100,000, a significant amount of money 
for a party organisation with a budget in the low millions, much of which had to be earmarked 
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for fund-raising efforts.
109
 Clearly organisational changes and a massive injection of finance 
would be required to equip the parties as channels of political and ideological influence.  
 Agree‟s solution was to work for the creation of a bipartisan institute staffed by 
Democrats and Republicans. Such a structure would subsume the factionalism within each 
party within the bipartisan institute, with the benefit that, as both parties were so broad 
ideologically, it was unlikely that one would be able to do something unacceptable to the 
other in international affairs.
110
 The goal of promoting democracy would act as ideological 
and organisational glue, subsuming factional differences within and between the parties in a 
more inclusive concept. Although the institute was based on the institutional model of the 
West German Foundations the different nature of the US political parties indicated that one 
bipartisan institute would be more effective than the model of separate partisan institutes 
favoured by the West Germans.  
The institute would carry out the aims outlined by Fraser, as well, as collecting 
information on foreign parties and their methods of organisation.
111
 The project came together 
over the course of 1978 and the first half of 1979. Agree secured the agreement of the RNC 
Chairman, William Brock, and that of the DNC chairmen during this period, first Daniel 
Horgan and then Charles Manatt.  The new bipartisan institute, the American Political 
Foundation, held its first board meeting on July 18
th
 1979
112
 and its existence was announced 
to the press in early November.
113
 The Wall Street Journal was hopeful that the APF would be 
able to have an impact on the perceived global turn towards dictatorship and on US foreign 
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policy, arguing that although over the previous 25 years regimes hostile to democracy had 
proliferated, “the other day we heard about a new organization, the American Political 
Foundation, whose birth gives us hope that at least someone out there knows what‟s wrong 
and is trying to help us recover our bearings.”114  
However, the financial problem remained unresolved. Although Agree applied to the 
German Marshall Fund for $100,000 in seed money for the APF in September 1979,
115
 this 
did not materialise due to the fund‟s perception of the general weakness of the US party 
organisations.
116
 Given that, at the first board meeting, an annual budget of $220,000 was 
called for in the organisation‟s early set-up stage alone, this left a substantial financial 
deficit.
117
 Agree remained optimistic about securing funding from US businesses and 
foundations from 1979-1981; however, although a small number of corporations donated low 
four-figure amounts, securing a stable source of funding was a perennial problem and the 
organisation was often indebted to its directors for loans they had made towards operating 
expenses, and staff members for unpaid salaries.
118
   
These funding difficulties were also a consequence of the APF‟s poor links with the 
Executive, as the APF did not receive any funding from the NSC or the White House despite 
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initial interest from Samuel Huntington, then working as an NSC staff member.
119
 The 
organisation did receive $74, 632 from USICA to carry out exchanges with Western European 
parties in 1980;
120
 however, there is no evidence that the APF was any more or less important 
than other private groups which received project money from USICA for their activities. The 
capabilities of the nascent private network were limited to small-scale programs because the 
split between private elites interested in democracy promotion and the state remained. The 
organisation was also hampered by the lack of a clear strategy which meshed its aim with a 
tangible national security goal: while Agree wished to promote democracy and felt that in the 
long-term this would be positive for the US and the world, he did not lay out a coherent plan 
for doing so or a list of target countries where operations could have an impact on these goals. 
In this, the APF and the Carter administration were much alike. 
Democracy promotion and national security strategy 
A further intervention from outside the Executive re-stated and narrowed the strategic focus 
of the emerging paradigm of democracy promotion, spurred by the failure of the Carter 
administration‟s Human Rights campaign to prevent revolution in Third World states allied to 
the US. The Carter administration‟s strategic failure was most evident in Iran and in 
Nicaragua,
121
 where the replacement of the Somoza dictatorship by the Sandinistas in July 
1979 led to the creation of the first Marxist-Leninist government on the mainland of the 
Americas. The collapse of the Somoza dictatorship had implications for US foreign policy 
which extended beyond Nicaragua, as the downfall of the regime represented an episode in a 
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wave of Third World revolutions which had begun in 1974. By 1979, 11 Third World 
governments had fallen to radical forces,
122
 and there was no guarantee that this current wave 
of revolutionary activity was petering out. The fall of Nicaragua thus re-opened the strategic 
question of whether US security could be better guarded through the implementation of 
reforms in order to defuse revolutions or heightened support for friendly authoritarians. The 
Nicaraguan case thus set the terms of the debate over the applicability of democracy 
promotion to authoritarian regimes allied to the United States in the Reagan administration 
and produced contending arguments which still appear in US democracy promotion at the 
time of writing. The conservative and neoconservative response to these events will be 
discussed in the following chapter. The crisis spurred the evolution of democracy promotion 
by pointing to the existence of a strategic problem which could be filled by the creation of a 
new state-private network devoted to party-building. 
Initially, Carter had tried to pressure the Somoza dictatorship to improve its Human 
Rights performance through vetoing loans and arms transfers. This began five days after 
Carter acceded to the Presidency, when he revoked export licences to Nicaragua for rifles and 
ammunition; this was perceived by the Somoza regime as a signal of the administration‟s 
intentions.
123
 When Somoza proved uncooperative the administration attempted to ease him 
out of power in favour of a government composed of middle-class liberals, fearing that “the 
longer Somoza stayed in power, the higher the chances were of a radical takeover”.124 It was 
planned that a transfer of power to the FAO, the liberal opposition organisation, would result 
in the preservation of the National Guard and the creation of a non-revolutionary government 
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of national unity, which would head off the approaching Sandinista victory.
125
 The liberals 
proved to be ineffective at carrying out these tasks due to their political and organisational 
weakness and the Marxist takeover proceeded. The US-supported dictatorship had proven to 
be unstable over the long-term; but pro-US forces had proven incapable of taking power when 
it collapsed.  
 In February 1980 George Agree, as President of the APF, received a proposal, “A 
Comprehensive Policy Response to Expanding US Interests in the Third World”, aimed at 
solving this problem. Its author was Michael Samuels, a former State Department political 
appointee and a current Director of the Centre for Strategic International Studies. Samuels 
would become one of the prime movers behind the rise of democracy promotion, and his 
appearance in its history represents the beginning of a link between the academics and 
organisers who had pushed the concept up to this point and the policy-makers whose support 
was required for the idea to become a reality. Samuels‟ range of experience clearly informed 
his analysis of the problem: while at the State Department he had dealt with relations between 
the Executive and Congress over Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, formerly funded 
covertly through the state-private network and then overtly since the exposure of this 
relationship in 1971.
126
 He had also been part of a team sent to Portugal to assess the political 
situation after the collapse of the Caetano dictatorship in 1974.
127
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Samuels offered a solution to the trade-off between current support of authoritarian 
regimes and the promotion of democratising reforms in the interest of long-term stability by 
arguing for the pre-emptive creation of democratic movements in dictatorships vulnerable to 
instability. Rather than pressuring dictatorships to reform in order to ward off revolution and 
then expecting a weak and unorganised liberal movement to take power in order to head off a 
revolutionary victory when the regime fell, as Carter had done in Nicaragua, the US should 
begin organising democratic movements in vulnerable dictatorships immediately, in order to 
prepare for regime collapse. Samuels made this point by contrasting the success of 
transnational party work in Portugal with the failure of the Human Rights policy in Nicaragua 
and Iran in terms of US national security. He argued that in the aftermath of the fall of an 
authoritarian dictatorship, elements “committed to political dictatorship, monolithic politics 
and monolithic economies” could assume power.128 These elements, such as Nicaragua‟s 
“Sandinista guerrillas” and Iran‟s “non-democratic, obscurantist religious forces”, posed a 
danger to US foreign policy interests.
129
 However,  
In Portugal, after the collapse of the Salazar-Caetano regime, democratic pluralistic 
elements emerged victorious, and Portugal retains at this time good relations with the 
United States. 
130
 
 
It was clear that the mechanism used in Portugal was far superior to the US‟ poorly thought-
out eleventh hour efforts elsewhere. This success showed that the establishment of democratic 
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movements in unstable dictatorships would serve US interests by creating political forces 
which could take power in the event of a political collapse.
131
  
 This new policy goal called for the creation of a new instrumentality to fill the 
organisational gap caused by the decline of the state-private network and the CIA. The 
solution was the creation of an overt “American Political Development Foundation”, “an 
autonomous, quasi-private, but government funded, foundation” to fill the gap caused by the 
fact that “[a]t present the US has insufficient foreign policy machinery for promoting the 
development of democratic-pluralist forces abroad, despite the national security need for such  
a capability.”132 A quasi-private institution would be more effective than a state agency in 
carrying out this task as it would be more credible in the Third World and avoid the “political 
contamination” of direct contact with the US government which could lead to the rejection of 
such a program “in many Third World contexts.”133  
Samuels‟ conception of how democracy promotion was to be deployed and organised 
was clearly focussed on US needs rather than the needs of democracy or of Third World 
populations. In contrast to Douglas, Samuels‟ argument did not refer to any benefits for Third 
World populations from democracy promotion and he advanced no concept similar to 
Douglas‟ “regimented democracy”, which described a type of democracy specifically tailored 
for the economic development needs of Third World states. Furthermore, Samuels‟ version of 
democracy promotion would focus on countries where the US had the greatest strategic 
interest, not those where democratic movements were most needed or had the greatest chance 
of succeeding. The democratic movements supported would be boosted only when a friendly 
dictatorship seemed about to lose power to anti-US revolutionary movements. Until such a 
                                                 
131
 Michael A Samuels, “Project Proposal,” 1. 
132
 Ibid, 2. 
133
 Ibid. 
53 
 
crisis emerged, the US would be best served by maintaining its relations with dictators. In 
addition, in contrast to Douglas‟ proposed multilateral party league, Samuels‟ organisation 
was limited to American parties acting in American interests. For Samuels, democracy 
promotion was not an ideological end-goal; rather, it was a vehicle for the attainment of 
existing US national security interests in the Third World. 
Organisationally, it is clear why Samuels had contacted Agree: his policy of 
maintaining simultaneous relations with pro-US dictators and democratic movements opposed 
to them required the plausible deniability and credibility which only a private group could 
provide, and as President of the American Political Foundation, Agree was in charge of the 
day-to-day management of such a group. However, a re-configured APF would not have 
sufficient resources to implement the new strategy. Samuels solved the question of access to 
financial support which had bedevilled private democracy promotion up to this point by 
pragmatically admitting the need for large-scale government funding.  
Samuels‟ proposal created the conditions for the forging of a state-private network on 
the private side of the equation by positing a program of action in support of a national 
security goal which could only be achieved by private groups provided with government 
funding. However, in order to procure the funding they required, it would be necessary to 
generate a new foreign policy consensus among state elites which equated democracy with 
US national security and legitimated political intervention abroad as the promotion of 
democracy and tie this to his proposal. In addition, generating a consensus within the 
Executive was not enough, as the creation of an overt organisation, as opposed to a covert 
structure, would need to be agreed by Congress in order to secure appropriations. To create 
this consensus, Samuels proposed launching a propaganda effort to counter the “tremendous 
residual reluctance to think about active American contributions to the evolution of various 
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political cultures around the world”134, that is, the reduced willingness of the US to intervene 
in the political structures of other countries. To achieve this, Samuels recommended 
launching a study on how a political development foundation could be created, targeted at 
legislators and members of the executive connected with Third World affairs.
135
   
 Agree‟s initial response highlights the differences which existed between Samuels and 
himself in their conception of democracy promotion. Whereas Samuels‟ proposal was geared 
towards convincing the US government to finance democracy promotion as a national 
security strategy, Agree continued to see the project as a purely private initiative and 
suggested “a real search for workable private sector alternatives”.136 However, he did agree to 
attend a follow-up meeting on the topic on February 25
th
.
137
 After this the APF as a whole 
seems to have supported Samuels‟ strategy; possibly because it promised to provide a stable 
source of funding from the Executive and Congress.  
 The APF‟s interest in Samuels‟ proposal marked its transition from a purely private 
exchange agency into an organisation lobbying the Executive to support a policy of 
democracy promotion. Samuels and the APF leaders soon began an effort to convince the 
policy-making elite of the value of democracy promotion. In 1980 and 1981, “leaders of the 
APF and various academicians organized a series of intensive discussions on the idea of a 
new U.S. democratic assistance program.”138  
The organisational and tactical elements of democracy promotion were a 
reformulation of paradigms of political intervention which had been deployed by the US 
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before the crisis of 1967-1975. However, it differed from these paradigms, and the recent 
Human Rights campaign, in several crucial ways. Unlike previous CIA operations the new 
state-private network envisaged was to function overtly, and so would not be vulnerable to the 
loss of credibility which had attended the exposure of covert relationships between the state, 
US private groups, and private forces in other countries which had occurred during and after 
the 1967 crisis. Democracy promotion‟s focus on the narrowly political motors of reform 
replaced Modernisation Theory‟s more diffuse concept, while in terms of end-goal, the 
concept went beyond Human Rights‟ tactic of pressuring sitting governments to rein in the 
most objectionable features of their rule in order to defuse dissent.  
Most crucially, whereas these elements had previously been deployed on a case-by-
case basis, the blueprint for democracy promotion developed over the 1970s provided a 
strategic approach to the problem of reconciling democracy and national security. The 
democracy promoters‟ argument that Marxist or revolutionary movements could be best 
contained through the creation of democratic governments provided a method of pursuing a 
consistent policy towards political reform in the Third World and bringing the ideological and 
geopolitical bases of containment into conformity. The switch from a government-to-
government modernising project to party-building meant that authoritarian governments 
which were not open to reform could be bypassed, while the delivery of political assistance 
through a private organisation would be more credible to foreign democrats than government 
aid. Thus, democracy promotion offered a method of pursuing political reform which need not 
cut across US national security goals and could be operationalised without giving rise to 
accusations of neo-colonialism by Third World elites. 
The development of democracy promotion was a product of the discrediting of 
previous modes of political intervention in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The failures of the 
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state in strategy and organisation, together with the perception of growing instability in the 
Third World, had spurred further private initiatives connected to democracy promotion in 
order to fill a space left by the state‟s incapacity. However, by 1980 democracy promotion 
had been developed as far as possible by private figures. The recognition that democracy 
promotion required financial resources that only the state could provide, together with the 
shift in the conception of the project from Douglas‟ multilateral effort to Samuels‟ more 
unilateral project, opened up the possibility of a state-private accommodation which could 
lead to the creation of a new, overt state-private network dedicated to democratisation.  
Samuels later argued that “[w]ith the advent of the Reagan administration, the time 
seemed propitious to launch a fresh effort in the field of political development.”139 While 
Reagan was more ideologically committed to an identification of the US with the cause of 
democracy than previous administrations, he was also far more committed to confrontation 
with the Soviet Union, something the democracy promoters had not yet factored into their 
blueprint, and to support for the US‟ authoritarian allies. Thus, it was possible that the private 
effort to re-engage the state which began in 1980 and continued under Reagan could result in 
the replication of the strategic and organisational tensions which had been a structural feature 
of US attempts to deploy democracy in the service of national security before the 1967 crisis. 
The question of how much autonomy the new administration would be willing to grant a 
privately-controlled but state-funded organisation whose long-term strategy might clash with 
its own national security priorities would need to be resolved. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
IN THE EARLY REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: NO GRAND DESIGN 
The advent of the Reagan administration provided an opportunity for the private democracy 
promotion network which had begun to take shape in 1980 to present its ideas to a new group 
of policy-makers. The ideological basis of the new administration was a tough anti-
communism which painted the Cold War as a struggle between American Democracy and 
Soviet Totalitarianism, rather than Nixonian realpolitik or the Carter administration‟s cautious 
stance of attempting to foster Human Rights without fundamentally altering foreign political 
systems. However, this rhetoric did not translate into a universal program of democratisation. 
Far from building on Carter‟s Human Rights policy, the Reagan administration abandoned it 
on the basis that it had been harmful to US national security interests by weakening friendly 
and strategically important dictatorships. Initially, there was little connection between the 
administration‟s rhetoric exalting American democracy and a coherent foreign policy design. 
This lack of interconnection between democracy and grand strategy occurred for two 
reasons. Firstly, the Reagan administration did not possess a coherent grand strategy to which 
a coherent strategy of democratisation could be attached. Instead, it was divided into different 
factions advocating foreign policies targeted on different objectives.  A strategy of 
confronting the Soviet Union by pressing economic, ideological and political warfare 
measures directly against the Soviet bloc in order to weaken Soviet power internally was 
championed by a hard-line “Reaganite” group, which contained many key officials such as 
NSA Richard Allen, Reagan‟s newly-appointed Director of Central Intelligence, William J. 
Casey, Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger. This group‟s proposals often appealed to 
President Reagan‟s more hard-line and ideological instincts. In contrast, a more pragmatic 
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group located mainly in the State Department wanted to concentrate primarily on building up 
the strength of the “Free World”, including the allied dictatorships the democracy promoters 
were interested in reforming, to enable it to resist perceived Soviet pressure and to strengthen 
containment.  In their view, the United States should concentrate on strengthening allied 
governments its own zone, especially those facing Marxist insurgencies, rather than 
attempting to weaken the Soviet zone. These separate tendencies were often able to agree on 
policies aimed at strengthening the US and its NATO allies, and on combatting further Soviet 
advances in the Third World, goals which both shared. However, disagreements often arose 
when policies aimed at more direct confrontation with the USSR were advanced. The fact that 
policy-makers were unable to synthesise these competing end-goals or make a definitive 
decision between them blocked the construction of a coherent foreign policy. 
 Secondly, the administration had no blueprint explaining how democratisation could 
be compatible with US national security interests. This meant that democratic ideology and 
democratisation were attached to existing geopolitical problems on a case-by-case basis as a 
tool of legitimation or ideological warfare. In cases where there was general agreement on the 
geopolitical goals to be pursued within the administration and the deployment of democracy 
was limited to a propaganda function which did not aim at transforming political structures 
overseas, there were few problems. However, in cases where policy options went beyond this 
to take in political action on the ground, the administration and its different factions were 
faced with ideological, strategic and organisational tensions which often acted as a brake on 
the implementation of concrete policies.  
 The effects of these tensions on administration policy towards El Salvador impelled 
one group of officials to propose a change of course in US foreign policy towards promoting 
democracy to achieve national security objectives. This development opened up the 
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possibility that lobbying by the private democracy promoters could extend the policy beyond 
the specific case of El Salvador to include acceptance of a wider campaign of democratisation 
by the administration. 
National Security and Democratic Propaganda in Western Europe 
US policy towards Western Europe was based on the achievement of US geopolitical aims 
through a public diplomacy campaign which became increasingly focussed on the projection 
of democratic ideology in opposition to Soviet Communism over the course of 1981. The 
administration experienced few problems in this case because both factions agreed on the 
geopolitical goal of this tactic, there was no tension between the projection of democratic 
ideology and the achievement of US national security aims, and the fact that Western Europe 
was already democratic meant that there was no need to carry out political operations on the 
ground. 
Strategic consensus over US policy towards Western Europe was possible as it was 
organised around a geopolitical goal which both factions in the administration prioritised; the 
renovation of US hegemony over the region. Throughout the Cold War the strategic denial of 
Soviet access to the industrialised economies of Western Europe had been of key importance 
to prevent their integration into a Soviet-led Eurasian bloc which would have the military and 
industrial resources to successfully challenge US global hegemony.
1
 This calculation was still 
current in the early 1980s and had been rearticulated several years before Reagan‟s 
inauguration by the Committee on the Present Danger, a private organisation consisting of 
conservative and neoconservative former policy-makers, intellectuals and labour leaders 
which had argued for tougher anti-Soviet policies under the Nixon and Carter 
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administrations.
2
 The CPD had argued that a key Soviet priority was “the severance of ties 
between the United States and its allies, primarily in Western Europe”, via “an enormous 
build-up on the European frontier which has the psychological effect of intimidating 
European public opinion” could “bring Europe to its knees without any shots necessarily 
being fired”.3 According to a CPD analysis,  
The centrepiece of the Soviet strategic view of world politics has always been that if 
Russia could control Western Europe and bring it under its dominion…that it would 
thereby control the world.
4
 
 
The Committee‟s philosophy was extremely influential in the early Reagan administration, 
with many officials having been former members, including the President himself.
5
  
The administration saw the Soviet replacement of their SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate 
range nuclear missiles targeted on Western Europe with more potent SS-20s as an 
intimidating military build-up which would alter the balance of power in Europe in favour of 
the Soviet Union and facilitate Soviet diplomatic pressure on the US‟ NATO allies. The 
Carter administration had tried to remedy the perceived imbalance in European Theatre 
Nuclear Forces by sending new Cruise and Pershing II missiles to bases in Western Europe. 
The decision had been made more palatable to European public opinion by casting it as two- 
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track process; NATO would simultaneously prepare to deploy the missiles while seeking 
negotiations with the Soviets to reduce the nuclear weapons deployed by both sides.
6
 
However, substantial sections of Western European public opinion were opposed to the US 
deployment, fearing that the US and the USSR might engage in a limited nuclear exchange 
which would devastate Europe but leave the American and Soviet homelands untouched.
7
 
This fear was aggravated by hard-line anti-communist statements from Reaganite 
officials in the administration in early 1981, including the President himself. In an interview 
published in the French newspaper Le Figaro in February 1981 Reagan stated that he would 
not hesitate to use US nuclear weapons in Europe.
8
 The President‟s much-publicised 
opposition to arms control negotiations also indicated that one of the two tracks of policy was 
in danger of disappearing.
9
 This fear was compounded by a speech given by the 
administration‟s National Security Advisor, Richard Allen, in March 1981, in which he 
criticised European softness on Communism and opposition to the Cruise and Pershing 
missiles, attributing “Better Red than Dead” sentiments to European publics.10  
These publics reacted to the intensification of the war of words over Theatre Nuclear 
Forces deployments by demonstrating against the deployments; in April 15,000 people 
participated in an anti-nuclear demonstration in Bonn; by October/November the numbers had 
swelled to 250,000 in Bonn, 150,000 in London and 200,000 in Florence.
11
 The public 
opposition was paralleled by a rebellion of European elites; in Holland government supporters 
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of the deployment were defeated and in Britain the Labour Party stated that it would be 
opposed to deployment if it regained power. In West Germany the ruling Social Democratic 
Party voted for a review of the deployment decision, and a USIA survey indicated that 60% of 
West Germans were opposed to Cruise and Pershing II deployments.
12
  
The immediate nuclear issue, however, was a symptom of a deeper strategic and 
ideological cleavage; while the US under the Reagan administration was moving inexorably 
towards a policy of confrontation with the USSR, the countries of Western Europe remained 
in a state of détente. This was mainly due to the substantial trade which some of these nations 
had developed with the Soviet bloc.
13
 The level of economic exchange was disquieting to the 
Reaganites, who were considering imposing new sanctions on trade and the transfer of 
advanced technologies to the USSR and tightening existing ones.
14
 The Western Europeans 
also showed themselves less enthusiastic at backing anti-communist foreign policy positions 
championed by the US; for example, the European reaction to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan had been much less intense than that of the US, even under President Carter.
15
  
Over the course of 1981 the Reagan administration generated to a solution to its 
geopolitical problems in Western Europe through the deployment of democratic ideology.  A 
clear response to the narrow problem of Western European public opposition to US missile 
deployments was proposed in August by USIA‟s Reaganite director, Charles Z. Wick: Project 
Truth, a propaganda campaign aimed at blackening the Soviets as ruthless militaristic 
totalitarians. Wick‟s proposal attributed the demonstrations against the deployment of Theatre 
Nuclear Forces then taking place in Europe to Soviet exploitation of the naiveté of the 
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younger generation, and the actions of church groups and political organisations which had 
been influenced by Soviet propaganda or were controlled by Soviet agents.
16
 Underlying these 
demonstrations was a dangerous “crisis of democracy” in the West.17 According to Wick, the 
Soviet disinformation campaign which was to blame for this was reaching a pivotal stage and 
the US needed to intervene, as the loss of Western Europe would represent a “strategic 
Dunkirk”.18 After presenting the situation in such apocalyptic terms, it is perhaps no surprise 
that Wick received the green light for Project Truth at an NSC meeting on August 17
th
 1981.
19
 
 Project Truth first focussed on explaining the threat posed by Soviet totalitarianism to 
Europeans by making use of sanitised, declassified material from the CIA and DOD and 
visual evidence of the Soviet military build-up targeted at Western Europe.
20
 The practical 
outcome of this was a plan for a series of bulletins, “Soviet Disinformation Alerts”, which 
would provide embassy and information personnel with information on the latest Soviet 
disinformation campaigns and the knowledge and arguments necessary to rebut them.
21
 The 
plan received full support from Secretary of State Haig, who ordered State Department 
personnel posted overseas to co-operate.
22
  
This focus on blackening the USSR may have been a necessary first step in preserving 
the NATO alliance; however, to manage the wider geopolitical and ideological stresses on the 
alliance, the administration invoked democratic ideology. A solution to the problem which 
focussed more on the positive selling of democratic ideology than anti-Sovietism had been 
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proposed by Alexander Haig‟s State Department before the USIA took over overall guidance 
of US ideological campaigns with the Project Truth proposal. Following a meeting between 
Haig and West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher in the first half of 1981 the 
State Department‟s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs proposed a major propaganda 
campaign to involve co-operation with Britain, France and West Germany, as “[i]t‟s critical 
that this not be a US-only effort”.23  
The campaign proposed by the bureau went further than the initial blueprint for 
Project Truth, however, in that it was proposed that the campaign should not only “counter 
Soviet propaganda” but also “sell our own policies”.24 This idea was stressed again by Haig in 
a letter to the British Foreign Secretary at the end of August. Haig argued that “…to take the 
initiative we need to both educate and inspire. We must be candid about the Soviet threat, and 
go on the political offensive with positive Western proposals.”25 To accomplish this, Haig 
suggested that  
we find ways to focus much greater attention on Western values. We have for too long 
permitted the Soviet Union to portray itself as revolutionary and progressive, when we 
are the most innovative and genuinely progressive societies. We must demonstrate 
how the Western values of individual freedom and initiative meet material and 
spiritual needs better than totalitarian regimes. And we must translate these values into 
specific proposals in the international arena which could help create a better world.
26
  
 
By November the scope of Project Truth was being broadened beyond a simple tit-for-tat 
propaganda war to include these ideas. A memo written by John Hughes, head of the 
executive implementing committee, argued: “It is just as important for Project Truth to 
underline the common values--moral, spiritual, cultural--that bind us to our allies.”27 
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In Western Europe, US policy was dictated by the geopolitical situation and then 
democratic ideology was added as a tool to legitimate and mobilise a US strategy which had 
been shaped by the power political realities existing on the ground in Europe. The meshing of 
democratic ideology and national security policy which this situation generated was aimed at 
solidifying the US‟ leadership of its allies by conflating the US‟ geopolitical interests with the 
fortunes of democracy and stressing the collective ideological identity of the US and the 
NATO states as democracies.  
This was a relatively low-risk strategy as there was no fundamental conflict between 
US foreign policy interests and backing for democracy in the Western European context, 
especially in the wake of Iberia‟s transition to democracy. The fact that the geopolitical 
objectives which underpinned the policy were widely accepted within the administration, 
coupled with the fact that the US envisaged a purely rhetorical campaign rather than attempts 
to influence or modify political structures on the ground, resulted in a solid consensus in 
favour of the policy. 
Democracy as a weapon in the Soviet Bloc 
As in Western Europe, the administration moved over the course of 1981 to deploying the 
projection of democracy as a tool of its policy towards the Soviet bloc. However, the 
generation of a coherent strategy in this case was complicated by the fact that the 
administration was divided over whether wanted to pursue a defensive approach aimed at 
preserving the status quo or an offensive one aimed at transforming or undermining the 
enemy state.  While attempts to project democratic propaganda into the Bloc were relatively 
uncontentious, the question of whether to provide American support for dissident movements 
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on the ground behind the Iron Curtain was complicated by the geopolitical situation and the 
organisational gap in the national security apparatus caused by the state-private split of 1967. 
Although the whole administration agreed that the Carter administration‟s approach to 
the Soviet Union had been too soft, high-level officials were divided over what the final 
objectives of policy towards the USSR should be. The Reaganites favoured a policy of 
weakening the economic and ideological bases of Soviet power within the Soviet bloc itself, 
based on a combination of virulent ideological anti-Sovietism and on the perception of Soviet 
political and economic weakness. DCI William Casey, a convinced hard-liner, argued that the 
economy of the USSR was “showing increasing weakness”28 and that there was “increasing 
internal discontent” in the Soviet Union,29  with the clear implication that this should be 
exploited.
30
 These views were shared by the President, who perceived the USSR‟s growing 
economic weakness and signs of popular and nationalist discontent within the bloc as “the 
beginning of the end”31 and wondered how these cracks in the Soviet edifice could be 
exploited to accelerate the USSR‟s collapse.32 The Reaganite faction proposed to exploit these 
perceived weaknesses through an economic and political offensive against the USSR. This 
faction believed that discouraging Western trade with and investment in the USSR would cut 
off the foreign currency earnings which the Soviets used to ward off domestic economic 
problems.
33
 At the same time, a Western strategy of psychological warfare which aimed to 
support opposition elements behind the Iron Curtain could also help to weaken the USSR and 
vulnerable Soviet satellites. While the original design for containment proposed by George 
                                                 
28
 New York Times, “Haig asserts Soviet wanes spiritually but rises as a threat,” The New York Times, 10th May 
1981, Nexis UK, http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis. 
29
 New York Times, “Haig asserts Soviet wanes spiritually”. 
30
Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 41. 
31
 Remark made by Reagan at a June 1981 press conference, quoted in John Dumbrell, American Foreign 
Policy: Carter to Clinton (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 69. 
32
 See Ronald Reagan, An American Life (London: Hutchinson, 1990), 237-8 
 
67 
 
Kennan had called for US actions aimed at placing the maximum strain on the Soviet system 
in order to foster its mellowing or gradual break-up,
34
 the actions proposed by Reaganite hard-
liners went further than this by proposing to supplement US external pressure on the Soviet 
Union with programs designed to target internal economic and political variables in order to 
put pressure on the Soviet system.
35
 This policy tendency represented a tough stance towards 
the USSR informing a set of disparate measures, however, rather than an integrated and 
coherent strategy for causing the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
This policy was opposed by a faction of State Department career officials led by 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig. These officials differed from the Reaganites in basing 
their policy on the geopolitical threat posed by the USSR rather than ideological anti-
Sovietism, and in their perception of Soviet strength. The geopolitical, as opposed to 
ideological, basis of Haig‟s policies is clear from his comment that ''A major focus of 
American policy must be the Soviet Union…not because of ideological preoccupation but 
simply because Moscow is the greatest source of international insecurity today”.36 Haig felt 
that although it might be possible to use economic and political warfare as tools to contain 
Soviet expansionism, they could not feasibly lead to the transformation or collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Haig‟s views on this had continuity, as he had stated at the Republican National 
Convention in 1979 that "Clearly the task ahead for this vital decade before us will be the 
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management of global Soviet power”37. If the Soviet Union was not about to collapse, it was 
better to concentrate US resources on safeguarding the US position in the “Free World” rather 
than jeopardising this for uncertain gains from economic and political warfare.
38
 Rather than 
focussing on an attempt to weaken Soviet control within the bloc, Haig‟s foreign policy called 
for a tough version of containment, coupled with negotiations, which he dubbed “Restraint 
and Reciprocity”.39 The gap between the Reaganite conception of an all-out campaign against 
the USSR and Haig‟s strategy surfaced in the Reagan administration‟s first NSPG meeting on 
30
th
 January 1981
40
 and the split continued until the Secretary of State‟s dismissal from the 
administration in June 1982, and beyond. 
Although the administration was divided over end goals, it was able to reach a degree 
of consensus over the broadcasting of democratic propaganda into the USSR. The 
administration‟s hard-liners had begun pushing for a stepped-up propaganda campaign against 
the USSR based on democratic ideology in March 1981, when hard-line NSC officials Carnes 
Lord and Richard Pipes argued for an increase in the budget and transmission capacity of 
Radio Free Europe and for Radio Liberty.
41
 Hardliners at the Voice of America wanted to go 
even further than Lord, Pipes or Wick, urging that 
We must strive to 'destabilize' the Soviet Union and its satellites by promoting 
disaffection between peoples and rulers, underscoring the lies and denials of rights, 
inefficient management of the economy, corruption, indifference to the real wants and 
needs of the people, suppression of cultural diversity, religious persecution, etc.
42
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Again, this negative theme was to be complemented by a positive US broadcasting campaign 
to "extol the merits of our system of pluralist, representative democracy and free enterprise as 
the surest guarantor of Human Rights and proven provider of the greatest prosperity the world 
has ever known."
43
 This propaganda campaign deployed the concept of democracy as a 
rhetorical tool to inspire political disaffection behind the Iron Curtain.  
It was possible to forge an administration consensus on the use of democracy as an 
abstract psychological warfare concept against the USSR as such a propaganda campaign did 
not aim at and could not have triggered the creation of democratic political structures on the 
ground. This meant that the strategic and organisational problems associated with such an 
effort did not arise. While the Reaganites believed that broadcasting democratic propaganda 
into the USSR could erode the regime‟s internal control, it was a comparatively safe tactic to 
deploy. The only consequence would have been poor diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union; and relations were already poor.  
This consensus was harder to maintain when the administration attempted to go 
beyond an abstract and rhetorical use of democracy to engage in operations which involved 
funding and backing opposition movements in Eastern Europe. Debates on political 
intervention in the Soviet Bloc focussed on Poland, which was then convulsed by the political 
conflict between the Polish Communist government and the Solidarity trade union. Key 
officials such as DCI Casey and the President himself saw Poland as the weakest link in the 
chain of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe
44
 and Solidarity as a key anti-Soviet political 
movement based in the heart of the Soviet zone of control in Eastern Europe. It was hoped 
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that US support of Solidarity could lead to the destabilisation of Communist Poland, with 
demonstration effects which would be felt throughout the Bloc. 
Although support of a democratic organisation such as Solidarity against a 
dictatorship was consonant with the portrayal of the Cold War as a battle between democracy 
and totalitarianism advanced by the administration, there were serious obstacles which would 
need to be overcome for the policy to be implemented. Geopolitically, the two factions within 
the administration disagreed over how far US policy was capable of influencing events on the 
ground in Eastern Europe, and thus how far the US should press its support of Solidarity. The 
fact that the USSR dominated Eastern Europe militarily made political operations on the 
ground extremely problematic, as the Soviets had shown themselves to be quite willing to 
crush uprisings and political movements with military force in East Germany in 1953, 
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968; and these movements had been indigenous 
rather than being linked to the US. While the Reaganites pushed for greater US involvement 
in the Polish situation, this course of action was opposed by the State Department and Haig, 
which argued that US ability to affect the balance of political forces on the ground was in fact 
limited in view of the geopolitical circumstances, and that US intervention could provoke a 
Soviet crackdown.
45
 Thus, Haig‟s policy was that, “We will stay out and we want [the 
Soviets] to do the same.”46 The democratisation of Eastern Europe simply had no place in 
Haig‟s policy framework of “Restraint and Reciprocity”. 
Implementation of the policy was also limited by the organisational gap left by the 
collapse of the state-private network and its aftermath. Clearly the chance of a hostile Soviet 
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response could be lessened by supplying US support through a private group, as the state-
private network had done before 1967. To accomplish this, the CIA attempted to re-forge the 
state-private network relationship it had had with AFL-CIO before the collapse of the network 
in 1967. The union confederation was already acting in support of Solidarity. In 1980 it had 
provided Solidarity with $150,000, collected through the union‟s Polish Workers Aid Fund, 
and also typewriters and printing presses, to allow the organisation to disseminate its message 
more widely.
47
 The AFL-CIO had also provided public support by organising an Information 
Office on Solidarity in New York,
48
 which was financially supported by Albert Shanker, 
leader of the American Federation of Teachers.  
    However, when the DCI attempted to re-forge an operational relationship with the 
AFL-CIO targeted at Poland, he was turned down
49
 due to the legacy of mistrust which the 
1967 exposure had left in the US civil society groups damaged by it. Although Irving Brown, 
the AFL-CIO‟s foreign policy chief, agreed to share information on the situation in Poland 
with the CIA during a meeting with Casey, he wanted no direct operational links between the 
Agency, the AFL-CIO and Solidarity, as he feared such links would taint both the AFL-CIO 
and Solidarity as puppets of the CIA, providing an excuse for a crackdown on the union.
50
 
Brown clearly wanted to take no risks in the wake of the crisis of 1967, in which a large 
number of CIA operations had been revealed to the world and the private groups associated 
with them tainted as collaborators of the US government. The US simply lacked an acceptable 
and effective organisational framework which could channel US funds to private groups for 
use abroad to match the pre-1967 state-private network as of 1981. The geopolitical and 
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organisational problems were inter-related, as organisational problems with channelling US 
aid through a plausibly deniable conduit reinforced the State Department‟s argument that no 
feasible way of intervening in the Soviet bloc existed without provoking a Soviet crackdown. 
While the promotion of democracy in the Soviet bloc was ideologically congruent 
with US values and supported US interests, intervention on the ground in Eastern Europe the 
second option was far more problematic than broadcasting propaganda, as it was limited by 
the problems of operating in an area under the military domination of a hostile state and the 
lack of a plausibly deniable organisational structure. In the absence of this structure, 
opposition to the policy crystallised on the pragmatic grounds that the US might obtain very 
little return for running the risk of triggering bloodshed in Eastern Europe and a US-Soviet 
confrontation. These pragmatic objections limited the application of the more confrontational 
Reaganite strategy in 1981. 
Democracy as Containment in El Salvador 
One of the most pressing issues facing the Reagan administration when it came to power was 
developing a policy towards Central America. It was this case which provoked the most 
tensions in its foreign policy, opening up an opportunity for the pursuit of a new policy aimed 
at democracy promotion. The Reagan administration had inherited the problems facing it in 
Central America from the Carter Administration. In 1979 Anastasio Somoza, a pro-US 
dictator, had been overthrown by a multi-class revolutionary uprising in Nicaragua and been 
replaced by the Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas. The administration believed that the Sandinistas 
were providing support to a Marxist insurgency against the pro-US civilian-military junta in 
El Salvador, which seemed to be in danger of collapse. The Carter administration had 
supplied aid to the Salvadoran junta, on condition that it pursue democratic and economic 
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reforms and curb Human Rights abuses carried out by the Army, Treasury Police and various 
right-wing death squads linked to these. 
 Reagan administration policy in the region faced the question of what course of action 
the US should take when an undemocratic pro-US regime with a poor Human Rights record, 
such as El Salvador, was threatened by anti-US Marxist insurgents. Although the situation in 
Central America was obviously most pressing, due to the upsurge in revolutionary activity in 
a region which was close to the US and which it had traditionally dominated, the issue was a 
wider one. The administration saw the fall of Nicaragua and the insurgency in El Salvador as 
the latest examples of an increase in revolutionary activity in the Third World over the 1970s 
which included the triumph of Marxist movements in South-east Asia, Angola and Ethiopia. 
Administration policy-makers attributed this surge to Soviet expansionism and intervention, 
not to local conditions. The President‟s comment in 1980 that “the Soviet Union underlies all 
the unrest that is going on” left little doubt about where he attributed responsibility for the 
recent wave of Third World revolutions.
51
 This perception that political instability in the 
Third World was the result of a Soviet plot to outflank the United States meant that the 
creation of a policy which could be deployed to halt further perceived Soviet expansionism in 
the Third World was of key importance. 
The administration saw democratisation and US national security objectives as being 
mutually contradictory in this situation; its initial approach was military. This approach was 
reinforced by a set of ideas which emerged from the criticisms of the Carter administration‟s 
Human Rights policy made by neoconservative intellectuals both before and after the fall of 
Nicaragua. The initial approach of critics such as Daniel P. Moynihan and Norman Podhoretz 
in the first two years of the Carter administration had been to co-opt the language of Human 
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Rights but to argue for a particularised campaign for their enforcement directed at Soviet 
communism rather than the right-wing regimes which the US was allied with to contain the 
USSR.
52
 To legitimise this, such critics drew a distinction between totalitarian Communist 
regimes and authoritarian dictatorships, arguing that authoritarian dictatorships were more 
likely to evolve towards democracy in the future.
53
  
Attitudes hardened after the fall of Iran and Nicaragua, as exemplified by the 
blistering attack launched on the Carter administration‟s foreign policy by Jeane Kirkpatrick 
in “Dictatorship and Double Standards”, an article published in Commentary several months 
after the fall of the two regimes. Kirkpatrick placed the question of US policy towards pro-US 
authoritarian regimes squarely in an East-West context marked by rising Soviet military 
power and influence in the Third World
54
 and argued that Carter‟s pressure on the Shah and 
particularly on Somoza to liberalise amounted to “active collaborat[ion] in the replacement of 
moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist 
persuasion.”55 Pressure on these strategically important regimes to liberalise had “actually 
facilitate[d] the job of the insurgents”,56 resulting in the weakening and then collapse of 
friendly regimes and damaging US interests. 
However, Kirkpatrick was concerned not only with criticising the administration‟s 
failures in specific cases but in setting out a doctrine for future policy towards pro-US 
authoritarian regimes. Kirkpatrick‟s argument that democratic systems were complex and 
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took many decades to build
57
  clearly implied that in the meantime the US should abandon 
misguided attempts to democratise authoritarian regimes under pressure from insurgents in a 
bid to defuse revolutionary movements. Kirkpatrick squared this with Human Rights concerns 
by arguing that right-wing authoritarian regimes were capable of evolving into democracies, 
whereas totalitarian Communist regimes could never do so.
58
 The argument made by these 
neoconservative intellectuals that authoritarian regimes were more susceptible to gradual 
democratic transformation at some point in the future provided a moral justification for the 
support of such regimes in the here-and-now, which they believed that US strategic interests 
dictated. By supporting authoritarian regimes the US was not only defending its own strategic 
interests, but also safeguarding spaces within which liberty could develop in the future. 
However, these critics laid out no concrete plan for facilitating such transitions and so failed 
to deal with the long-term strategic problem: the rise of anti-US revolutionary forces which 
such regimes often provoked, and their poor record in defeating these forces.  
This combined strategic and moral argument – the Kirkpatrick Doctrine - was 
extremely influential on the foreign policy of the early Reagan administration. In fact, Reagan 
was so impressed with Kirkpatrick‟s article that he appointed her UN Ambassador, with 
Cabinet rank, and made “Dictatorships and Double Standards” required reading for high-level 
foreign policy-makers in his administration.
59
 The President‟s use of Kirkpatrick‟s ideas is 
clearly shown in his comments, delivered at a press conference in May 1981, that under the 
Carter administration: 
we took countries that were pro-Western that were maybe authoritarian in 
government, but not totalitarian, more authoritarian than we would like, did not meet 
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all of our principles of what constitutes Human Rights, and we punished them at the 
same time we were claiming détente with countries where there were no Human 
Rights. The Soviet Union is the greatest violator today of Human Rights in all the 
world.
60
 
 
Similarly, Reagan‟s National Security Advisor and fellow CPD member, Richard 
Allen, stated that  
we may fervently wish that all nations adopt institutions similar to our own. But we 
are too sensitive to the…manifold obstacles many nations in maintaining even a 
modest level of political stability, to try to impose our institutions on them.
61
 
 
While in Eastern Europe and the Soviet bloc an effort to set up regimes modelled on 
America‟s form of government was thought to be in the national security interests, such an 
attempt in the Third World could erode the US‟ strategic position and lead to Soviet gains. 
Instead, the goal for policy towards pro-US authoritarians was to maintain political stability 
through support for existing regimes, not to push for reforms. 
In Latin America, this drive for stability was augmented by a perceived deterioration 
in US power and influence in the region over the Carter years, due to the Human Rights 
policy. Kirkpatrick‟s follow-up article in early 1981 was more narrowly focussed on Latin 
America, and Central America in particular, and it sounded alarms over what she argued was 
a serious deterioration of the US security position in the region. Kirkpatrick stated that 
The deterioration of the US position in the hemisphere has already created serious 
vulnerabilities where none previously existed, and threatens now to confront this 
country with the unprecedented need to defend itself against a ring of Soviet bases on 
and around our southern and eastern borders.
62
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A similar analysis emerged from the Republican Committee of Santa Fe, which held meetings 
on Latin American policy during Reagan‟s election campaign and concluded that the Human 
Rights policy in Latin America 
must be abandoned and replaced by a non-interventionist policy of political and 
ethical realism. [The Human Rights policy] has cost the United States friends and 
allies and thus influence...”63 
 This fear that pressuring pro-US authoritarian regimes to reform would lead to 
Communist takeovers was bolstered in the case of El Salvador by concerns about US 
credibility and geopolitical considerations. Early in the Reagan administration‟s first year 
Alexander Haig selected El Salvador as a test case to demonstrate that the Soviet advance in 
the Third World could and would be halted, chiefly for two reasons. Firstly, El Salvador was 
seen as the US‟  “front yard” and it was believed that the United States needed to react to it in 
such a way as to demonstrate its renewed toughness and “determination to control world 
events”.64 Secondly, the conflict in El Salvador was thought to be winnable, leading to an 
easy victory for the US which would re-establish US credibility without a great deal of 
sacrifice.
65
 In this way the situation was “fortuitous” as " a specific crisis already was under 
way in which Reagan could demonstrate his resolve”; by defeating the supposed Soviet-
Cuban attempts to take over El Salvador, Reagan would be “send[ing] a message to 
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Moscow”66 that further intervention in the Third World would not be tolerated, thus 
strengthening containment. 
Conversely, it was believed that failure in El Salvador would touch off a “domino” 
effect in the rest of Central America which would be damaging to US strategic interests. 
According to Haig: 
What we are watching is a four-phased operation of which phase one has already been 
completed-the seizure of Nicaragua. Next is El Salvador, to be followed by Honduras 
and Guatemala ...I would call it a priority target list-a hit list, if you will, for the 
ultimate take-over of Central America.
67
 
 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders further spelled out the 
geopolitical implications of a Marxist victory in El Salvador: 
If, after Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority, who in Central 
America would not live in fear? How long would it be before major strategic US 
interests-the [Panama] Canal, sea-lanes, oil supplies-were at risk?
68
 
 
This set of geopolitical fears, coupled with the ideological anti-communism of many 
Reaganite policy-makers, combined to create a situation in which maintaining a non-Marxist 
government in El Salvador was perceived as vital; there was no margin for error. This 
elevation of what was essentially a civil war of no more than regional importance at most into 
a situation of key importance for US geopolitical interests and credibility produced an 
atmosphere of crisis in which the strategy of the Reagan administration differed sharply from 
that of the Carter administration, which had tied military aid to the Salvadoran government to 
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calls for increased respect for Human Rights and land reform measures 
69
 “as a means of 
alleviating the underlying causes of leftist revolutionary pressures”.70  
In contrast, in the first half of 1981 the Reagan administration argued that reforms in 
El Salvador should be pursued at some unspecified future time after US national security 
objectives had been fulfilled.
71
 Reagan argued that “You do not try to fight a civil war and 
institute reforms at the same time. Get rid of the war. Then go forward with the reforms.”72 
The administration‟s policy was based on the fear that calling for reforms during a period of 
conflict and thus weakening the regime would lead to its collapse and a guerrilla takeover, in 
a repeat of what policy-makers believed had happened in Nicaragua under Carter. 
This fear of the national security consequences of pressuring a dictatorial US ally to 
reform was reflected in the administration‟s initial military approach to the conflict. In March 
1981 the administration granted $25 million in emergency military aid to El Salvador, an 
amount larger than the previous military aid for 1946-1980 combined.
73
 Although the State 
Department gave rhetorical support for free elections and condemned the terror wielded by 
the army and rightist death squads in February 1981,
74
 at the same time the administration 
removed the conditions which had been placed on military aid by the Carter administration to 
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encourage reform,
75
 arguing that defeating the insurgency should take first priority.
76
 The 
administration gave rhetorical support to reform and elections while jettisoning the very 
leverage which would have allowed it to pressure the Salvadoran army to support these 
objectives. US support for democracy was thus reduced to negative anti-communism, as the 
administration and its supporters argued that a Marxist victory would be more damaging to 
the cause of democracy than the status quo. 
However, this policy proved to be unsustainable in its initial form due to ideological 
and political pressures within the United States and military stalemate in El Salvador. The 
domestic problems which the administration encountered were a product of the raised profile 
of Human Rights in the thinking of Congress and the general population due to the Carter 
administration‟s championing of the concept, coupled with uncertainty that a solely military 
approach could be effective, produced by the US defeat in Vietnam. The administration, in 
attempting to return to a pre-1967 policy framework towards pro-US authoritarians threatened 
by revolutionaries, had failed to factor the political and ideological changes which had 
occurred during the Vietnam War and due to the rise of Human Rights as a legitimate US 
foreign policy concern under the Carter administration into its thinking.
77
 While Carter had 
lost the 1980 election, the Human Rights current in US society had not begun with him, and 
advocates of a Human Rights approach remained in Congress after his fall.
78
 
The administration experienced a low level of support for its policy among the US 
population, with many Americans rejecting greater US involvement in El Salvador due to 
fears that US aid would inevitably lead to the introduction of US combat troops, as it had in 
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Vietnam, and greater concern over Human Rights abuses by allied governments.
79
 While the 
administration was internally united in its military approach to El Salvador, this lack of 
support from the general population was exacerbated by a strategic disagreement with 
Congress, which argued that rather than being damaging to US national security objectives, 
pursuing a policy of pressuring the junta to enact reforms could help to achieve these 
objectives. In Congress‟ view the US should pursue a strategy of reform to draw the people of 
El Salvador away from support for the guerrillas, rather than putting off reforms to some 
future date when the danger of a Marxist victory had disappeared. The initial policy came 
under increasing assault from Congress during 1981 as the legislature attempted to push the 
administration closer to a policy more focussed on support for Human Rights and political 
reform. This pressure began in the House, where Democrats on the Foreign Affairs 
Committee restored the conditions which the Carter administration had attached to aid to El 
Salvador. In May the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called for Reagan to certify, every 
six months, that the Government of El Salvador   
Is not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of Human Rights treatment of its 
people. 
Is moving to achieve control over all elements of its own armed forces. 
Is making continued progress in implementing essential economic and political reforms, 
including the land reform program. 
Is committed to the holding of free elections at an early date. 
Has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate with opposition groups an equitable political 
resolution of the conflict
80
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before aid would be released. While Congress may have been influenced in this stance by 
moral considerations connected to Human Rights, the disagreement was primarily over 
tactics, with the debate being over “how best to isolate and deal with these terrorists [the 
Salvadoran left], through military assistance or through reforms that eliminate the grievances 
upon which they depend for sustenance.”81 
The hard-line faction of the Reagan administration continued to believe that such 
reforms would result in the collapse of the Salvadoran junta, as it believed Human Rights 
reforms had helped to topple Somoza, thus further worsening the US strategic position in 
Central America. Several Reaganite policy-makers, such as Richard Allen, William Clark, the 
Deputy Secretary of State, and Fred Ikle, the Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, argued 
that the administration should maintain its original policy to provoke a confrontation with 
Congress over the management of US foreign policy. If the administration won such a show-
down it would be able to make foreign policy in Central America and other areas of the world 
without Congressional interference; however, if Congress won it would then have to take the 
blame for losing El Salvador to Communism.
82
 Winning the war had to take priority over the 
promotion of democracy, which might turn out to be unachievable and lead to another US 
defeat.
83
 It was clear that unless the policy was changed, the Executive and Legislature were 
moving towards a serious confrontation over El Salvador, sparked by disagreements over 
whether pursuing a policy of democratisation would enhance or detract from the achievement 
of US national security objectives. 
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At the same time, State Department officials were coming to believe that the purely 
military policy was proving ineffective on the ground. A State Department assessment of the 
situation in El Salvador produced in early July 1981 stated that  
Neither the Armed Forces nor the guerrillas are strong enough to defeat the other 
decisively in the near term. The struggle has evolved into a war of attrition.
84
 
 
With no immediate government military victory in sight, detaching the population from the 
guerrillas assumed more importance. The government needed to broaden its “narrow base of 
support”85  and end the political fragmentation which gripped the country:  
All the major actors – the Armed Forces, the Christian Democrats, the business sector, 
labor and peasant organizations – are highly suspicious of each other and face sharp 
internal divisions.
86
 
These domestic political and strategic pressures impelled State Department officials to 
advance a new approach to the conflict in El Salvador based on the support of democratic 
processes. On July 16
th
 Thomas Enders, the highest-ranking State Department official with 
direct responsibility for policy towards Central America, called for US support for free 
elections in El Salvador.  In part, this change was motivated by “a growing feeling within the 
administration that that its policy in El Salvador had gained little popular support”.87 To 
secure such support from Congress and the population, Enders‟ speech stressed US support 
for concrete democratisation measures, a position which was likely to resonate ideologically 
with Americans. 
Enders also tied democratisation to the need for military aid, stating that “the search 
for a political solution will not succeed unless the United States sustains its assistance to El 
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Salvador”88 and that “[w]e can help by…[s]tanding by our friends while they work out a 
democratic solution.”89 Therefore, democratisation was offered as a quid pro quo for the 
maintenance of military aid for El Salvador, as the administration feared that without reform 
Congress might simply pull the plug on funding. Enders‟ speech deployed the spread of 
democracy as a legitimating concept to rally Congress and the American public behind US 
government support for the government of El Salvador and headed off a possible 
confrontation between the Executive and the Legislature. 
The new policy went beyond the rhetorical use of democracy often deployed by the 
Reagan administration, however, by proposing the creation of democratic structures on the 
ground for geopolitical reasons. According to the Assistant Secretary, the best way to produce 
a stable government with popular legitimacy was through elections, which would act to 
dampen down the insurgency:  
We believe that the solution must be democratic because only a genuinely pluralist 
approach can enable a profoundly divided society to live with itself without violent 
convulsions.
90
 
 
Democracy would contribute to the future stability of El Salvador, rather than 
undermining it, by producing a government which was seen as legitimate by the population 
and removing the conflict from the battlefield, where the US and its client government were 
just about holding the line, into the political arena. 
Enders had a great deal of difficulty in building a consensus for the support of 
elections in El Salvador in the administration due to the fear of other policy-makers that the 
outcome of elections would not necessarily be in line with US interests. The Assistant 
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Secretary recalled: “People said they don‟t know what will happen. Who‟ll win. How can we 
tell?”91 This fear underlined the essential contradiction between US support for the autonomy 
of foreign populations and security interests; such populations, given autonomy, might choose 
a government which was incompatible with US interests. However, the State Department had 
decided to run this risk in the hope that greater stability would result from democratic 
elections. 
The Department had not changed the objective of US policy towards El Salvador: this 
still remained the containment of the insurgency and maintaining a stable pro-US government 
in power in San Salvador. However, State Department officials had come to believe that in the 
case of El Salvador a democratic regime would be a more efficient tool of containment, as it 
would be more stable and more legitimate with both the Salvadoran population and with 
Congress, and thus a stronger barrier to Marxism than the current ruling junta. This was a 
pragmatic decision, not an ideological one, aimed at resolving the political problems the 
policy was facing in Washington and securing a more stable and legitimate regime capable of 
facing a protracted guerrilla war on the ground. 
However, Enders‟ speech did not touch on one real difficulty of the policy: it specified 
no mechanism to ensure that the elections it called for would be credible enough to be 
accepted as legitimate by the population of El Salvador. This was a very real difficulty 
considering El Salvador‟s political history of rigged or stolen elections. The State Department 
paper commented that:  
The process for establishing a legitimate successor regime through elections is 
underway, but its success is far from assured. Owing to their experience with “stolen” 
elections, few Salvadorans have faith in the democratic process.
92
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Ratification of the elections as free and fair by a US government agency would not be 
convincing in propaganda terms, as the US was supporting the government in the civil war. 
This was an organisational gap in the State Department‟s political strategy.  
Despite the existence of this organisational gap, however, it is important to stress the 
novelty of the State Department‟s strategy; rather than deploying democratic rhetoric to 
legitimate US tactics which had little or no connection to democracy as a functioning political 
system, the Department was calling for the creation of functioning democratic processes in a 
friendly state threatened by an anti-US insurgency. Furthermore, the Department saw this 
action as a way of protecting US national security interests, not as sacrificing them to 
ideology or the need for legitimation. 
Although the Reagan administration deployed democratic rhetoric in support of its 
foreign policy in 1981, it failed to meld this democratic rhetoric with a coherent national 
security strategy which operationalised democracy promotion in support of US objectives. 
Instead, the administration remained divided into two factions pursuing particularist strategies 
of heightened economic and political warfare focussed on weakening Soviet control of the 
Bloc in Europe, or containment. The starting point for these strategies and the focus on the 
particular cases tied to each one was geopolitics and, more so for the Reaganite faction, 
fervent ideological anti-communism, not a universal democratic ideology. Rather than 
informing the formation of policy, democratic ideology was deployed on a piecemeal basis in 
cases where it was thought to be in line with US national security interests. 
While the administration was able to agree on the tactical use of democracy in cases 
where both sides prioritised the same short-term geopolitical goal and the use of democratic 
ideology was limited to propaganda, the question of whether attempts to alter political 
87 
 
structures on the ground were congruent with US national security interests and how this 
could be achieved was more divisive. In the case of Poland, pragmatic difficulties such as 
disagreements over how far US attempts to intervene politically could be effective, coupled 
with the organisational gap which continued to exist in the national security apparatus, 
conspired to halt implementation of a more interventionist policy. In the case of El Salvador, 
the administration became embroiled in a dispute with Congress over whether 
democratisation would further or damage US national security, while its allies became bogged 
down in a military stalemate on the ground. The State Department‟s final decision to support 
elections was taken on a pragmatic basis to break both the political impasse domestically and 
the military impasse in El Salvador, rather than on ideological grounds. Thus, while 
democracy was deployed in different cases to achieve different outcomes in 1981, there was 
no attempt by the Reagan administration to operationalise a universal democratic ideology. 
In addition to strategic and political/ideological problems, the administration as a 
whole also faced an organisational problem which it was just beginning to perceive. What is 
striking is that the policies of both administration factions in those areas where the primary 
mode of struggle was to be political, such as Poland and El Salvador, were hampered by the 
lack of a plausibly deniable organisation capable of supporting political forces abroad. It was 
precisely this organisational gap that the democracy promoters aimed to fill. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PARTICULARIST VERSUS EXPANSIVE VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
The State Department‟s change of course to supporting democratic processes in El Salvador 
in July 1981 had been preceded by calls for democracy promotion programs from private 
figures. In the first half of 1981 these figures advanced two blueprints for democracy 
promotion which were based on the ideas advanced by William Douglas, George Agree and 
Michael Samuels over the 1970s. The first was set out by Constantine C. Menges, a 
conservative intellectual and former analyst for the RAND Corporation and critic of the 
Carter administration‟s policies in Iran and Nicaragua.1 The second was set out by William 
Douglas and Michael Samuels and marked a further phase in the private democracy 
promoters‟ attempt to gain Executive backing for their proposals. These plans deployed 
similar tactical and organisational ideas; however, they differed in their targeting. Menges‟ 
vision focussed primarily on El Salvador and perhaps Nicaragua, with the proviso that it 
might be useful in other Latin American countries. It represented a particularist strategy 
which had been generalised from pre-existing national security cases. In contrast, the second 
approach began from a more expansive strategy targeted at all non-democratic states in the 
Third World and fitted existing current crises into this framework.  
 Despite this key difference, both of these blueprints went beyond the pre- and post-
July 1981 Reagan administration policy in a number of ways. Firstly, they went beyond the 
use of democratic rhetoric as a tool of legitimation and an ideological weapon to advocate 
serious efforts to construct functioning democratic systems in other countries. Secondly, they 
went beyond the State Department‟s focus on El Salvador as an isolated case where the 
support of democracy was possible and permissible. Thirdly, they proposed the creation of 
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new instrumentalities to pursue the creation of democratic systems through democratic 
political tactics.  
This was far more coherent than the Reagan administration‟s practice of attempting to 
legitimate a disparate group of strategies and tactics arising from different cases under the 
banner of “democracy”. In contrast, the private sector visions advocated an internally 
coherent approach which married together a strategy aimed at genuine democratic 
transformations with tactics for achieving these transformations based on democratic methods 
of political organisation, to be implemented by an organisation which could credibly claim to 
be democratic in form.  
 In the wake of the State Department‟s policy shift on El Salvador, there was a clear 
window of opportunity to push for a more expansive and coherent strategy on the model of 
the private blueprints. However, this opportunity was not taken. Strategically, intra-
administration policy debates continued to be framed in terms of containing Soviet power or 
weakening the USSR and its allies through political warfare initiatives, with democratic 
rhetoric being exploited to support policies which had little connection to promoting 
democracy in reality. More generally, the administration tended to meld democracy with 
Human Rights and to continue to attempt to use this as both a tool of legitimation and an 
ideological weapon, avoiding serious discussion of how and whether to aim at the 
transformation of existing political structures in countries beyond El Salvador. By the end of 
1981, democracy promotion still remained confined to the Americas, with immediate 
implementation restricted to El Salvador at the most limited.  
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The Particularist approach  
Although the core group of private sector democracy promoters had been active in promoting 
its ideas in Washington through presentations given by Michael Samuels and William Brock 
of the APF, who had recently been appointed the US Trade Representative in the Reagan 
administration, a more particularist vision was put forward by Constantine C. Menges in 
January 1981 at a Woodrow Wilson Centre symposium on the future of US foreign policy. 
Although he had not been connected with the APF or with William Douglas or Michael 
Samuels in the 1970s, his proposal articulated many ideas that had emerged from these 
individuals and organisations. Furthermore, Menges‟ memoirs make clear that he was aware 
of the source of the ideas he was deploying, and may have had prior contact with their 
proponents.
2
  
In the January 1981 paper, several months before the State Department‟s shift towards 
supporting democracy in El Salvador, Menges explicitly identified the support or creation of 
functioning democratic governments as a US national security interest in terms that paralleled 
the arguments made by the democracy promoters in the 1970s, arguing that “social reform 
and democratic political development are not only intrinsically in the US interest, but that 
these ultimately provide the best defence against Communist success.”3 However, in contrast 
to the visions put forward by William Douglas, George Agree and Michael Samuels in the 
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1970s, Menges limited the sphere of his suggested strategy to the crises immediately facing 
the US in Central and Latin America. In El Salvador, Menges called for provision by the US 
of “more political and economic support for peaceful reform…”,4 thus pre-empting the State 
Department‟s change of course in July.  In Nicaragua, Menges argued that 
Genuinely democratic groups still exist and there is still some chance to prevent a 
Cuban-style totalitarian state being consolidated – but only if much more help (a la 
Portugal) is given to the democratic forces…5 
 
In addition, the US could also provide democratic assistance to liberalisation programs 
beginning in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile.
6
 
In a line of argument clearly indebted to Samuels, he suggested that the best method 
of supporting democratic forces in Central and Latin America would be through semi-private 
organisations. One example of such an organisation was the AFL-CIO‟s American Institute 
of Free Labor Development, a trade union training organisation running programs in union 
organising techniques and anti-communist ideology across Latin America. AIFLD had been 
founded 18 months after the Cuban revolution of January 1959 to strengthen pro-US unions 
in Latin America and so prevent further revolutions. It had been funded by the Kennedy 
administration as part of the Alliance for Progress,
7
 in the hope that “the talents and 
experience of the US labor movement could be brought to bear on the danger that 
Castro…might undermine the Latin American labor movement.”8 Throughout its history the 
organisation had received funds from US government agencies, either AID or the CIA,
 9
  and 
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had acted in support of US foreign priorities either through its training centres or through 
affiliated Latin American unions in Brazil in 1964, the Dominican Republic in the 1960s and 
Chile in the 1970s, before, during and after the right-wing coups these countries 
experienced.
10
  
Menges stated that “[t]his private organization…has worked for years in some Latin 
American countries to help the genuinely democratic trade union community…become more 
effective and compete with the Communist-dominated unions and mass action 
organizations.”11 This recommendation may also have specifically been designed with the 
situation of El Salvador in mind, as AIFLD was at that moment already active in El Salvador 
providing assistance to peasant groups in support of the Duarte government‟s land reform.12 
However, Menges‟ plans went beyond stepped-up funding for AIFLD to include a 
new “semi-autonomous organization” modelled on the West German Party Foundations13 
which had intervened in Portugal to prevent a Communist takeover in 1975-6. Such a semi-
private foundation could provide a focal point for the creation of a network of US-friendly 
democrats; help the leaders of democratic groups to ward off attempts to capture their 
organisations by extremists;
14
 and even “provid[e] advisory help in the conduct of fair 
elections”.15 This organisation would clearly need to be American to make certain that it 
acted in the US national interest; while one of the West German party foundations, the 
socialist Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, was already involved in political work in El Salvador, it 
was providing assistance to anti-government leftist groups linked to the guerrillas, not the 
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government itself.
16
 While the methods deployed by the FES were worthy of emulation, 
clearly the targeting of its assistance was a problem. 
The semi-private nature of this foundation would be integral to its ability to operate 
abroad in support of pro-US democratic groups in Central America, as its non-governmental 
nature meant that it would be able to “act separately from the official diplomatic presence”17 
in “specific countries of interest”.18 Assistance with the conduct of elections by such an 
organisation could be vital in the context of El Salvador, with its history of stolen or rigged 
elections, to convince the populations of both El Salvador and the United States that any 
elections held as part of a transition to a democratic regime were credible. The semi-
autonomous nature of the proposed organisation would be suitable for performing this 
function, as it was clearly preferable that elections be certified as credible by an ostensibly 
private organisation rather than an agency of the US government, which was supporting the 
government of El Salvador in the civil war. 
Menges‟ proposals were in direct contradiction to the administration‟s foreign policy 
framework for dealing with dictatorships, which were rooted in Jeane Kirkpatrick‟s 
arguments that support of authoritarian regimes accorded more closely with US interests than 
attempts to reform them from the outside. The organisation he recommended was clearly 
intended to produce political transformations in its target countries through direct assistance 
to political sectors by yet-to-be-founded instrumentalities and organisations, linked to 
previous state-private network participants such as organised labour. This proposal was more 
tactically and organisationally coherent than the administration rhetoric of the time, as it 
called for the creation of democratic systems abroad through the support of democratic 
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groups rather than aid to military-dominated regimes, connecting the end goal which the 
administration professed to support – democracy – with the tactics to be used to achieve it. 
Menges‟ proposal was strategically less comprehensive than the other models put 
forward outside the Executive in the 1970s. Geographically it was limited to the Western 
Hemisphere, and clearly emphasised a focus on countries within the region where national 
security crises were already in train at that time, such as El Salvador, giving the strategy an 
immediate emphasis on short-term national security goals rather than a transformative 
approach which aimed to alter pro-US dictatorships before such problems began. 
Nevertheless, the proposal took many of the tactical and organisational ideas of the 
democracy promoters and applied them in detail to an existing national security crisis, which 
could provide a way to secure administration support of the concept. 
A coherent approach to promoting democracy in the Third World: beyond the Kirkpatrick 
Doctrine 
Whereas Menges‟ proposal had been particularist, a program of democracy promotion aimed 
at the Third World as a whole was set out by two of the original proposers of democracy 
promotion in the first few months of 1981. The authors of this proposal were William 
Douglas, who had originally proposed a private campaign of democracy promotion in the 
Third World in 1972, and Michael Samuels, who had narrowed the concept to focus on US 
national security interests. In 1981 they amalgamated their ideas in a paper which was given 
at the International Studies Association
19
 and then published as an article in August 1981 in 
order “to further focus policymakers' attention on the need for a political development 
program.”20 The two campaigners set out a strategy for democracy promotion which was far 
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wider than Menges‟ ideas, both in terms of geographical reach and transformative strategy. 
They set out a clear strategic need for the US government to support democracy promotion 
which went beyond the case of El Salvador, arguing that “US security is jeopardized when 
dictatorial leftist movements are likely to succeed in overthrowing conservative authoritarian 
regimes that have been pro-West.”21 The remedy for this was to be US support for democratic 
parties, interest groups and coalitions who could act as “bulwarks against Marxist 
revolutionaries or militarists”,22 thus averting successful Marxist revolutions and replacing 
unpopular dictatorships with more stable and legitimate democracies. This agenda was 
clearly compatible with the evolving administration priorities in Central America; indeed, 
Samuels and Douglas cited “El Salvador and Guatemala” as countries “where the presiding 
regimes are shaky, the democratic center is miniscule, and dictatorial leftists lead the 
opposition”,23 indicating that these countries would benefit from a democracy promotion 
approach. In common with Menges, they also suggested that democracy promotion would be 
useful in Nicaragua, where “democratic pluralist elements have been fighting a rearguard 
action to try to prevent the installation of a totalitarian dictatorship” and argued that the 
independent newspaper, La Prensa, labour and business organisations and “a private sector 
Commission on Human Rights” should be given assistance to co-ordinate their efforts and 
make them more effective political opponents of the Sandinistas.
24
 
However, whereas the administration as a whole began with particular cases and then 
deployed universalist democratic ideology to legitimate its particular approach to those cases, 
Samuels and Douglas began from an expansive strategy focussed on the Third World as a 
whole, and then showed how it could be applicable to the current crises which the Reagan 
administration was prioritising. Their strategic conception of using guided democratic 
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transformations to ward off anti-American revolutions clearly went beyond anything the 
administration had in mind at that moment, as it was primarily focussed on preventing 
national security crises before they arose. This approach went beyond immediate national 
security priorities in Central America, as Douglas and Samuels‟ argument that initial 
“activities not be limited to purely short-term targets of opportunity” and that “[m]any of the 
program‟s activities should focus on the longer range development of political institutions”25 
showed clearly that their approach was aimed at fostering change over the long-term. This is 
further shown by their argument that the US should begin to build democratic groups in pro-
US authoritarian regimes such as “Zaire, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and 
Honduras”26 as “countries in which there is an apparent danger of imminent political 
collapse”27, since “US interests would be furthered by strengthening democratic pluralist 
forces of countries facing political collapse before such a collapse occurs.”28. The authors‟ 
final aim was to create “programs to assist development of democracy in the Third World.”29 
This provided the coherent approach to Third World political systems which had been 
missing from US foreign policy throughout the Cold War.  
It is clear that democracy promotion had an internal coherence as a strategy which 
was lacking in the worldview of both administration factions. For the strategy to be effective, 
however it would need to be implemented in a manner that was tactically and 
organisationally sound, and credible to foreign democrats. The authors argued that the best 
organisational structure for such an effort would be a “new semiprivate foundation 
specifically for political work abroad” 30 which could act as an “umbrella organization”31 for 
several US private groups carrying out democracy promotion programs. Almost all, if not all, 
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of the funding for this foundation was expected to be provided by the US government.
32
  The 
foundation would provide training rather than financial support to political parties overseas, 
as Samuels and Douglas felt purely financial support could attract opportunists who wanted 
to benefit financially from the program rather than committed democrats.
33
 Instead of merely 
disbursing funding, a US democracy foundation would offer training to party leaders and 
activists and seek to strengthen the organisation of political parties, as “organisation, more 
than black bags full of dollars or rubles, change[s] the political course of a nation”.34  
The new foundation would also incorporate US private groups which had previously 
participated in state-private network operations, such as the AFL-CIO and the US business 
community.
35
 Samuels and Douglas sought to co-opt these influential sectors into their 
democracy promotion campaign by arguing that they needed to expand their focus from 
spreading US economic practices to spreading the political model which they claimed 
supported this economic framework. They pointed out that although the US Chamber of 
Commerce was active in advocating the economic value of free enterprise in its publications,  
little is said about the fact that free enterprise can flourish best only under democratic 
pluralist conditions. Free enterprise is part and parcel of pluralism, but dictators of all 
kinds prefer centralization, regimentation, and hierarchy.
36
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 In a similar way the authors acknowledged the work done abroad by the AFL-CIO‟s 
institutes – AIFLD in Latin America, together with a similar instrumentality for Asia, 
AAFLI, and for Africa, AALC – but complained that these organisations‟ training programs 
for foreign unionists tended to focus on the economic role of unions rather than their political 
role and did not provide sufficient ideological guidance.
37
 “In contrast,” the authors argued, 
“their labor colleagues who graduate from communist labor training courses have no such 
doubts about where they stand ideologically.”38 Labour and business would have their 
overseas operations re-politicised and their sectional interests subsumed into a wider project 
of democracy promotion as a result of their incorporation into the new state-private network 
the authors wanted to construct. 
The form of the proposed organisation, as a project to be managed by private groups 
rather than government bureaucracies or intelligence agencies, was ideologically consistent 
with the idea that what separated democracy as a political system from its competitors, such 
as Soviet Communism, was the autonomy of individual citizens and the vitality of the sphere 
of civil society. This was the same logic which had prompted CIA officials to construct the 
pre-1967 state-private network of civil society groups. The authors refer to these operations 
in their article,
39
 but there were several key differences between this previous model of 
political intervention and the new network being proposed. Firstly, whereas previously 
private groups had been deployed on a tactical basis within a strategic framework set by the 
state, the strategy proposed in the article was based on priorities set by intellectuals working 
outside the Executive, not the state. Although there was some crossover between the 
immediate target countries for democracy promotion in Central America, such as El 
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Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua,
40
 and the current geopolitical concerns of the Reagan 
administration, it is clear that the program of democratisation advocated by the democracy 
promoters was wider than the Reaganite‟s sphere of concern in the Third World. The aim of 
democratising pro-US authoritarian regimes was also out of step with the fact that most 
administration policy-makers accepted the Kirkpatrick Doctrine‟s contentions that support of 
political reform and the achievement of US national security objectives were often mutually 
contradictory, especially in pro-US authoritarian states.  In addition, while the Reagan 
administration was also concerned with the projection of democratic ideology in Western 
Europe and the Reaganites in particular wished to support anti-communist political 
movements behind the Iron Curtain, these concerns are not mentioned by Douglas and 
Samuels. This omission of plans for activities in the Soviet bloc prevented the vision 
advanced by the two campaigners from being a truly universal one aimed at all non-
democratic states. These strategic differences between state and private priorities translated 
into differences in organisational form between the old and new networks, as the fact that 
democracy promotion would function within a strategic framework which did not exactly 
correspond to the immediate national security concerns of the state indicated the need for 
more autonomy for the democracy promotion instrumentalities than the previous state-private 
network had enjoyed. Significantly, while Douglas and Samuels accepted the need for “a 
government policy input” into democracy promotion, they specified that the new democracy 
promotion foundation would be “free from government control”.41 This indicates that the 
foundation, rather than a government agency such as the CIA, would serve as the co-
ordinating centre for democracy promotion.  
A further key difference between the old and new state-private organisational models 
was that the new democracy promotion foundation would provide assistance to foreign 
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groups openly, rather than covertly. This overt method of operation was necessary, as 
“Covert political aid provided directly by the US government is limited in its effectiveness by 
the fact that political movements are uncomfortable with such direct contacts, fearing that 
their independence could be compromised.”42 This formulation was undoubtedly correct, as 
shown by the AFL-CIO‟s response to offers of CIA co-operation over Poland and its 
prediction of Solidarity‟s likely response, discussed in the previous chapter. However, in 
common with the previous state-private network, almost all, if not all, of the funding for the 
foundation was expected to be provided by the US government.
43
  This begged the question 
of why overt assistance from a private group disbursing government money and with a policy 
input from US government officials would be seen as any more credible than the pre-1967 
organisational model. Douglas and Samuels did not discuss this question in depth in their 
article, but there are indications of their thinking on this matter. They believed that their tactic 
of providing foreign groups with assistance and training in organisational methods would be 
seen as more credible to foreign populations than simply providing funding, as “[a]n 
organization dependent on foreign funding could have difficulty convincing the local citizens 
that it speaks for local interests, not foreign interests.”44 In addition, they mentioned other 
organisations which combined private management and government funding and were 
already operating effectively, such as the Asia Foundation, the Inter-American Foundation 
and the West German party foundations
45
, as models for their own foundation. However, 
there does not seem to have been any systematic thinking on this matter; when the two 
authors do raise the matter of credibility, they dispose of it rapidly by asserting that “Political 
development abroad is a legitimate function for the US government.”46 
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In the first half of 1981, private sector intellectuals had made two differing proposals 
for a democracy promotion policy and an instrumentality to implement it through. While both 
could be applied to immediate US national security crises in Central America, the blueprint 
set out by Douglas and Samuels was more comprehensive than that of Menges, both in terms 
of the tactical and organisational blueprint offered, and in terms of going beyond immediate 
national security crises to develop a pre-emptive approach to democracy in the Third World 
by building democratic movements in dictatorships before revolutionary seizures of power. 
Douglas and Samuels also went beyond the Reagan administration‟s concepts by arguing for 
a concrete attempt to build functioning democratic movements abroad
47
 rather than seeing the 
promotion of democracy as a rhetorical tool for the legitimation of policy or as an ideological 
weapon.
48
 If accepted by the administration, the attempt to operationalise this blueprint would 
re-open the question of how attempts to promote political reform overseas could be meshed 
with US national security objectives at the strategic and organisational levels. 
The Governmental limitation of Democracy Promotion 
Irrespective of whether the State Department was influenced by the proposals of Douglas and 
Samuels or by Menges, on El Salvador the Department was moving towards a strategy of 
democracy promotion. This change presented the private sector democracy promoters with an 
important opportunity to push for the implementation of a wider policy of democracy 
promotion and the creation of a democracy promotion foundation to implement it. The 
opportunity arose from the fact that Enders‟ policy speech had not addressed the 
organisational gap which had been pointed out by Menges, Samuels and Douglas: the speech 
specified no mechanism to promote democracy in El Salvador, or to build up civil society 
groups favourable to the United States.  
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 This organisational problem and the opportunity for the democracy promoters to 
overcome it through their tactical and organisational concepts created an incentive for the 
State Department to champion a policy of democracy promotion. However, the question 
facing the Department in the second half of 1981 was whether it would widen its new 
strategy of democratising El Salvador to strengthen containment to embrace the whole of the 
Third World, as Douglas and Samuels were advocating, or whether it would treat the country 
as an isolated particular case and limit the deployment of the strategy geographically. The 
administration as a whole failed to generalise a policy from the Salvadoran example and 
continued to conduct its strategic discussions in terms of containment of Soviet power or the 
undermining of existing Communist regimes, and to see democracy as an ideological tool for 
the legitimation of its policy in its own zone and for launching ideological attacks on the 
Soviet bloc, rather than as a guide to practical action. 
 The obvious next step in widening a strategy based on democracy beyond El Salvador 
would have been to institute support for pro-US political and civil society groups in 
Nicaragua, as Menges had advocated in January and Douglas and Samuels had discussed 
several months later. Political methods of intervention in Nicaragua, such as the funding 
parties or trade unions, were initially championed by the US ambassador to Managua, 
Lawrence Pezzullo. These methods may have feasibly produced some change or disruption in 
Nicaragua in early 1981, as the Sandinistas were still consolidating their position and did not 
yet have total dominance over Nicaraguan political life. Although the FSLN was a powerful 
political force in Nicaragua at this point, pro-US political actors still held a small number of 
positions in a coalition government, and anti-Sandinista labour unions and business 
organisations existed. Pezzullo hoped that measures of support for the internal opposition 
such as action to build up the independent news media and political parties would encourage 
key opposition figures to remain within Nicaragua, where they could exercise some influence 
103 
 
on the course of political events, rather than having them flee outside the country.
49
 Under the 
Carter administration, 60% of the US government‟s aid to Nicaragua had been ear-marked for 
the private sector of the economy, in the hope that this would boost moderates within the 
country.
50
 However, no section of the administration advocated continuing and building on 
this policy. Instead, the Reagan administration first suspended and then terminated US aid to 
Nicaragua‟s private sector in April 1981,51 leaving these potential internal political allies to 
go it alone over the protests of Pezzullo and pro-US opposition leaders such as Alfonso 
Robelo.
52
  
Assistant Secretary Enders‟ stance on Nicaragua was consistent with a policy of 
containment, but not one of democracy promotion. This was in contrast to the emerging 
policy on El Salvador, in which the two imperative had merged. During negotiations with the 
Sandinistas Enders de-emphasised the question of democratic reform in favour of a proposal 
that the Sandinistas would cut off support for the insurgency in El Salvador in return for 
acceptance of their regime by the United States,
53
 to the regret of Ambassador Pezzullo.
54
 
The accord fell through partly due to the fact that the Sandinistas felt that Enders had 
not made a firm enough commitment that the US would close down training camps for anti-
FSLN Nicaragua exiles on American soil,
55
 but they were also undermined in Washington by 
the steadfast opposition of Reaganite policy-makers who used concerns about democracy in 
Nicaragua as a tool to discredit the State Department‟s containment policy and to promote 
their own policy of rollback. William Casey, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Clark and State 
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Department counsellor Robert McFarlane criticised Enders for not placing enough emphasis 
on the democratisation of Nicaragua  in the talks and for stating that the United States 
accepted Nicaragua‟s revolution and its present internal order.56 These objections were then 
used to call for a rejection of the policy and a renewed emphasis on support for a militarised 
covert program aimed at overthrowing the Sandinistas.  
This process had already begun in August, and was couched in terms of bringing 
democracy to Nicaragua. When Dewey Clarridge, a CIA official working under Casey, met 
military leaders in Honduras in August 1981 and pledged US support for the Contras he cast 
this US commitment in the language of spreading democracy, declaring to the Hondurans that 
“We must change the government of Nicaragua to give the Nicaraguan people the chance to 
democratically elect its own government.”57The process culminated in NSDD-17, signed by 
the President in November, which allocated a $19.95 million program of support for the 
Contras.
58
   
However, the Reaganite policy was no more an endorsement of Douglas and 
Samuels‟ vision of democracy promotion than of the State Department‟s pragmatic 
containment policy. The fact that the Reaganites had not shown a serious degree of 
commitment to democratic transformation in El Salvador indicates that their use of 
democratic rhetoric in support of the Contras was purely tactical, and that their calls for 
democracy in Nicaragua masked their geopolitical objective: the overthrow of the Sandinista 
regime.
59
 This objective was to be achieved, not through political methods but through the 
support of a violent insurgency whose commanders had a commitment to democracy which 
was shaky at best. Reaganite officials used an abstract concept of democracy which identified 
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the pursuit of democracy with the pursuit of US national security interests to legitimate a 
policy of supporting an anti-democratic force. Rather than taking on board democracy 
promotion as a coherent policy framework, the administration was still divided into factions 
which deployed democratic rhetoric when needed to prosecute or legitimate their own 
policies but which remained uninterested in the wider framework advanced by private sector 
democracy promoters.  
 This continuing focus on legitimation rather than serious programs of political reform 
was showcased in the administration‟s new Human Rights policy, produced in late October 
1981, which sought to provide its foreign policy with a moral basis which extended beyond 
anti-Communism. The Reagan administration had not been greatly interested in Human 
Rights in its first few months, as it blamed the strategy for the perceived erosion of US power 
in the Third World under the Carter administration.
60
 Moreover, it had experienced problems 
in staffing the State Department‟s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Its 
first nominee for head of the Bureau, Ernest Lefever, had not been confirmed due to 
Congressional belief that he was not interested in promoting Human Rights.
61
 This meant that 
the Bureau did little, and had little clout within the administration, until the Reagan 
administration‟s second choice, a young Reaganite neoconservative called Elliott Abrams, 
was confirmed.
62
 Abrams later played a role in managing support for the Nicaraguan contras 
after his subsequent appointment as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs in 1985
63
 
and later returned to government in the George W. Bush administrations as an NSC official 
with responsibility for the Middle East and then democracy promotion.
64
 The transfer of the 
Bureau into friendly hands after this hiatus provided an opportunity to codify a Human Rights 
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policy for the Reagan administration, which had up to this point devoted little attention to a 
policy area seen as tending to damage US national security through weakening pro-US 
dictators. 
 This new doctrine, outlined in a memo produced within the State Department on 27
th
 
October by the Reaganite Deputy Secretary of State William Clark and Under Secretary of 
State for Management Richard T. Kennedy, showed some signs of bringing Human Rights 
closer to democracy promotion by narrowing the Human Rights agenda which had been 
pushed by the Carter administration. Whereas the Carter administration had conceptualised 
Human Rights as containing economic and social dimensions
65
 and as not exclusively geared 
towards exporting democracy, the authors of the memo favoured a narrower concept which 
limited Human Rights to political rights and civil liberties, and even considered changing the 
name of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to reflect this.
66
  The memo 
recommended that “we should move away from 'human rights' as a term, and begin to speak 
of ''individual rights,'' 'political rights' and 'civil liberties.'”67  
This narrower concept, shorn of the social and economic rights which the Carter 
administration‟s conception had included,68 allowed a closer identification between Human 
Rights and more traditional American ideas of democracy and foreign policy ideology. 
However, the memo put forward no program to advance Human Rights or to spread “political 
liberty” in the world on a practical basis and did not engage with the issue of promoting 
democracy. Instead, it was a continuation and systemisation of the administration‟s practice 
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of using democratic ideology to legitimate its own foreign policy, both domestically and in 
Western Europe, while criticising the Soviet Union.   
The new doctrine had been prompted first and foremost by attacks on the 
administration‟s foreign policy both by Congress and by allies, rather than a concrete plan to 
push for global political reform. This is made clear in the document, which states that:  
We will never maintain wide public support for our foreign policy unless we can relate it 
to American ideals and to the defence of freedom. Congressional belief that we have no 
consistent human rights policy threatens to disrupt important foreign policy initiatives…. 
Human rights has been one of the main avenues for domestic attack on the 
Administration's foreign policy.
69
 
The administration also planned to use Human Rights as a propaganda concept to maintain 
the bonds between the US and its democratic allies, as it had been using democracy in Project 
Truth: 
We must continue to draw the central distinction in international politics between free 
nations and those that are not free. To fail at this will ultimately mean failure in staving 
off movement toward neutralism in many parts of the West.
70
 
Furthermore,  
Our audience is not only at home but in Western Europe and Japan and among 
electorates elsewhere.
71
 
To accomplish the aims of combating neutralist sentiment in Western Europe and restoring 
the US‟ moral and political leadership of the Western bloc, State‟s Bureau of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs was given the role of providing policy guidance on Human Rights 
to USIA, highlighting how US ideological power and the concept of Human Rights were 
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becoming ever more tied together.
72
 Thus, the new Human Rights doctrine would support 
propaganda initiatives already under way, such as Project Truth. 
 The concept of Human rights was also to be used as an ideological weapon against the 
USSR, as the memo stated that “'Human rights' - meaning political rights and civil liberties – 
conveys what is ultimately at issue in our contest with the Soviet bloc.”73 The ideology of 
Human Rights was thus a tool in the “battle of ideas” which the Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs was expected to wage.
74
 In practical terms this meant “[e]xpounding 
our beliefs and affirmatively opposing the U.S.S.R. in the U.N., C.S.C.E. (Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) and other bodies.”75 Thus, the US would continue to 
engage with the processes and machinery to monitor Human Rights abuses in the Soviet bloc 
which had been set up in the wake of the Helsinki Accords in 1975.  
 Human Rights could play a key role in legitimating the administration‟s foreign 
policy to the American public and US allies while also being a useful propaganda weapon 
against the USSR, as in these areas the pursuit of Human Rights did not clash with national 
security objectives. However, the administration a more difficult challenge in the Third 
World, where it had to balance its fear that the promotion of Human Rights in pro-US 
dictatorships could weaken existing governments and lead to Communist advances with 
measures to placate its domestic critics. The administration‟s Human Rights policy towards 
the Third World allowed more room for criticism of the US‟ authoritarian allies, while 
essentially preserving the policy of working through and with existing regimes to safeguard 
US national security interests.  
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The memo recognised that “A Human Rights policy means trouble, for it means hard 
choices which may adversely affect certain bilateral relations….”76 However, the fear was 
that failing to criticise authoritarian allies would delegitimate US foreign policy, not that 
failing to press for real reform of their regimes could lead to anti-US regime changes, with 
the document arguing, “There is no escaping this [need to criticise authoritarian allies] 
without destroying the credibility of our policy, for otherwise we would be simply coddling 
friends and criticizing foes.”77 Rather than proposing a policy of supporting reform, the 
memo concentrated on how the US could rationalise its further support of such allies, arguing 
that: 
our response or retaliatory actions should result from a balancing of all pertinent 
interests. Human rights is not advanced by replacing a bad regime with a worse one, 
or a corrupt dictator with a zealous Communist politburo.
78
 
 
The positive measures put forward for improving Human Rights in dictatorial allied states, 
such as limited embargoes of riot control equipment, amounted to little more than cosmetic 
measures to reassure Congress and did not constitute a strategy of political transformation. It 
kept the essential core of the Kirkpatrick doctrine, while providing space for criticism and 
limited sanctions on authoritarian regimes at the margins. 
 The new Human Rights doctrine represented an attempt to systematise the 
administration‟s justification of its foreign policy initiatives in Western Europe, the USSR 
and Central America in terms of abstract democratic ideology into one rhetorical framework 
for the legitimation of its incoherent policy, not a genuine attempt to connect the promotion 
of political liberty in the world to US foreign policy aims. It seemed clear that while the State 
Department, and the administration as a whole, might be prepared to deploy democracy 
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promotion in the particular case of El Salvador, it remained uninterested in the wider project 
advanced by Douglas and Samuels. 
 The Department‟s subsequent policy initiative on democracy promotion limited the 
policy to Latin America in its widest interpretation, and confined it to El Salvador in its most 
limited. In a speech to a meeting of OAS foreign ministers on December 4
th
 on the island of 
St Lucia, Haig called for the creation of a democracy promotion organisation but tied it 
clearly to the need for credible elections in El Salvador. In his address, Haig laid out a 3-point 
“agenda for co-operation”:  
First, to reaffirm and promote democracy; second, to create new economic 
opportunity, and third, most urgently, to oppose interventionism by strengthening the 
principles of nonintervention and collective security.
79
  
Opposing “interventionism”, by which the administration meant 
Soviet/Cuban/Sandinista support of revolutionary movements, was the true objective, with 
the other two points listing being methods to achieve this. Haig tied this support for 
democracy specifically to support for elections in El Salvador: 
Specifically, we hope that the countries of this hemisphere will support the 
government of El Salvador as it leads its people through the electoral process toward a 
political solution of the conflict there.
80
 
Haig gave his proposals concrete form by calling for “an institute for the study of 
democracy in the Americas” to provide a “regular exchange of ideas and experiences among 
democratic leaders”81. It is unclear from Haig‟s speech what the exact duties and parameters 
of the new institute would be and documents fleshing out this plan have yet to be located; 
however, Haig seems to have had in mind some sort of central focal point for the political 
training of Central American democrats, similar to Menges‟ proposal of January that year, 
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which might be combined with the technical assistance and observer missions to Latin 
American elections which he also called on the OAS to carry out.
82
 This program seemed to 
represent an immediate response to the crisis in El Salvador, and it is uncertain how far its 
operations would have extended beyond this. 
Organisationally, the proposal cut out the US private groups which the private 
democracy promoters wanted to mobilise under a semi-autonomous umbrella foundation. 
While Douglas and Samuels had argued that this organisational form would make democracy 
promotion more credible to foreign democrats and serve to clearly separate it from previous 
covert operations, Haig‟s proposal resolved these concerns in a different way. Rather than 
creating a private organisation which could not be seen as part of the government‟s foreign 
policy bureaucracy, Haig‟s strategy was to cast the effort as a multilateral one involving all 
Latin American countries. To this end the Secretary of State began his speech by invoking 
Simon Bolivar and stated that “by making the [OAS] secretary-general [the Institute‟s] 
director, we would insure a cooperative effort.”83 Haig also proposed that the Institute should 
be named “The Betancourt Institute” in honour of the famous and respected Venezuelan 
democratic leader Romulo Betancourt,
84
 a further attempt to give it a Latin American image.  
Although the proposed Betancourt Institute represented a more concrete vision of 
democracy promotion than had been achieved thus far, it was still an element of a particular 
strategy rather than an expansive one, and the proposed organisational framework was too 
limited to accommodate a strategy of democracy promotion which embraced the wider 
transformative project urged by the private sector democracy promoters outside the Western 
Hemisphere.  
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While in 1981 the different factions within the administration had attempted to 
mobilise democratic ideology in support of their own particular geopolitical goals, the private 
democracy promoters had used these immediate crises as examples to convince the 
administration of the value of their own pre-existing strategy. This strategy had clear 
applications to existing national security crises in El Salvador and Nicaragua, but went 
beyond them to propose a long-term transformative project aimed at the whole of the Third 
World conducted through privately-managed instrumentalities funded by the US government. 
However, these proposals did not impel a shift in the way the Reagan administration 
viewed the interconnection of democracy and national security strategy. With the exception 
of El Salvador, the administration as a whole and the factions within it continued to mobilise 
democratic ideology as a cover for the implementation of policy options which had no clear 
link to the creation of democratic systems, as in Nicaragua, as a tool of legitimation 
domestically and in Western Europe, and as a weapon of ideological warfare to be used 
against the Soviet Bloc, while reproducing Kirkpatrick‟s justifications for support of 
authoritarianism in its policy towards the Third World. The only exception to this was the 
State Department‟s policy towards El Salvador. A decisive shift in US policy produced by a 
further catalytic event would be needed to enable democracy promotion to transcend the State 
Department‟s corralling of the concept to Central America.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
The declaration of martial law by the Polish government and its suppression of Solidarity on 
13
th
 December 1981, a few days after Haig‟s speech recommending a Central American 
democracy institute to the OAS, was the catalytic event which brought the idea of a wider 
campaign of democracy promotion into the policy-making debate within the administration. 
The more strident calls for the support of dissident movements in Eastern Europe which 
resulted from the Polish government‟s actions triggered a process which resulted in the 
proposal of a government-sponsored strategy of democracy promotion to be implemented by 
US private groups. 
 This proposal, in turn, brought the strategic and organisational tensions involved in 
pursuing such a campaign to the forefront of the policy debate and resulted in horizontal 
conflicts within the administration between competing groups of policy-makers. Although the 
struggle was largely between officials based in the State Department and the NSC, the 
primary reason for this conflict was not bureaucratic politics but competing visions of how 
such a campaign for democracy could be used as a vehicle to pursue US national security 
interests. The primary tension was strategic and brought the pre-existing policy differences 
between these two departments over policy towards the Soviet Union and pro-US 
authoritarian regimes into the open and intensified them.  
The debate turned on which regimes a campaign for democracy should target and the 
end-goals of such a campaign. The NSC wanted to prosecute a particularist campaign aimed 
at using democracy promotion to weaken and undermine pro-Soviet governments and the 
government of the USSR internally, while maintaining support for pro-US dictatorships. In 
contrast, the State Department felt that democracy promotion could be used to enhance 
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containment in the Third World by transitioning illegitimate pro-US dictatorships to more 
stable democratic governments, while creating internal problems for the USSR in its zone 
through the support of dissident groups and movements. These Soviet bloc operations aimed 
to strengthen containment by focussing Soviet attention inwards and away from external 
expansion, not to destroy or transform pro-Soviet governments or the USSR itself. This 
vision was far more universalist than that of the NSC. Tensions over democracy promotion 
were incorporated into the strategic debate over whether to pursue the containment of Soviet 
power or a project of weakening Communist regimes internally through political warfare. 
 The move to political operations on a wide scale required the creation of a state-
private network to implement them. However, the injection of US private groups into the 
campaign complicated the strategic tension by adding an organisational one. While the use of 
private groups had operational advantages for the United States government, some degree of 
government control would clearly be needed to manage the gap between private interests, 
whether these were expressed as the ideological promotion of democracy or the sectional 
interests of the groups concerned, and the particular national security interests of the US. The 
choice of either a particular strategy based on operations against the Soviet bloc only or a 
more universalist one based on the containment of Soviet power through the support of 
democratic movements globally, including the Soviet bloc, implied the exercise of different 
degrees of control over the private groups by the government. Each contending faction within 
the administration engaged in bureaucratic warfare to institute a pattern of state-private 
relationships favourable to its own strategy, while blocking other solutions. It was the 
distribution of power in the administration and the attitude of the President which would 
exercise the most influence on the model of democracy promotion which emerged from this 
struggle. 
 
115 
 
Martial law in Poland and the shift towards democracy promotion 
The declaration of martial law in Poland had a profound impact on the development of 
democracy promotion. The emergence of the crisis in Eastern Europe brought the 
disagreements over anti-Soviet strategy within the administration between those who were 
focussed on weakening and undermining Communist control of the Soviet bloc internally and 
those who gave priority to strengthening the “Free World” instead into the open and made it a 
matter of urgency to resolve them. It was this raising of the stakes in Eastern Europe which 
resulted in the proposal of a strategy of democracy promotion which would operate in both 
the Communist and non-Communist worlds. 
 The immediate effect of the crisis was to strengthen the Reaganites in their calls for a 
political and economic assault on the Soviet bloc. This campaign could be prosecuted as a 
crusade for democracy, as in the Polish case US national security interests and pro-
democratic rhetoric intersected and reinforced each other instead of working at cross-
purposes. Richard Allen, who had recently left the administration but continued to serve on 
the President‟s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, showed this link when he asked 
rhetorically: “Are we not now presented with a beautiful opportunity to raise the cost 
suddenly and dramatically and seize the high ground?”85 In addition to this ideological 
reinforcement, the Reaganite faction found they had more space in which to push for punitive 
actions against the USSR and Poland, because while the US government as a whole had been 
preparing for a Soviet invasion, there was no pre-existing consensus on what action to take in 
the event of a crackdown by the Polish government.
86
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The Reagan administration in fact imposed a range of sanctions on Poland in the wake 
of martial law, suspending talks over a long-term grain agreement with the USSR and placing 
an embargo on the export of scientific and technical equipment to the Soviet Union.
87
 Dobson 
argues that President Reagan‟s motivation in imposing these measures was to send a clear 
message of disapproval to Moscow;
88
 however, the Reaganite faction in the administration 
wanted to go further. This hard-line group, composed of Casey, Clark and Weinberger, 
together with second-tier policy-makers such as NSC staffers Richard Pipes and Norman 
Bailey, Weinberger advisor Richard Perle and Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 
Administration Lawrence Brady
89
 wanted to institute more punitive measures, including 
declaring Poland in default on the debt it owed to Western banks. The aims of such a policy 
were to wage economic warfare
90
 by reducing the Soviets economic capacity to build up and 
maintain its military forces
91
. This Reaganite desire for economic warfare preceded the Polish 
crisis, as Casey had argued that economic problems and political unrest made the Soviet bloc 
vulnerable in May 1981,
92
 long before the Polish crisis had come to a head.  
The Reaganites had found a tangible target for US economic warfare measures in the 
Urengoi gas pipeline, which was intended to transport Soviet natural gas to Western Europe 
and was being part-financed by a number of Western European countries. It was thought that 
embargoes on the equipment the Soviets needed to construct the pipeline would hurt them by 
depriving them of foreign currency earnings and damaging the Soviet economy.
93
 However, 
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the administration had never been able to agree on the parameters for restricting the export of 
the technology the Soviets required to complete the pipeline: Haig had pressed for the 
adoption of the least restrictive guidelines possible in order to gain Western European support 
for the policy, while NSA Richard Allen pushed for tougher measures.
94
 The Polish crisis 
changed this dynamic and allowed the hard-liners to push for the harsher measures they 
favoured on the grounds that sustained economic warfare could cause the collapse of the 
USSR.
 95
 On December 29
th
, the Reagan administration suspended export licences for pipe-
laying equipment to the Soviet Union. The Department of Commerce then decided, 
seemingly unilaterally, that the sanctions would be retroactive and would apply to US 
subsidiaries.
96
 While these actions were insufficient to meet the maximal program of the 
Reaganites, they were certainly a step in the right direction. 
This decision opened up a potential fault-line between the US and its allies, as it 
meant that companies in Western Europe manufacturing pipe-laying equipment under licence 
from US firms would also be subject to the ban or risk having secondary sanctions imposed 
on them, and that contracts already signed would have to be abrogated.
97
 However, the 
largest fault line which the decision opened up was in the administration itself. While 
Weinberger, Casey and others in the administration wished to forge ahead with tough 
sanctions, up to and including a complete Western trade embargo on Poland and the USSR, 
Haig was initially cautious, fearing that too strong a response could trigger direct Soviet 
intervention in Poland.
98
  He also felt that the Soviet Union‟s political and economic 
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vulnerability was being greatly exaggerated.
99
 In general, Haig, while in favour of some 
sanctions, recommended more incremental measures.
100
 Although, as Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe, he had also opposed the pipeline when it was first begun, and for the 
same reasons as the Reaganites,
101
 as Secretary of State he recognised that the Western 
Europeans had already invested a great deal in the pipeline project, both in terms of money 
and planning, and that they were unlikely to withdraw from it or buckle to US sanctions.
102
  
In Haig‟s view, US pressure on Western Europeans to abrogate economic relations 
which they stood to profit from greatly in the service of an uncompromising anti-Sovietism 
which was not part of their ideological worldview would probably serve the interests of the 
USSR more than the USA in the long run by driving a wedge between the US and its 
allies.
103
 Preserving the NATO alliance was more important than spending valuable allied 
goodwill to achieve a goal which might prove to be unattainable. Haig managed to delay the 
imposition of tough sanctions by sending a State Department mission to Western Europe to 
persuade the Western European leaders to fall into line with the US approach,
104
 but he was 
not hopeful, seeing the whole controversy as damaging to the NATO alliance.
105
 Haig was 
supported in this stance by State Department officials with responsibility for foreign 
economic policy such as Meyer Rashish, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
and Robert D. Hormats, his successor, who argued that US attempts to impede the pipeline 
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could result in a rupture of the Western alliance.
106
 However, the State Department was not 
unified on this question, with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Policy Planning 
Staff taking a more hard-line position.
107
 This brought the Reaganites and more pragmatic 
State Department officials into direct collision; one faction wanted to push for economic 
warfare in the belief that this could weaken the Soviets and possibly begin the process of 
destabilising the regime; the other saw little prospect of seriously harming the Soviets 
through sanctions and believed it was more important to preserve the Western alliance. 
The conflict within the administration went beyond sanctions to include the issue of 
political operations in the Soviet bloc itself, as the Reaganites also began to push for greater 
US support of Solidarity now that the worst possible consequences of such support becoming 
known to the Soviets had materialised anyway. A proposal by Richard Pipes, the NSC‟s hard-
line anti-communist Director of Eastern European and Soviet Affairs, that the US 
government should begin covertly funding Solidarity was strongly supported by Weinberger, 
Casey, Clark and the President.
108
 Pipes argued that Solidarity must be kept going at all costs 
to spread its example to the rest of the Soviet bloc, while Casey argued more practically that 
the organisation would need help with command, control and communications systems and 
equipment to survive martial law.
109
 In mid-February Casey submitted a proposal for US 
covert funding of Solidarity to the President.
110
 Although proposals to channel US 
government aid to Solidarity were strongly opposed by Haig, who felt that the Soviets would 
not tolerate such actions,
111
 the crackdown had invalidated his previous arguments against US 
support of Solidarity to a large degree. The argument that if the Soviets discovered links 
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between the US and Solidarity they would launch a crackdown lost its force once the 
crackdown was already in train, as the US had little to lose.  
This move to greater militancy in supporting anti-Soviet democratic groups behind 
the Iron Curtain was paralleled in the sphere of policy and ideology by a shift in the US‟ 
Human Rights doctrine from the use of Human Rights as a rhetorical framework to criticise 
foreign governments to a policy of intervening politically to support private democratic 
groups. The new doctrine was announced in the State Department‟s annual “Country Reports 
on Human Rights and Practices” for 1981,112 which stated that the goal of punishing abuses  
must be accompanied by a second track of positive policy with a bolder long-term 
aim: to assist the gradual emergence of free political systems. It is in such systems 
that we can most realistically expect the observance of human rights across the 
board.
113
 
Whereas the administration‟s previous guidelines for the use of Human Rights in US 
foreign policy, laid down in November 1981, focused on the rhetorical use of the concept to 
solidify the Western alliance system and blacken the USSR internationally, the modified 
doctrine unveiled in January 1982 called on the US to take positive steps to alter political 
systems abroad.  This ideological melding of Human Rights and democracy promotion co-
opted the task of safeguarding Human Rights to the promotion of democracy abroad and 
transformed the campaign for Human Rights into a struggle over the shape of political 
systems in foreign countries. As a leading neoconservative analyst of Human Rights policies 
argued several years after this shift, “The struggle for human rights, far from being, as Carter 
and his aides proclaimed, indifferent to political systems, is fundamentally a struggle about 
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political systems.”114 Thus the doctrine of Human Rights was transformed into the 
legitimating ideology for US intervention in the internal political structure of other countries 
which had been missing since the scandals and crises of the late 1960s and 1970s. However, 
while this was a significant shift, impelled by the Polish crackdown, it was not the defining 
shift towards a policy of democracy promotion. Instead, it opened up further questions about 
whether such a policy should and could be pursued against all dictatorships on a universalist 
basis, or whether it would be limited to enemy states. 
  While the rhetoric underlying the policy was universalist, its targets were not. While 
this new Human Rights doctrine was couched in universal terms, its real strategic focus was 
determinedly particularist in targeting the USSR and its allies. The Country Reports had been 
produced under the aegis of Elliott Abrams, the recently-confirmed head of the Bureau of 
Humanitarian Affairs, a strongly anti-Soviet neoconservative who believed that “The greatest 
threat to Human Rights is the Soviet Union and its allies”.115 The announcement devoted a 
great deal of criticism to the Soviet Union, arguing that 
…it is a significant service to the cause of human rights to limit the influence the 
USSR (together with its clients and proxies) can exert. A consistent and serious policy 
for human rights in the world must counter the USSR politically and bring Soviet bloc 
human rights violations to the attention of the world over and over again.
116
 
 
It also singled out Poland‟s actions for criticism, stating that “The recent suppression of the 
Solidarity labor movement in Poland constitutes a massive violation of the [Helsinki] Final 
Act.”117 In contrast the document did not devote such harsh criticism to violations in friendly 
countries, beyond reiterating the position of the November 1981 memo that “hard choices” 
between Human Rights and other US objectives were sometimes necessary in dealings with 
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such regimes.
118
 The impression is of a policy which remained more concerned with the 
Soviet bloc than friendly dictatorships. 
 This impression is strengthened by Abrams‟ subsequent explanation of the policy in a 
speech to the Council on Foreign Relations several days after the Country Reports had been 
published. While Abrams spoke about the need to influence pro-US dictatorships in the 
direction of democracy, he argued that the interests of the US and Human Rights were served 
through maintaining strong relationships between the US government and pro-US 
dictatorships. This was important to prevent Communist takeovers which, he argued, would 
be more damaging to the cause of Human Rights than the current regimes.
119
 The speech 
outlined no concrete strategy for promoting democracy in non-communist dictatorships, 
instead making an argument for the support of such regimes which was based on the short-
term strategic interests of the United States. This was the Human Rights doctrine towards 
allied dictatorships advanced in the memo of 1981, not the new doctrine articulated in early 
1982. Abrams‟ actions were consistent with his words; one of his first acts as head of the 
Bureau was to certify that the Human Rights situation in El Salvador had improved, thus 
allowing military aid to be disbursed in January 1982.
120
  
The second key aspect of the doctrine was that it outlined a method for building 
democracy in dictatorships through connections with private groups abroad which it called 
“Building Freedom”. This meant that the US would lend support to private “pockets of 
freedom” which could then spread to the whole society. These “pockets of freedom” included  
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labor unions, churches, independent judicial systems, bar associations and 
universities. Where we do not have leverage over the shape of an entire society, we 
can nourish the growth of freedom within such institutions.
121
 
 
Further support for the idea that the policy of promoting democracy and Human 
Rights was focussed on the Soviet bloc is the inclusion of “labor unions and churches” as 
“pockets of freedom” to be supported by the US, as these institutions constituted the 
leadership of the anti-communist movement in Poland. The doctrine would thus supply a 
rationale for US government funding of the AFL-CIO, which could then act as a conduit to 
Solidarity. However, neither the Country Reports nor Abrams himself spelled out exactly 
how such private groups could be mobilised or what role US private groups might play in 
linking up with foreign democrats. While Abrams conceded the freedom of US private 
groups to protest against Human Rights abuses in allied states if they wished,
122
 his speech 
contained no ideas on the role of private groups in building democracy in such countries or 
how they could be deployed. 
The Polish crisis had impelled a shift towards a more confrontational posture towards 
the Soviet bloc which was tied to a conception of supporting private groups overseas to build 
democratic systems. However, it had not resulted in the delineation of a coherent strategy 
utilising foreign private groups. Instead, this shift served to open up the strategic and 
organisational questions connected with any such effort to further discussion. While the 
impetus seemed to be behind a particularist strategy of democracy promotion focussed on the 
USSR and its allies the idea of “Building Freedom” offered room for manoeuvre as it only 
articulated the policy in general terms and contained no organisational blueprint for how the 
policy could be implemented in co-operation with private groups. These omissions were used 
to argue for a much more universal campaign of democracy promotion implemented by 
private groups. 
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A strategic and organisational model for universalist democracy promotion 
Up until March 1982 it seemed that the initiative within the administration had passed to the 
narrowly anti-communist Reaganite faction. However, the fact that they had advanced no 
organisational solution to the problem of “Building Freedom” through private forces 
provided space for others to push their own priorities.  A solution to the organisational 
problem was offered by Alexander Haig in a memo to Reagan in early March; however, 
rather than seeking merely to enable the Reaganite policy, Haig proposed his solution in the 
context of a strategy of democracy promotion which was far wider and more universalist than 
anything proposed previously, by either the government or the private sector democracy 
promoters. 
Haig‟s proposal was based on two geopolitical cases which preoccupied the 
administration – Poland and El Salvador – and generalised the approach to be deployed in 
each into a more universalist strategy. Haig‟s argument that “In non-communist countries we 
need to help moderate democratic forces as the best long-term protection against 
communism”123 was clearly an expanded version of the State Department‟s approach to the 
conflict in El Salvador which had been generalised to encompass a new US approach to Third 
World dictatorships. It also reversed the usual response of the national security bureaucracy 
to political change in allied states by arguing that, rather than opening the way to 
Communism, greater political freedom would actually create more stable regimes which were 
better able to withstand Communist pressure. Such an approach would go beyond the 
Kirkpatrick Doctrine and begin to implement the Bureau of Human Rights‟ more positive 
policy in the Third World. 
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However, Haig went beyond this focus on the Third World to take in the Soviet bloc 
by arguing that “[w]e can help to keep the Soviets preoccupied with problems inside their 
existing empire (rather than expanding further) by giving practical assistance to democratic 
and nationalistic forces and thus going on our own political offensive”124, with Poland cited 
as the concrete example. This expansion of democracy promotion to take in the Soviet bloc 
went further than the proposals of the 1970s, or Douglas‟ and Samuels‟ article of 1981. 
This citing of the Soviet bloc as a possible target of political operations appears to 
indicate that Haig had abandoned his opposition to the tougher Reaganite policy. However, it 
is clear from a close reading of the memo that Haig‟s acceptance of anti-Soviet political 
operations was motivated by his desire to limit and manage their impact, rather than a 
genuine conversion to the Reaganite viewpoint that such operations could help to undermine 
Soviet control of the bloc and the USSR. Haig‟s formulation in the March proposal makes it 
clear that the support of democratic forces within the Soviet bloc was aimed at boosting 
containment by tying the Soviets up with domestic difficulties, not overthrowing or 
transforming Marxist governments. Haig accepted the proximate goal of the Reaganite 
strategy – disorder and instability in the Soviet bloc – as part of his own strategy but did not 
believe that the US was capable of overthrowing bloc governments. Thus, the State 
Department‟s general strategy had not evolved from a policy of containing the USSR to one 
of undermining the internal control of Communist governments within the bloc.  
Given the disagreements between the US and its NATO allies which he feared over 
the issue of economic sanctions, Haig might have agreed to political operations to head off 
the more serious threat of the tough sanctions the Reaganites proposed, which he believed to 
be dangerous to the Western alliance. This idea is supported by the next sentence in the 
document, which argues in regard to the anti-Soviet political offensive that  
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The use of this political tool [of containment] is no less effective than military and 
economic leverage, and is much less costly and risky.
125
 
Haig‟s proposal of a gradualist approach was also aimed at limiting the political 
dangers posed by a democracy campaign. Haig called for a gradual approach to the targets of 
the strategy as a whole, as “[o]bviously there are constraints as to what we can do towards 
both communist and non-communist countries in the immediate future”. However, 
specifically, a “pragmatic and careful” approach would be best to avoid pushing the Soviets 
into dangerous counter-actions or “alarming our European allies with visions of an all-out 
effort to destabilize Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself”;126 all consequences of a 
more aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union which Haig had predicted and feared. Thus, 
the long-range approach advocated by Haig would make political operations within the 
Soviet bloc more acceptable to himself and other State Department officials. He also argued 
for a gradualist campaign in the Third World, stating that an immediate and all-out campaign 
might “destabili[ze] non-democratic friends”127. Such an approach might also make a 
campaign in the Third World easier to sell within the administration, as the Reaganite NSC 
was intensely worried that pushing pro-US dictatorships into liberalising measures 
precipitately would only weaken them and lead to seizures of power by anti-American forces, 
as these policy-makers believed had occurred in Nicaragua in 1979. 
The new universalist strategy required a new instrumentality to implement it, as the 
expansion of the remit of democracy promotion from Central America to take in Eastern 
Europe rendered the organisational form which Haig had championed to the OAS in 
December 1981 – a democracy training institute to be run as multi-governmental organisation 
through the OAS – insufficient; such a limited institute could not be used to carry out 
democracy promotion operations outside the Western Hemisphere. 
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Instead of this multi-governmental approach, Haig turned to the solution which had 
been advocated by the private sector; a non-governmental democracy promotion 
organisation. There were clear strategic and operational reasons for the shift to a private 
sector instrumentality which would be more flexible, plausibly deniable and credible than a 
government-run campaign. A strategy of democracy promotion which was to be deployed 
simultaneously in the Third World and in Eastern Europe needed as much freedom of action 
as possible, both from bureaucratic constraints within the policy-making apparatus and from 
interference from other countries. This freedom of action, which would be used to achieve 
US national security interests and not those of a coalition such as the OAS, would clearly best 
be provided by an organisation located outside the executive, and one which was solely 
American rather than a multi-governmental one of limited geographical scope.  
The use of a private organisation could also solve the problem of plausible deniability 
inherent in mounting a program to alter the political structures of both allied and enemy 
dictatorships. The fact that the actions of such a private instrumentality could not be blamed 
on the US government would defuse accusations of American political or cultural 
imperialism or neo-colonialism in the Third World, as Douglas had originally argued, 
“fend[ing] off charges of interference from other countries.”128 It would also serve to fend off 
charges of interference from Poland or the Soviet Union, or at least make them less credible 
to the rest of the world. In addition, outsourcing democracy promotion to a non-governmental 
body would allow the US government to maintain working relationships with friendly 
dictators until they fell or the time came to replace them. A non-governmental instrumentality 
would also be more credible; as Douglas and Samuels had previously argued, such an 
institute would be more acceptable as an ally to the foreign private groups it sought to shape 
and influence than a government program. Whereas foreign democrats might be reluctant to 
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accept help from a foreign power, it might be easier to convince them to accept help from US 
private citizens. The fact that the new private organisation would require Congressional 
funding, as well as private money, to engage in a “major, sustained and professional effort”129 
seemed to pose a threat to its ability to act in a credible and plausibly deniable manner; 
however, Haig did not consider this question in depth, merely asserting that “[t]he Europeans 
and the Soviets use such „private‟ institutions for political operations without serious 
problems.”130 
Haig‟s choice of a non-governmental instrumentality to implement democracy 
promotion opened up the prospect of closing the organisational gap in the national security 
apparatus by generating a new state-private alliance to replace the one which had ended in 
1967. In fact, this new state-private network was already in the process of formation. State 
Department personnel were in contact with the private democracy promoters, who noted that 
State‟s proposal “reflects a line of thinking developed in the State Department with some 
input from the APF” as a result of “several private meetings which included Doctor Michael 
Samuels, International Director of the Chamber of Commerce and Mr Mark Palmer, Deputy 
to the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department”.131 This is clear from the 
fact that many of the points made by Haig in his proposal were derived from arguments used 
by the private democracy promoters previously. Haig‟s argument that “the United States is 
organized to give economic and military assistance, but we have no institutions devoted to 
political training and funding”132 was derived from the article co-authored article by Michael 
Samuels and William Douglas in 1981.
133
 Haig also uses the analogy of Western European 
political assistance to the Portuguese Socialist party used in Samuels‟ proposal and refers to 
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other European efforts, possibly the West German foundations whose example was 
championed by George Agree. He also proposed a non-governmental Institute for Democracy 
along the lines previously suggested by Samuels.
134
 Haig remained unhappy with the more 
militant ideas of the Reaganites about what policy the US should pursue in the Soviet bloc; 
however, he had converged with them over the use of private groups to conduct political 
operations overseas.  Superficially, Haig‟s proposal showed how the Reaganite blueprint 
could be carried out; however, his emphasis on implementation through a private group in the 
context of a gradualist campaign showed a desire not to empower the Reaganite vision but to 
limit and manage it. 
 This proposed recourse to a state-private institution to implement national security 
programs re-opened the strategic and organisational questions which had bedevilled the 
previous state-private network. The President‟s response to Haig‟s proposal clearly showed 
the strategic and organisational tensions which would have to be negotiated to make 
privately-implemented democracy promotion a reality. This response took several weeks to 
materialise and when it did, on 2
nd
 April, it was channelled through William Clark, the 
administration‟s new Reaganite National Security Advisor and a longstanding collaborator of 
the President. While Reagan was interested in the concept he was unsure how a universalist 
strategy based on building democracy abroad could be implemented in conformity with the 
particular national security interests of the United States. Strategically, Reagan wanted to 
know how the operations of the institute could be squared with the US need to maintain good 
relations with friendly dictators; this was a prime concern for the Reaganites within the 
administration, who feared any policy which might weaken such dictators in the face of 
Marxist insurgents. This was linked to the organisational question, as the President also 
wanted to know how the actions of a private organisation could be tied to US national 
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security priorities while remaining credible enough to be effective and who would make 
operational decisions.
135
 Clearly, the administration did not want to create a private 
democracy institute which might escape Executive control and pursue actions which were not 
in line with US national security interests as it conceived them. All of these questions had a 
bearing on whether a non-governmental institute for democracy could be used effectively to 
support US national security interests.  
Designing a new state-private network 
Reagan‟s queries led to further meetings between State Department representatives and the 
private sector democracy promoters. These discussions were not aimed at resolving strategic 
questions, as there was a considerable degree of overlap between the agenda of both groups. 
Instead, the focus was on how a credible and effective state-private organisation could be 
created to implement a campaign of democracy promotion. 
 On April 6
th 
the APF directors met with Mark Palmer, the Deputy Undersecretary for 
Political-Affairs. Palmer had played a role in bringing the democracy promoters to the 
attention of the Department, meeting with Michael Samuels before Haig‟s proposal of March 
8
th
. Born in 1941 in Ann Arbor, Michigan, as a student Palmer had been a civil rights activist 
for the Student Nonviolent Co-ordinating Committee and a Freedom Rider for the Congress 
of Racial Equality before spending time in the Soviet Union as an exchange student. He had 
joined the Foreign Service in 1964 as a career official and was posted to Moscow as a 
consular officer, before returning to Washington to continue work in the State Department.
136
 
Palmer was committed to the APF‟s cause and believed that change within the USSR and 
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Poland was possible. However, he also believed that such change needed to proceed in 
tandem with negotiations, and that it should not be pushed so obviously or rapidly that it led 
to Soviet countermeasures which would destroy the groups the United States was trying to 
help.
137
 
For these reasons, and to decide how operations could be carried out under similar 
constraints in the Third World, discuss at the APF meeting turned on how an effective, 
credible and plausibly deniable government-funded private democracy foundation could be 
created. The problems to be solved were similar to those which had led to the creation of the 
initial state-private network organisations in the late 1940s; the US state needed private allies 
whose actions would be more flexible, plausibly deniable and credible than the actions of 
national security agencies. These requirements had led to the provision of covert funding by 
the CIA to maintain credibility for the programs. However, the problem was more complex in 
the 1980s, as the shift to an overt relationship with the government threatened to tar any new 
democracy foundation as merely an arm of the national security bureaucracy.   George Agree 
stated the problem neatly in a memorandum he circulated to the APF directors prior to the 
meeting: 
An American institution for contact with democratic forces abroad along the lines of 
the State Department memo will need the utmost credibility to be effective. Attacks 
on its motivations and insinuations as to its control are inevitable. These can be 
minimized and their damage limited by careful preparation and structure.
138
 
Palmer concurred with this analysis, arguing that “the initiative should be independent 
or outside the executive branch”.139 To avoid tension between the government funding of the 
organisation and its stated goal of promoting democracy, Agree and Palmer believed that it 
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should grow from the APF.
140
 As this organisation already existed, its enlargement into the 
umbrella organisation called for by Douglas and Samuels in 1981 could be presented as a 
natural development, helping to duck controversy. This covered the state to an extent in terms 
of plausible deniability, as it could argue that as its private allies had been active in their 
fields for a long period, they were not controlled by the state.
141
 The APF was already known 
to foreign party leaders, giving the state influence over a network which was already being 
constructed. It would also be more easily accepted overseas and domestically than a totally 
new institution. In addition, it already had the tax-exempt status necessary to make the most 
of any government funding.
142
 To further deflect suspicions of government manipulation of 
the organisation or allegations that it was being funded by the CIA, it was agreed that all 
financial records of the democracy institute would have to be open to public scrutiny. 
 Government funding of the APF alone was insufficient to wage a democracy 
campaign which was to include actions by other groups such as unions and business 
associations, however. What was needed was an effective umbrella structure which would be 
credible and would allow a number of different private groups to fold their sectional interests 
into a coherent strategy to promote democracy. Both the State Department and the APF 
agreed in principle with the State Department‟s idea that: 
While the American Political Foundation would be one beneficiary of funds from this 
new Institute….clearly the Institute needs to be a separate and much larger effort. But 
both parties should be on its board, along with other important elements like the AFL-
CIO, a representative of the press, etc.
143
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The State Department and George Agree fixed on the example of the West German party 
foundations as a model of how US private groups could act together to promote democracy 
overseas in a credible way.
144
 
Agree had first lobbied for instrumentalities on the pattern of the West German 
foundations in 1977 and rearticulated his arguments in favour of them now. These 
foundations, although they were in fact and in the public perception, party-connected, were 
legally separate entities to the parties, operating independently of the parties, and able to 
receive private as well as government funding. Agree argued that the US institutions should 
be structured in exactly the same way, as this would facilitate their acceptance in countries in 
which the German foundations already operated; moreover, it would be difficult to attack the 
credibility of the US entities without also attacking that of the German foundations.
145
  
The structure also needed to effectively corral private interests into a campaign to 
promote democracy. For the APF, the choice was between partisan government-funded party 
institutes along the lines of the West German instrumentalities, or one bipartisan foundation. 
It was this question which provoked disagreement. Agree and the Palmer argued that the US 
should create one bipartisan party foundation rather than following the West German model 
of a separate foundation for each party. Agree had argued for this when setting up the APF 
originally and Palmer‟s position on this was clear; the State Department supported the 
creation of a bipartisan institute on the model of the APF, arguing that a bipartisan structure 
would help to overcome factional differences between and within the parties, as the 
promotion of democracy could act as an ideological rallying point which all the participants 
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agreed with.
146
 Of the APF‟s most important Republican and Democratic leaders, Republican 
Chairman William Brock also supported the idea, believing a bipartisan institute would be 
more acceptable to Congress. It would also serve to maintain the focus of operations on 
democracy promotion rather than sectional group interests, as neither of the two parties 
would be able to conduct any democracy promotion operations the other was opposed to. 
While the position was generally accepted, Charles Manatt, the Democrat Vice-Chairman of 
the APF, questioned the viability of the idea of a bipartisan foundation and argued for 
separate party foundations.
147
  
While these conflicts over the connection between democracy promotion and private 
interests would grow in importance in the future, however, they were muted at this stage. All 
agreed that the most pressing matter was to convince the Reagan administration to back the 
creation of a private democracy promotion organisation. To accomplish this, the State 
Department accepted the game plan put forward by Michael Samuels in his proposal of 1980; 
a study which would help to build political consensus in favour of the plan. Palmer offered 
$200,000 from the Human Rights division of AID to finance the study.
148
 The commission 
would employ area and political specialists and would report in the first quarter of 1983. It 
would investigate existing international political activity by others, problems and 
opportunities for the US, and recommend pilot projects, a 3-year plan of operations, structure 
and a financing plan.
149
 Finally, Palmer urged haste, as the State Department wanted to 
include an announcement of the study in Reagan‟s forthcoming speech to the British 
Parliament in June.
150
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Policy conflicts over democracy promotion 
Although the State Department and the APF had managed to come to an agreement over how 
private groups could be operationalised in the emerging campaign for democracy relatively 
easily, the Department‟s attempt to sell its design within the administration encountered 
resistance. The primary difficulty was strategic disagreements with the Reaganite NSC, 
which feared that the Department and its private allies would press pro-US dictators hard 
enough to destabilise them while being too soft on the Soviets. These strategic disagreements 
translated into competing organisational models for the democracy promotion effort, as the 
degree of the state control required was directly linked to how far a universalist democracy 
promotion campaign was seen to clash with particular US national security interests.  
Some progress had been made towards convergence between the different factions. 
The State Department‟s acceptance of the Reaganite‟s proximate goal in the Soviet bloc – to 
support anti-communist political movements – opened the way to some accommodation over 
Soviet policy. By April 1982 the NSC had also come to accept, however reluctantly, the State 
Department‟s strategy of containment in Central America, with a policy summary dated April 
6
th
 stating that 
We have an interest in creating and supporting democratic states in Central America 
capable of conducting their political and economic affairs free from outside 
interference. …In the short run we must work to eliminate Cuban/Soviet influence in 
the region, and in the long run we must build politically stable governments able to 
withstand such influences.
151
 
However, although the Reaganites had acknowledged the logic of State‟s position in the case 
of Central America because a strategy of “[b]uilding democratic political institutions capable 
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of achieving domestic political support”152 could ease the passage of the military aid the NSC 
sought for the pro-US Salvadoran junta through Congress, this grudging acceptance of the 
need to build democracy in an allied state in one strategic case did not mean these Reaganites 
were willing to have this strategy generalised to other right-wing dictatorships in the Third 
World.  
The fact that the APF‟s organisational history, Douglas and Samuels‟ article and the 
Department‟s plans before martial law had been declared in Poland had focussed on 
democratising allied Third World dictatorships may have made Reaganites in the NSC 
suspicious that State‟s plans for political warfare against the Soviet bloc were a fig leaf 
covering an obsession with toppling pro-US dictators. This debate emerged in full force after 
the Department reported to the NSC on its response to Reagan‟s three concerns after its 
meeting with APF, on April 13
th
 1982.  
 State‟s reply tried to manage the Reaganites‟ concerns by restating the anti-
communist rationale for the democratisation of Third World dictatorships, arguing  
While we often need to support non-democratic friends in the near term, over the long 
term most dictatorships are unstable and we should lay the foundation for a stable 
democratic successor. If we do not, we are leaving the field open for the 
communists.
153
 
The State Department also attempted to distance itself from the Carter administration‟s 
Human Rights campaign, which many in the administration blamed for “losing” Iran and 
Nicaragua:  
[t]he long-term institution-building nature of the institute‟s programs would be a far 
cry from the human rights policies of the previous administration, which were 
punitive in approach and demanded immediate results.
154
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The policy of promoting democracy in the Third World would be a long-term effort aimed at 
building the private institutional precursors of a democratic regime from the ground up rather 
than a top-down attempt to pressure unsavoury dictators to reform or to dispense with them 
rapidly if they refused to do so. NSC staffer Dennis Blair
155
   summed up the “basic 
idea” of the project as “to give the United States an additional instrument for dealing with 
authoritarian regimes…We need a way to operate openly in support of moderates who are 
trying to build the structure of democracy – political parties, trade unions, media, etc.”156  
While DCI Casey was a strong supporter of the idea, however, the NSC was split over 
it, with some staffers fearing that promoting democracy in allied regimes would damage the 
national security of the United States. NSC official Norman Bailey, a hard-liner who had 
championed tough sanctions on the USSR in the wake of Polish martial law, feared that such 
programs would damage relations with friendly dictatorships, arguing that 
[State‟s memo] does not answer the question of how one trains labor leaders, 
journalists and others from friendly dictatorships without damaging our relationships 
with those dictatorships. In fact, a statement is made that “we should lay a foundation 
for a stable democratic successor.” I know of no dictators who would take kindly to 
that particular suggestion.
157
  
Bailey also objected that such a campaign would dilute the US government‟s focus from 
contending with the Soviet Union:  “[State‟s memo] ignores the problem of building 
democracies in communist countries completely.”158 The State Department had not been 
asked to expand on this topic in William Clark‟s memo of April 2nd, which the report of April 
13
th
 was written in response to, so the criticism was unwarranted, but it does show the 
centrality of narrow anti-Sovietism to the Reaganite world view.  
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 These strategic disagreements had a direct bearing on debates over what the 
relationship between the private groups and the state should be. Some level of government 
control would be needed, as there was no guarantee that once the organisation had been built 
and the private groups had received government funding they would pursue the national 
interests of the United States rather than carrying out actions based on their own ideologies or 
interests. However, a level of government control that was too visible would erode the 
advantages the democracy institute was expected to provide. Such a group would be more 
credible to foreign democrats as a source of assistance and advice than a US government 
organisation, especially in a Third World which had recently emerged from colonial 
domination by Europeans. The democracy institute would also be more capable of acting in 
support of democratic groups overseas without provoking credible accusations of a US 
government-led destabilisation campaign from sitting governments. 
This problem recalled the tension between exercising the control of private groups 
receiving government funding necessary to ensure their actions conformed to national 
security objectives and providing them with the level of autonomy required for them to 
appear fully independent of the government which had been a constant and unresolved 
feature of the state‟s relationships with private groups before 1967.  However, this tension 
was more difficult to resolve in the early 1980s because the state-private relationship could 
not be kept covert due to the lingering effects of the 1967 crisis. The challenge was then to 
create an institution which would receive government funding overtly but which “could avoid 
being seen as an agency of the US government, while acting in a complementary way to 
government policies.”159  
The lack of strategic consensus within the administration over the targets and end-
goals of a democracy promotion campaign complicated this task, as different administration 
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factions proposed organisational models with differing mixes of state control and private 
autonomy commensurate with their own strategies. The State Department‟s more 
geopolitically expansive strategy meant that the US government would have to exert less 
control over private partners, as the fact that both the State Department and the APF agreed 
on the promotion of democracy in both enemy and allied states meant that the private groups 
would not need to be warned out of activity in specific regions. In contrast, the NSC‟s focus 
on a more narrowly anti-Soviet strategy indicated that a greater level of control would be 
needed in order to restrain private actions in pro-US dictatorships which the hard-liners 
feared might be weakened by democracy promotion programs. Significantly, no faction in the 
administration called for full private autonomy.  
The State Department‟s solution to the autonomy/control dilemma was to begin 
building long strings of control into its relationship with the APF which would not be 
apparent to a casual observer but which would enable the “light touch” direction needed to 
deploy private groups within the Department‟s more universalist strategic framework. One 
method of exercising this control would be through government funding of the organisation. 
The Department also attempted to gain government leverage over the internal political 
dynamics of the organisation by recommending that the new democracy foundation‟s voting 
procedures be structured so that a two-thirds majority of board members would be required to 
approve operations, with each party being given 40% of the votes, to ensure the party of the 
administration could ensure consistency with government policy.
160
 State‟s April 13th report 
reassured other government officials that 
The Foundation is viewed as independent, as are similar but government-funded 
foundations of the German political parties. However, it cannot as a practical matter 
stray far from government policy.
161
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This mode of control was similar to the “ringed autonomy” which Stonor Saunders argued 
the CIA had used to manipulate its private partners in the 1950s and 60s;
162
 private groups 
would be given latitude over day-to-day operations, but rogue actions could be effectively 
vetoed due to the government‟s influence over the foundation. 
Some Reaganite staffers felt that this mode of control would be either unworkable or 
too damaging to the US‟ existing relationships with pro-US dictatorships, however.  
According to Norman Bailey, the State Department‟s suggestions for controlling the 
democracy foundation would only serve to destroy its credibility: 
[The State Department memorandum‟s] suggestions as to maintaining the myth of 
independence from the government are ludicrous.
163
 
 
Two other NSC officials, William Stearman and Carnes Lord, argued that “the body will be 
„tainted‟ as an arm of the US government”, thus destroying its credibility, “yet the 
government will not have complete control”,164 increasing the possibility of rogue actions. 
These criticisms implied that the project was unrealisable because the autonomy/control 
problem was unresolvable. 
The NSC‟s solution, rather than abandoning the project, was to sacrifice credibility to 
control and to devise an organisational solution for corralling a private democracy promotion 
foundation into its own particularist anti-Soviet strategy in May. The power of the 
organisation, together with its ability to impose its Reaganite views on the other foreign 
policy-making agencies in the Executive, had been greatly increased by the departure of 
Richard Allen as NSA in November 1981.
165
 Unlike Allen, who had reported to the President 
through White House aide Edwin Meese his replacement, William Clark, reported to Reagan 
                                                 
162
 See Chapter 1, 19-22. 
163
 Norman A. Bailey, memo to Dennis Blair. 
164
 Dennis Blair, memo to William Clark. 
165
 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 193. 
141 
 
directly. Clark‟s relationship with the President and his access to Reagan made the NSC a far 
more important player in the administration.
166
  
In May, Clark tied the strategy of promoting democracy, and so the proposed institute, 
to the NSC‟s budding anti-Soviet democracy campaign, the Council‟s plan for a concerted 
ideological offensive against Soviet communism. Clark did this by embedding his call for 
“political training, organization and financial support for pro-Western forces” with 
“international campaigns on issues like Afghanistan and Poland”, “covert political action 
programs” and “USICA communications efforts”,167 elements of the NSC‟s campaign and of 
Project Truth.  
This action diluted State‟s more ambitious universalist project by connecting it 
explicitly with a strategy focussed exclusively on direct anti-Sovietism, rather than the 
creation of democratic regimes as firewalls to Soviet expansion. It also diluted the emphasis 
on building democratic systems abroad by merging it with programs which aimed to deploy 
democratic ideology as an ideological rallying cry against communism in a way which was 
more reminiscent of the pre-1967 state-private network‟s approach of projecting democracy 
ideologically than the new proposals which Douglas, Agree and Samuels had made in the 
1970s. The targeting of the campaign was determined by the imperative of confronting the 
Soviet Union, rather than a strategy focussed on the creation of democratic systems in both 
friendly and enemy dictatorships. In contrast to this focus on anti-Sovietism, Clark made little 
mention of an anti-authoritarian dimension to the strategy aside from an isolated reference to 
“strengthen[ing] democracy in both communist and non-communist countries.”168 Thus, as of 
May 1982 the Institute for Democracy was contained within a larger program which 
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emphasised political and propaganda confrontation with the Soviet Union, not a balanced 
campaign to support democratic groups in both friendly and unfriendly dictatorships.  
 While Clark‟s action forged an organisational link between the proposed private 
democracy promotion foundation and the Reagan administration‟s narrowly anti-Soviet 
world view, the link between democracy promotion and anti-Soviet strategy was made clear 
in NSDD-32. This document was the Reagan administration‟s first attempt at a coherent 
national security strategy, after over a year in office. The process of drafting it had begun in 
February 1982, when Reagan signed off on an NSSD which tasked Clark‟s NSC to develop 
an overarching framework for national security policy.
169
 While the preparatory study which 
it was based on had been carried out by carried out by an interagency group consisting of the 
NSC, the State Department, CIA, JCS and Department of Defence,
170
 the document reflected 
the views of the Reaganite faction.
171
  
 The objectives for US national security policy outlined in NSDD-32 clearly went 
beyond the State Department‟s focus on containment to include more aggressive anti-Soviet 
campaign which posited different objectives towards different elements of the Soviet Empire.  
The policy contained in the NSDD envisioned a campaign of rollback directed against 
Soviet-allied states in the Third World, with the document calling upon the US to “contain 
and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world”.172 
Within the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the administration would conduct political action to 
“encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies”173 – a formulation which 
echoed Haig‟s language in his 8th March proposal. The campaign also included efforts to 
weaken the USSR domestically “by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic 
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shortcomings”,174 as NSC hard-liners had called for in the wake of the Polish declaration of 
martial law. White House aides, speaking to journalists after a rare speech given by William 
Clark at Georgetown University on 21
st
 May 1982 to explain the new strategy,  further 
characterised the policy towards the Soviet bloc as an “active … campaign aimed at reform in 
the Soviet Union and dissolution or at least shrinkage of the Soviet empire''
175
.  
The basic objectives of US national security policy towards the Soviet Empire were to 
contain further Soviet expansion, roll back the spread of Soviet influence in the world, and 
weaken Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the power of the ruling elite in the USSR 
itself through economic warfare and support for political movements behind the Iron Curtain. 
Beyond these objectives, the bulk of the document consisted of discussion of US military 
posture, and a clear strategy for achieving these objectives was not laid out. However, 
NSDD-32 clearly indicated the beginning of a move beyond the policy of containing the 
USSR through external measures to one of rolling back Soviet advances and seeking to affect 
the balance of political forces within Eastern Europe and the USSR itself through political 
intervention within these states.
176
 While the document did not set out a clear strategy for 
political operations within the Soviet bloc, it did posit objectives which such operations could 
be used to attain. 
Clark‟s Georgetown speech clarified the ideological basis of the policy by couching it 
in the context of an ideological struggle for democracy in the Soviet bloc. Clark stated that 
“….collectivism and the subordination of the individual to the state” constituted a “bizarre 
and evil episode of history…We have something better to offer – namely freedom.”177 He 
was also forthright about the administration‟s goal of using US national security policy 
                                                 
174
 Ibid. 
175
 White House aides quoted in Helen Thomas, “Reagan Approves Tough Strategy with Soviets,” United Press 
International, 21
st
 May 1982, Nexis UK, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive. 
 
177
 Quoted from Lettow, Ronald Reagan’s Quest, 69. 
144 
 
encourage reform in the USSR by “convince[ing] the leadership of the Soviet Union…to seek 
the legitimacy that only comes from the consent of the governed…”178 It was clear that 
private democracy promotion programs would play a role, alongside other forms of 
intervention, in the administration‟s anti-Soviet strategy. 
 Despite this democratic rhetoric and the similarity to Haig‟s language in the 
description of the political operations to be conducted, however, the document had 
incorporated democracy promotion into a particularist strategy, not a universalist one. The 
objective of pressuring regimes to reform or altering regime types was not set with regard to 
non-communist dictatorships in the Third World. There was some recognition of the roots of 
Third World instability and the Soviet exploitation of it:  
Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient economies, and the 
persistence of traditional conflicts create opportunities for Soviet expansion in many 
parts of the developing world.
179
 
However, the document detailed no strategy to solve this problem which included the ideas of 
Douglas, Samuels or the State Department. Instead, the paper remarked blandly that 
encourag[ing] and strongly support[ing] trade, aid and investment programs that 
promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders 
in the Third World
180
 
would be sufficient. Nowhere in the document were the political problems of Third World 
regimes analysed or a solution proposed, beyond this piece of economic determinism. Thus, 
democracy promotion in the Third World was not an integrated part of this Reaganite grand 
strategy; in contrast, democracy promotion activities in the Soviet bloc were clearly linked to 
attempts to reduce Soviet power or alter the regime through propaganda and the support of 
anti-Soviet political movements.  
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This integration of democracy promotion into the administration‟s pre-existing plans 
for a campaign to deploy democratic propaganda against the Soviet Union and its allies and 
then the codification of this particularist strategy in the administration‟s new national security 
framework diverged from the State Department‟s vision, which called for a wider campaign, 
and that of the APF. The document represented a defeat for the State Department‟s strategy 
of tough containment and did not have a great deal of support from higher-level Department 
officials, especially Haig.
181
 However, the Secretary of State‟s power within the 
administration was declining, and there was little he could do to block it at this stage.
182
 
 The tussle between these two visions, one more particular and one universalist, also 
occurred over the drafting of Reagan‟s speech to the British Parliament, to be delivered on 
June 6th 1982, in which Reagan was to unveil a coherent vision of the administration‟s 
attitude towards Human Rights and the spread of democracy in the world. State had wanted 
to announce the APF study, which would lead to a campaign of democracy promotion in both 
the Soviet bloc and the Third World in the course of the speech, and a draft was prepared by 
the State Department and submitted in April, with no Reaganite participation.
183
 Richard 
Pipes claims that the President rejected this draft as being too moderate because it did not 
focus strongly enough on the Soviet Union‟s internal structure184 and that the final draft, 
produced by Reagan‟s main speechwriter, Anthony Dolan, was based partly on a paper on 
anti-Soviet strategy which he wrote in May 1981 and was then forwarded to Reagan in 
November of the same year.
185
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Reagan‟s speech to the British Parliament on 8th June followed the strategic and 
organisational course set out by Clark and in NSDD-32 in May. The speech set democracy 
promotion through the support of private groups overseas as a goal of US foreign policy: 
The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, 
the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to 
choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences 
through peaceful means.
186
 
However, the speech tied this effort to a particularist campaign aimed at the Soviet bloc, not a 
universalist one. The theme running through Reagan‟s remarks was an ideological struggle 
against the USSR based on democracy. Reagan‟s remarks were uncompromisingly anti-
Soviet, claiming that communism would be left on the “ash-heap” of history by a worldwide 
democratic revolution and fiercely criticising Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and 
particularly Soviet repression in Poland.
187
 However, he made little mention of democracy in 
the Third World, preferring to keep the focus on the Soviet Bloc. Regarding democratisation 
of the Third World, Reagan stated that  
Some argue that we should encourage democratic change in right-wing dictatorships, but 
not in Communist regimes. Well, to accept this preposterous notion – as some well-
meaning people have – is to invite the argument that once countries achieve a nuclear 
capability, they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror over their own citizens. 
We reject this course.
188
  
While this might suggest an even-handed desire to democratise both types of regime, the fact 
that the speech was devoted almost completely to discussion of the Soviet Union suggested 
that the Soviet empire was uppermost in the President‟s mind, rather than right-wing regimes 
allied to the US. While Reagan made some reference to “the establishment of conditions of 
freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries” he made little reference to the 
specific need to build democracy in Third World states. The only reference to political 
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conditions in Central America is criticism of the FMLN and comments on their lack of 
participation in the elections of March 1982.
189
  
The Reaganites in the administration who had influenced the content of the speech 
clearly saw the campaign for democracy as primarily an anti-Soviet strategy, and wanted to 
present it to the world in this light. This ideological strategy was intertwined with actions: on 
June 7
th
, the day before he gave the speech, Reagan had visited Pope John Paul II in Rome to 
discuss the situation in Poland and increase co-operation between the US and the Vatican 
over assistance to Solidarity.
190
 While Reagan described his call for a democratic campaign 
against the Soviet Union as a “plan and hope for the long term”191 rather than an effort that 
would bring immediate results, there could be little doubt that the final goal was to transform 
the Soviet regime.  
 The speech said little about how a campaign for democracy could be organised. 
Reagan‟s words on building the infrastructure of democracy contained references to many of 
the private groups which the democracy promoters had argued should be supported through a 
non-governmental foundation, such as political parties and unions. However, it is clear from 
Reagan‟s speech that these private groups were to be expected to function in co-ordination 
with governmental organisations, as Reagan stated that 
It is time that we committed ourselves as a nation – in both the public and private 
sectors – to assisting democratic development.  
This represented an endorsement of the idea Clark had put forward in May, of a campaign 
which was to embrace both governmental and private instrumentalities.  
 The campaign presented by Reagan was at odds with the original vision of private 
sector democracy promoters and the APF leadership. The organisation had clearly become 
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aware that the power centres of the administration had become more focussed on a vision of 
democracy promotion which tied it into a particularist anti-Soviet strategy rather than their 
own universalist conception. To head off the danger of the universalist dimension of the 
policy disappearing, the APF‟s Republican and Democrat leaders, together with APF 
Chairman William Brock, who was also a member of the administration due to his position as 
US International Trade Representative, wrote a letter to Reagan on June 4
th
 outlining the 
rationale and aims of the APF‟s study into democracy promotion, as agreed with the State 
Department in April. The APF leaders made no reference to authoritarian or communist 
regimes, preferring to state diplomatically that the study aimed at investigating “how to 
handle the tension between maintaining friendly relations with current governments while 
sowing the seeds of democratic successors” and “how to encourage domestic pluralistic 
forces in totalitarian countries”.192 It was a plea for the reinstatement of the more universalist 
vision which the APF and the State Department had converged over earlier in the year. 
Although the appeal did not change Reagan‟s mind over the thrust of the strategy it clearly 
had some effect, as the President did announce the study which the APF and the State 
Department had lobbied for: 
The chairmen and other leaders of the national Republican and Democratic Party 
organizations are initiating a study with the bipartisan American [P]olitical [F]oundation 
to determine how the United States can best contribute as a nation to the global campaign 
for democracy
193
 
The entry of the concept of privately-implemented democracy promotion into the 
policy debate within the Reagan administration had brought the strategic and organisational 
tensions inherent in the effort to the surface and divided policy-makers over how a campaign 
aimed at building democratic structures overseas through the support of private groups could 
be integrated into the national security strategy of the United States. Behind these divisions 
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lay two competing policy visions; the strategy of tough containment espoused by State and 
the more aggressive strategy of rolling back Soviet influence and pressuring the USSR to 
reform championed by many Reaganite policy-makers in the NSC. Both groups wished to 
limit the campaign proposed by the private sector; the Reaganites by focussing on the Soviet 
bloc rather than non-Communist dictatorships, the State Department by seeing democracy 
promotion operations in the USSR as an additional tool of containment rather than a serious 
attempt, no matter how long term, to liberalise the system.  
Attempts to limit the campaign, either in terms of geopolitical focus or final 
objectives, translated into attempts to exercise control over private sector democracy 
programs to bring them into conformity with US goals; however, the different objectives of 
groups of policy-makers called for differing modes of control. The State Department‟s more 
universal campaign called for light methods of control, while the Reaganites‟ more narrow 
vision of a campaign focussed on Communist regimes required a stronger dose of 
government intervention and supervision. The merging of the original private conception 
with the administration‟s anti-Soviet strategy, as laid out in NSDD-32 and Clark‟s plan for a 
range of political action and propaganda programs, together with Reagan‟s focus on the 
narrowly anti-Soviet dimension of democracy promotion in his speech, indicated that as of 
June 1982, the more particular vision was ascendant in the administration. This placed the 
anti-authoritarian element of the strategy, which had emerged before the widening of the 
campaign to include the Soviet bloc, in danger of being abandoned. However, the President‟s 
announcement of government funding for the APF‟s study meant that there was still an 
avenue through which a more universal strategy could be pursued. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
Reagan‟s speech to Parliament of June 8th had left little doubt that he saw USSR as the 
primary target of the democracy promotion program, as he called for a campaign for 
democracy that would “leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history”.1 This laid down 
a marker, both publicly and within the bureaucracy, that the US should pursue a narrow anti-
communist strategy. In contrast to the anti-Soviet thrust of the speech, Reagan made little 
mention of the need to democratise the US‟ dictatorial allies. 
However, rather than ending debate, Reagan‟s announcement opened up further areas 
of contention which threatened to push the project beyond the administration‟s concept of a 
campaign focussed on the Soviet bloc in terms of strategy and objectives. Reagan‟s anti-
communist crusade was particularist in intent; however, the deployment of universalist 
democratic rhetoric to legitimate it opened up the question of whether an American campaign 
for democracy should be and could be limited to enemy totalitarian regimes or whether it 
would also encompass friendly authoritarian countries. The President‟s announcement that 
private forces would also be deployed and his offer of support for the APF‟s study of 
democracy promotion methods created a space for these forces to advocate a campaign which 
stretched beyond the President‟s focus on anti-Soviet propaganda in two ways. Firstly, the 
private democracy promoters wished to go beyond the anti-Soviet focus to work in pro-US 
authoritarian regimes. Secondly, they wanted a campaign which went beyond propaganda to 
include programs aimed at building democratic structures overseas 
The fact that Reagan had announced his policy publicly and indicated that private 
groups would have a role within it triggered a wider public debate which gave an opportunity 
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for groups outside the administration to agitate for their own wider conception of democracy 
promotion. Up until this point, private forces had spread their ideas in restricted circles or 
been involved in consultations with the bureaucracy behind closed doors, but this dynamic 
was changed by the speech. Divergences between the administration and forces outside it 
became public after the policy had been announced, as the President‟s concept was publicly 
contested by both the private groups committed to democracy promotion, centred on the 
APF, and also a wider foreign policy elite outside the administration consisting of the press, 
former government officials and Congress. All these groups had visions of democracy 
promotion which went beyond the particularist anti-communist strategy which the President 
had announced in London. The fact that the creation and operation of the new democracy 
campaign would proceed on an overt, rather than a covert, basis opened up the space for these 
different visions to be articulated. 
To advance the project, it was necessary to engineer consensus over both the strategic 
role of democracy in US foreign policy and the organisational relationship between private 
groups and the government. Although debate on both strategy and organisation proceeded 
concurrently, the key factor was the role of democracy promotion in US strategy, as the 
agreement reached on this factor would determine the organisational framework. Strong 
convergence between the administration and private democracy promoters meant that the 
latter could be trusted with more autonomy; conversely, serious divergences on strategy 
between these two groups would lead the administration to attempt to keep tighter control of 
the process. Organisationally, the need for a measure of control had to be balanced against 
the need to create an effective organisation which would be credible with foreign democrats 
as a democratic institution rather than an arm of the national security bureaucracy.  
The resolution of these questions required the construction of a consensus between the 
administration and the private groups who would play a role in executing it similar to that 
152 
 
which had allowed the state-private network to function before 1967. However, the overt 
nature of the policy also made it necessary to engineer a bipartisan consensus with Congress 
to obtain funding for the project. While all groups accepted that promoting democracy was a 
legitimate function of US foreign policy, the administration‟s failure to engineer this 
consensus placed the project in jeopardy. 
Differing visions of democracy promotion 
After the speech both the administration and the private democracy promoters began to 
define and focus their visions. The wider foreign policy establishment weighed in 
immediately before and after the speech in favour of a more expansive democracy promotion 
campaign carried out under private auspices. On June 6
th
 The New York Times supported the 
idea of “a quango to promote democracy in developing countries and, where possible, in 
communist countries.”2 Far from seeing the project as solely an anti-Soviet campaign, the 
Times believed that democracy promotion should be aimed at dictatorships of both the right 
and left.
3
 David Newsom, a former Carter administration official who had served as 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, argued that the Reagan administration‟s 
insistence on targeting Eastern Europe and the USSR would only increase Soviet paranoia 
with little chance of success. He was also sceptical over the administration‟s willingness to 
support democrats in allied dictatorships such as Argentina, Chile, Pakistan and the 
Philippines but argued that a refusal to do so would destroy the credibility of the campaign.
4
 
These tensions could only be overcome through a campaign for democracy deployed 
exclusively through private groups, as  
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It is when we move out from the campuses and the think tanks within this country to 
the rhetoric and guided programs of a government-financed effort abroad that we 
increase the risks and lose credibility.
5
  
 
The founders of democracy promotion also entered the debate. However, rather than 
becoming embroiled in a strategic discussion over whether the campaign should be 
implemented in a particularist fashion against Communism or in a more universalist fashion 
to also take in friendly dictatorships,  they articulated a vision which went beyond these 
considerations. In an interview given in early July, George Agree stated that “We would be 
building democratic structures, not becoming involved in electing specific individuals.”6 
According to Agree, democracy promotion activities would consist of support to civil society 
groups such as training of local democrats to run voter registration campaigns, efforts to 
boost union organising and conferences on democracy.
7
 This concept went beyond the 
Reagan administration‟s concept of a propaganda campaign. It also side-lined the question of 
whether democracy promotion should be used to pursue tangible strategic goals such as 
containing Soviet power in the Third World through support of democratic forces in pro-US 
Third World dictatorships or more direct confrontation of the Soviet Empire through political 
operations. Instead, Agree‟s formulation subsumed these issues within a pro-democratic 
campaign which would secure the US over the long-term by building a world order in 
conformity with its internal system. Such a campaign was in line with the more universalist  
instincts of the wider foreign policy elite, but not limited by it. 
The democracy promoters and the wider foreign policy establishment also agreed that 
the best implementing mechanism for the campaign would be a private structure similar to 
the West German party foundations. Taking the democracy campaign out of the hands of 
government would make the effort more credible to foreign democrats and also 
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institutionalise a wider approach, not the narrow anti-communism of the NSC. The APF 
provided the organisational model for a privately-implemented effort by promoting the 
advantages of the West German party foundations, which were now explained to a wider 
audience in a newspaper article written by William Brock at the end of July. According to 
Brock, such an organisation would be more effective than existing foundations and 
instrumentalities in carrying out democracy promotion activities:  
West Germany, like the United States, has many academic, business, church, labor, 
and other organizations engaged in cultural and social development work overseas. 
But only its party-related foundations have the motivation and expertise to help 
critically important institution-building in the political area that other foundations shy 
away from.
8
 
 
Although Brock mentioned the fact that the West German foundations had aided 
democratic parties against the Portuguese Communists in the 1970s, his discussion of the 
utility of the foundations was couched primarily in terms of building democracy, not merely 
opposing Communism.
9
 This approach was compatible with Congressional Democrats‟ 
suspicions of the narrow anti-communism which characterised the Reagan administration. An 
aide to Senator Edward Kennedy stated Congressional concerns succinctly: 
Our concern is that it not become an exercise in Reaganitis… We want to see the 
sophisticated European model adopted and not a return to the 1950s hardline anti-
Communist politics.
10
 
 
There was clearly substantial support in Congress and among elite opinion leaders for 
a democracy campaign which would function on a universal rather than a particular basis. 
This in turn fitted in with the more idealistic conceptions of idealists such as Agree, which 
aimed at a global campaign of democracy untied to either containment or a tougher policy of 
confronting the Soviet Empire. Furthermore, in terms of organisation some sections of private 
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opinion saw private and governmental programs as competing models for the implementation 
of the project, rather than complementary ones. 
Within the government, on the other hand, democracy promotion was conceived of as 
an umbrella concept for a campaign of public diplomacy and political action aimed at 
combatting Soviet Communism in the Third World and Western Europe and US financing of 
opposition forces in the Soviet Empire in the minds of the administration principals. NSA 
Clark, reporting on a meeting between the new Secretary of State, George Shultz, Casey, 
Wick and McFarlane on implementing the President‟s speech, described the objectives as 
“strengthen[ing] the forces of democracy throughout the world and…more effectively 
engag[ing] in the competition of ideas and values with the Soviets and their allies.”11 The 
grounding of the campaign in national security priorities rather than democracy is clear from 
the fact that, rather than focussing exclusively on nations which did not have existing 
democratic systems, one of objectives of the new democracy policy was to counter Soviet 
propaganda aimed at undermining the US‟ democratic allies. An August 1982 explanation of 
“The Democracy Initiative” states that  
 In addition to supporting democratic principals [sic] worldwide, it is designed to  
counter Soviet attempts to weaken the democratic institutions of our friends…12  
 
This effort to guard against increasing Soviet influence in states which were already 
democratic was clearly linked to safeguarding US national security interests rather than the 
private conception of creating democratic systems overseas in countries which were not yet 
democratic on a global basis.  
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The administration was also at odds with the private consensus in its conception of the 
role of private groups in the emerging campaign. It wanted the co-operation of private groups 
in its effort for reasons of credibility.  Clark, reporting on the meeting between high level 
officials after the speech, reported, “Some of the public funds…would be allocated to private 
US organizations which could conduct certain programs overseas more easily than the 
USG.”13 However, in the administration‟s conception these private forces were expected to 
work alongside government instrumentalities as part of the administration‟s campaign rather 
than being in control of an autonomous universalist effort. Clark‟s memo makes this clear, 
stating, “We…have to create some new programs…to provide support and training to 
democratic forces. The private sector must be energized to join us in this effort.”14 The 
implementing structure for the campaign for democracy would be a Special Planning Group 
composed of representatives of government agencies such as the State Department and the 
USIA, not a private board directing a US version of the German Party foundations. The 
campaign was seen as a retooled state-private network effort with a command centre located 
in the administration, not within a private institution. 
State-private consensus was difficult to achieve due to the different visions of 
democracy promotion held by these groups. For state-private co-operation to function 
effectively there needed to be a measure of convergence between the two. This convergence 
was easiest to achieve when the government and private groups were able to focus on specific 
and limited programs and most difficult to create when the actors involved focussed on their 
differing frameworks for democracy promotion.  
State-private agreement proved easiest to engineer in the case of the AFL-CIO, which 
had officially joined the APF‟s democracy promotion coalition in the wake of the President‟s 
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speech.
15 
The AFL-CIO was eager to join the new political action effort in order to regain the 
level of funding and operational flexibility it had enjoyed as a member of the CIA-guided 
state-private network before 1967. Although the union had received US government funding 
through AID after the collapse of the network, legal restrictions had limited it to funding 
projects which were ostensibly non-political
16
 and had also barred it from funding anti-
communist unions in Europe. AFL-CIO officials had tried to evade this handicap in the 1970s 
by proposing the creation of a non-governmental foundation on the pattern of the West 
German Party foundations.
17
 Participation in the democracy project was a way for the union 
to gain the funding it required to pursue its more political objectives. 
However, an agreement over targeting with state officials was necessary because 
although the union was strongly anti-communist it was also engaged in a universalist project 
which was not necessarily connected to US national security objectives: the building of a 
global network of “free trade unions” patterned after the AFL-CIO itself and under its 
influence. American labour had its own priorities and interests, and disagreements between 
the union and the national security bureaucracy stretched back to previous programs carried 
out in co-operation with the CIA.
18
 These disagreements continued into the 1980s; a State 
Department briefing paper on AALC, the AFL-CIO‟s training foundation for African trade 
unionists, noted that  
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AALC, because of its strong fraternal outlook on union-to-union linkages with 
African unions, has on occasion appeared to view advice from State, AID, and/or 
Labor Department as making unwarranted intrusions into African labor union 
matters.
19
 
 
Such tensions might re-emerge within the democracy project. However, when the union 
began to submit requests for funding for political operations in August 1982 under the 
democracy campaign, it and the administration were able to reach a limited consensus over 
specific operations without having to give ground on their wider strategic objectives.  
This convergence was strongest over the AFL-CIO‟s proposed programs for Western 
Europe, where the union and the US government had worked together since the beginning of 
the Cold War on programs to support pro-US unions and undermine communist political and 
cultural influence. There was also minimal disagreement between the State Department and 
the NSC over US objectives. The AFL-CIO requested funds for the backing of pro-US and 
anti-communist unions and parties such as the centre-right French trade union Force Ouvriere 
in its campaign against the Communist-led CGT and the Inter-University Union (UNI), a 
small youth group composed of French faculty and students which contested university 
elections with Communist groups and distributed propaganda in favour of Solidarity and the 
mujahedeen.
20
 Funding these groups also served the interests of the AFL-CIO, which had 
begun funding Force Ouvriere in the late 1940s first with its own money and then with 
assistance provided by the CIA.
21
  The union also wanted to heighten Western consciousness 
of the plight of Solidarity. The operations would also clearly serve the larger US purpose of 
strengthening Western European allegiance to NATO, a key objective of the administration.  
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Convergence over the Soviet bloc was also comparatively simple because the AFL-
CIO and the administration held the same near-term goal of supporting dissident 
organisations. Both had already been working towards these goals, although separately.  The 
AFL-CIO was already involved in providing low-level private support for Solidarity in 
Poland,
22
 and requested funds from the administration to be conduited to the Solidarity Co-
ordinating Committee in Brussels to the Solidarity leadership in Poland.
23
 Reaganites within 
the administration had been seeking such an arrangement since 1981
24
 while the State 
Department had agreed to a degree of democracy promotion in the Soviet bloc in Haig‟s 
March 1982 memo to Reagan.
25
 This co-operation built on previous state-private operations 
behind the Iron Curtain which had been carried out in the late 40s and 1950s, although such 
operations had not included the AFL-CIO. 
Convergence over operations to be carried out in the Third World was the most 
difficult because the history of state-private co-operation here differed to that in Western 
Europe and the Soviet bloc. Whereas in these regions US interests clearly dictated the support 
of pro-democratic forces, the US had had no political grand design for its intervention in 
Third World political systems and had supported democrats or dictators as short-term US 
interests dictated. Thus, while the AFL-CIO had been implementing political operations in 
the Third World since the 1950s, as had the US government state apparatus, the approach 
taken was a more disjointed one in which domestic groups were supported purely on the basis 
of anti-communism. Policy towards the Third World was also more subject to intra-
administration disagreement due to the uncertainty over whether such operations should 
merely continue the previous focus on combatting Communism or be widened to include the 
support of democratic successor groups in pro-US authoritarian states.  
                                                 
22
 See Chapter Two, 71. 
23
 Anonymous,  Document beginning “In response to request…,” 3-4. 
24
 See Chapter Two, 71-72. 
25
 See Chapter Four, 127. 
160 
 
Explicitly anti-communist programs put forward by the AFL-CIO seem to have 
provoked little debate within the administration. One example of this is the union‟s plan to 
conduit funds to Nigerian trade unions to help them combat the Communist leadership of the 
National Labor Centre: 
There exists within Nigeria a non-communist pro-Western group with the potential to 
turn the tables and take control of the NLC, or barring that to at least establish a 
counter-force in the country. They obviously cannot do this without assistance from 
their friends outside.
26
 
 
A State Department assessment of possible programs to run through AALC, the AFL-CIO‟s 
own African labour foundation, written a few weeks later supported the AFL-CIO‟s 
assessment:  
the leadership of the [NLC] came from the communist union. This could be turned 
around with money. One half the affiliates of the current National Center are friendly 
moderates who could build their support and dominate the National Center.
27
 
 
The picture was the same in Latin America, where the AFL-CIO requested funds to 
support “The Seaman and Waterfront Workers Union of Grenada, headed by Eric Pierre, 
[which] is the only organized opposition to the Marxist government of Maurice Bishop.”28 
The State Department agreed: “A person who runs the Seamen and Waterfront Dockworkers 
Union – powerful union – is the only hopeful opposition to Bishop. This union should be 
helped.”29 The AFL-CIO and the State Department also agreed on the need to support pro-US 
unions such as the CTP in Peru against its Communist and leftist competitors and the CUS 
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against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
30
 These operations would have appealed to the NSC‟s 
strong anti-communism as well.  
While the state and private actors were able to converge over union programs directed 
at Third World communists, programs aimed at dictatorships allied to the US had the 
potential to be much more divisive. In contrast to operations against enemy states such as 
Grenada, NSC support of AFL-CIO programs in countries such as Chile and South Africa 
could not be taken for granted due to the organisation‟s fears that mounting democracy 
promotion operations in friendly dictatorships could destabilise them and open the door to 
Communist seizures of power.  
In South Africa, the AFL-CIO requested money to support newly-formed black trade 
unions, arguing that these organisations would probably have “an immense impact on the 
economic, social and eventually political structure of the country.”31 The union also requested 
funds to support a Chilean union, the UDT, described as “only democratic and anti-
communist workers organization in opposition to the Pinochet government”32 The State 
Department supported the funding requests for these operations, arguing that they would 
strengthen containment by building up democratic forces ready to take power and keep 
opposition movements from being dominated by communists. The Department agreed that 
“AALC should be building a union inside South Africa which could be an organization to 
help change the government to a more democratic system,”33 explaining that 
[t]he objective would be to keep the trade unionists pro-West as the government 
changes instead of combining leftist political organizations with labor to form an 
opposition to apartheid…During eventual blow-up, we want to have labor stay in our 
camp.
34
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The Department saw South Africa‟s apartheid system as unstable and believed it would one 
day end; by supporting black trade unionists in the meantime, the US could assert its 
influence over South Africa‟s future rulers and prevent them from allying themselves too 
closely with communism. Regarding the proposal for Chile, the Department commented that 
“We need to do the same thing we did in Venezuela in the „50‟s.”35 Expanding on this, the 
Department noted that ORIT, a Latin American labour confederation funded by the AFL-CIO 
in the 1950s had  
employed large numbers of organizers, particularly democratic elements forced into 
exile by the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in Venezuela. These individuals were 
instrumental in setting Venezuela on a pro-Western course when the Perez Jimenez 
dictatorship fell and democracy was re-established.
36
  
 
The State Department was clearly in favour of AFL-CIO programs aimed at supporting 
groups in pro-US authoritarian states. While administration hard-liners based in the NSC and 
other agencies had historically tended to be unconvinced that such programs were in line with 
US national security objectives, a basis for agreement existed due to the fact that these 
programs were aimed at preparing democratic groups to compete for power with Soviet-
funded groups after the collapse of pro-US dictatorships, not at funding them to destabilise 
the sitting regime.  The basis for an agreement between the union and the bureaucracy clearly 
existed if a list of operations could be agreed upon and definite limits to these set. 
This accommodation over specific cases was a useful starting-point for the 
development of consensus between the state and the private groups. However, it did not 
amount to the generation of the strategic framework which the campaign for democracy 
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required to avoid the prosecution of operations on a piecemeal basis. It was here that tensions 
emerged between the anti-communist approach of the administration and the more 
universalist, pro-democratic ideological frameworks articulated by other elements of the 
private coalition for democracy promotion coalition. 
This tension occurred in administration relations with the leaders of the APF. Unlike 
the AFL-CIO, the parties had put forward no clear program proposals besides the vague 
statement in the APF‟s letter to Reagan of 4th June that they would focus on building 
democratic movements in totalitarian states and preparing democratic successors in other 
regimes. They also lacked an extensive track record of foreign operations which officials 
could scrutinise for clues to their future behaviour. This lack of specificity, together with the 
lack of a grand strategic framework, caused concerns among Reaganites that the APF would 
be “soft on communism” rather than pursuing actions in line with their own hard-line anti-
Sovietism.  
This led to attempts to establish informal control over the organisation‟s projected 
study of democracy promotion to co-opt the APF into the strategic priorities of the 
Reaganites. To this end, former Reagan administration NSA and current Republican National 
Committee foreign policy advisor Richard Allen attempted to keep William Brock, Chairman 
of the APF, from playing a leadership role in the study announced in Reagan‟s June speech. 
Brock was viewed by the Reaganites as being “an ideological soft spot in the Republican 
Party”37. This was probably because he was insufficiently hawkish on communism, as shown 
by his decision to back Haig against the NSC hard-liners over the question of more extensive 
sanctions on the USSR in response to the Polish declaration of martial law in the early 
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months of 1982,
38
 together with the fact that he was linked to the State Department‟s more 
even-handed approach to dictatorships of both the left and right. This view is reinforced by a 
comment by an anonymous member of the APF study group that “Dick Allen doesn‟t want 
Bill Brock and the State Department playing a role in this thing.”39 Allen was nominated as a 
member of the study board by Richard Richards, Chair of the RNC,
40
 apparently with White 
House backing,
41
 but did not succeed in excluding Brock from involvement. This episode 
illustrates the fears of hard-line anti-communists over the direction of private democracy 
promotion operations.  
Even more threatening than this lack of specificity from organisers such as Brock, 
however, were the views of intellectuals who had helped to shape democracy promotion such 
as William Douglas and George Agree. These figures had a tendency to outline grand, 
ideologically-driven frameworks for democracy promotion focussed primarily on the needs 
of democracy and not US national security,  rooted in the ideas both had put forward in the 
1970s, when democracy promotion had existed as a grand concept divorced from day-to-day 
US national security concerns. The effect of this was to highlight the disjuncture between the 
state and private democracy promoters even further. 
An example of this is the framework for democracy promotion which William 
Douglas set out in an article published in September 1982, which was clearly determined first 
and foremost by the need to promote democracy on a global basis as a form of government 
rather than US security needs. While Douglas began by arguing that democracy promotion 
could help to stabilise pro-US dictatorships, as he had done previously, he then went beyond 
this by arguing that a US democracy promotion organisation should also concentrate on areas 
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or countries where democracy was in decay or where sectors of the population felt 
inadequately represented by existing democratic structures. Douglas argued that such a lack 
of representation was a long-term danger because it could lead to groups or classes 
abandoning electoral politics in favour of armed struggle, creating instability and, if they 
won, a dictatorial state. This could be averted by studying the political system of such a 
country for gaps of representation and then building political parties to fill them.
42
 Douglas 
gave the example of Honduras, where there was no leftist party to represent the poor majority 
and argued that the construction of such a party with finance and political technology 
imported from the United States would help to stabilise the Honduran political system and 
avert another insurgency in Central America.
43
  
This analysis was extremely far-sighted, but Douglas‟ recommended action in 
Honduras went far beyond the concept of a propaganda campaign aimed at combatting Soviet 
influence which was taking shape in the administration. It also went beyond the focus of the 
State Department on containment in US dictatorships threatened by insurgencies, as 
Honduras was already a democracy dominated by a pro-US elite. Douglas‟ ideological 
perspective - which put forward no strategic framework and was divorced in some respects 
from immediate national security concerns - showed that the NSC‟s fears that an autonomous 
private effort to promote democracy would waste government funds on ideological projects 
instead of guarding US national security were not groundless. 
This problem was not limited to Douglas, as a September newspaper interview with 
George Agree and an unnamed government official showed clear differences in their 
understanding of the nature and goals of the democracy project. In contradiction to Agree‟s 
earlier emphasis on building democratic structures rather than supporting individual 
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candidates, the official stated that “Some elements [of the democracy campaign] involve 
sophisticated campaign tactics” and mentioned CIA support of the Christian Democratic 
Party in the Italian elections of 1948 as a precedent for the democracy project.
44
 This 
operation had been clearly geared at electing pro-US forces to safeguard US national security 
interests and block the Italian Communists from taking power, rather than building 
democracy.
45
 While the official went beyond a purely anti-Soviet framework in conceding 
that the democracy crusade could function in authoritarian states allied to the US,
46
 it was 
clear that to the administration the campaign was aimed at resolving near-term US security 
issues. This showed a clear difference in how the groups associated with each conceptualised 
democracy promotion. The private intellectuals saw democracy promotion as a global 
transformative project, although Agree conceded that “We can‟t be doing things that would 
be seriously harassing to our own government‟s foreign policy, or it would jeopardise its own 
success.”47 
This strategic and ideological disagreement inevitably led to differences over how the 
project was to be organised and implemented. According to Agree the campaign would be 
implemented through groups outside the government and foundations rather than the 
government.
48
 However, the official restated the administration consensus that it would be 
managed by an interagency group based in the White House rather than privately-
controlled.
49
 The fact that the interviews with Agree and the official quoted in the newspaper 
story had been separate indicated both a lack of co-ordination between the state and private 
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democracy promoters of the emerging democracy crusade and the conceptual differences 
between them. 
Managing the conceptual gaps which existed between the administration and private 
groups had proven problematic by autumn 1982. Consensus was possible in cases where the 
NSC, State Department and private groups could focus on specific tactics and programs to be 
run in specific countries to achieve clear national security aims. However, when this was not 
possible due to a lack of specific program proposals by the privates or a private focus on 
grand ideological frameworks, the rift between the government and the private democracy 
promoters widened. These disagreements over strategy were, in turn, linked to different 
organisational conceptions; whereas the administration, and particularly the Reaganites, 
believed that a campaign focussed on US security needs would be best implemented under 
government supervision, private groups favoured an autonomous implementing structure for 
their wider campaign. What was lacking above all was a clear strategic framework which 
incorporated the private groups into administration priorities. 
Creating a strategic framework for democracy promotion 
The administration moved to create this strategic framework in the second half of 1982. This 
required not only agreement between the administration and private forces but also between 
contending factions within the administration over these aims. The administration held two 
consensus-building events in October and November 1982 to resolve these problems; a 
closed anti-Soviet strategy conference at the end of October and a public Conference on Free 
Elections in early November. Although both of these gatherings reached provisional 
agreements on how democracy promotion would be implemented tactically, the larger 
problem of reaching a consensus over grand strategic issues such as the final objectives of a 
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campaign for democracy directed at the USSR or the targeting of democracy promotion in the 
Third World were not solved. 
 The anti-Soviet conference, the Conference on the Democratization of Communist 
Countries, was held in the State Department and focussed on generating tactics and programs 
which the government and private groups could co-operate on to promote democracy in the 
Soviet Empire. In addition to government officials it included representatives of interested 
private and quasi-private groups. This private and quasi-private contingent included 
organisations which had functioned as part of the covert state-private network in the 1950s 
and 60s before becoming quasi-autonomous overt organisations in the 1970s, such as Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty. John Richardson, a former director of RFE and the President 
of Freedom House
50
  and future Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy also 
attended, along with prominent US academics and Sovietologists.
51
 This private contingent 
also included the AFL-CIO but not representatives of the APF, highlighting the fact that the 
private democracy promotion coalition, which the union had joined shortly after Reagan‟s 
speech to Parliament, was a diverse group in which some members had closer ties to the 
administration‟s more narrowly anti-Soviet vision than others.52 
The Conference was focussed on “develop[ing] suggestions for more effective US 
Government and private sector program– to implement the broad initiatives set forth in the 
President‟s address to the British Parliament” with regard to the USSR, Eastern Europe and 
Third World Communist countries.
53
 The participants recommended a two-pronged campaign 
of propaganda and political operations be launched against the Soviet Empire using both 
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governmental and private agencies.
54
 The suggested strategy made a clear distinction between 
the Soviet Union itself and vulnerable satellites such as the Eastern European countries and 
Nicaragua.  
The propaganda element would be a long-term campaign focussed on developing 
consciousness of the benefits of the democracy in populations under Communist rule without 
provoking a violent response.
55
 This element was clearly focussed on the USSR itself and 
was to be accomplished through governmental and quasi-governmental propaganda 
organisations such as the VOA and RFE,
56
 as increasing US broadcasting was seen as a key 
way to play on Soviet vulnerabilities. A November 1982 introduction to a program book of 
democracy promotion operations stated that  
Centrifugal forces abound within [the Soviet] empire, and our broadcasting, the 
largest component of our agenda, is the key weapon in encouraging these forces.
57
  
 
The campaign would deploy further traditional methods of exerting psychological and 
cultural influence such as exchanges; the setting up of an institute as a home base for the 
most recent wave of Soviet émigrés; and the distribution of literature through both official 
and non-official channels, as “most considered books and journals to be basic weapons in the 
competition of ideas.”58  
The strategy towards client states and satellites such as Nicaragua and Poland was 
more politically-focussed and required greater deployment of US private groups. Secretary of 
State Shultz, when speaking at the conference, clearly supported US aid for Solidarity, stating 
that he saw the rise of the organisation as beginning a new era of democratic reform and 
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revolution,
59
 and promised that the US "will not ignore the individuals and groups in 
communist countries who seek peaceful change."
60
 It was also felt by the conference 
attendees that “In transitional states like Nicaragua, the US (especially private groups) should 
be providing far more support to those elements still fighting for democracy.”61 In general 
“the participants advocated a substantially expanded role for non-governmental 
organizations; these can often be more effective than government.”62 Private involvement 
was clearly required, as the actions against Poland and Nicaragua were far more political than 
those aimed at the USSR and so required greater plausible deniability to avoid harsh Soviet 
counter-actions.  
The conference was able to produce a rough consensus over tactics and individual 
programs by leaving the final strategic objectives of the policy unresolved. However, when 
the US government attempted to define a more cogent policy internally, the struggle over 
end-goals continued. The State Department‟s cautious approach to the idea of promoting 
democracy in the Communist world was evident in administration discussions over NSDD-
75, the administration‟s statement of anti-Soviet strategy, which had been drafted largely by 
NSC Reaganite Richard Pipes.
63
 Pipes, who was working for the NSC while on leave from 
his position as a Professor of History at Harvard, was a confirmed hard-liner. He had 
previously conducted consultancy work for the US government in 1976 as the Chairman of 
Team B, a group of analysts from outside the intelligence community who had been brought 
in to review the CIA‟s intelligence data and conclusions on the USSR by the Ford 
Administration. The Team‟s conclusions on the threat posed by the USSR were far bleaker 
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than those of the CIA‟s analysts. 64  Pipes had also written extensively on the threat posed by 
the Soviet Union for the Committee on the Present Danger. The hard-line NSC Director of 
Eastern European and Soviet Affairs was soon to leave government service and return to his 
teaching position at Harvard; the NSDD on US Soviet strategy was to be his legacy to the 
administration. However, the process of creating the document proved to be contentious. 
Disagreement centred over the goals for US policy outlined in NSSD 11-82, the 
policy study which NSDD-75 was based on. This study envisaged a confrontational posture 
towards the USSR which included ideological warfare and support for political movements 
within the Soviet Empire. In terms of Soviet client states the study echoed the objective of 
“contain[ing] and revers[ing] Soviet expansion” by “encourag[ing] long-term liberalizing and 
nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries” contained in NSDD-32.65 
According to the study, the US should “not accept the idea that Communist rule is 
irreversible” in Soviet client states in the Third World and follow a policy of rollback by 
supporting “democratic movements…to…bring about political change” in Third World 
allies.
66
 There was a clear role for democracy promotion instrumentalities in this policy, as 
Long-term political cadre and organization building programs, long a strongly 
emphasized instrument of Soviet policy, must become a regular, and more developed, 
part of U.S. policy.
67
 
 
However, the policy outlined towards the Soviet Union itself was more far-reaching 
than previous objectives. The drafting of the new NSDD on Soviet policy proceeded on the 
assumption, drawn up by Pipes, that  
Soviet international behaviour is a response not only to external threats but also to the  
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internal imperatives of the Soviet political, economic, social and ideological system.
68
 
 
This implied that US national security could be enhanced by an effort to change the 
Soviet Union‟s internal system, and the study that set the ambitious goal of “promoting 
change within the USSR itself” through support for “internal forces”.69 This objective was to 
be accomplished through putting pressure on the USSR through economic sanctions
70
 and a 
US ideological and political offensive, as “US policy towards the Soviet Union must have an 
ideological thrust which clearly demonstrates the superiority of US and Western values” such 
as “political democracy”71. This policy went beyond previous US conceptions of Cold War 
strategy, a fact that the study acknowledged:  
By identifying the promotion of evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself as 
an objective of U.S. policy, the United States takes the long-term strategic  offensive. 
This approach therefore contrasts with the essentially reactive and defensive strategy 
of containment…72 
 
To accomplish this, the US would have to strengthen its political action capability, including 
“The President‟s London initiative to support democratic forces”73 and to consider how 
political action could be used to influence Soviet policy.
74
 It was clear that both governmental 
and private programs aimed at the projection of American ideology and democracy 
promotion would play a part in such a project.  
The novelty of this new strategy of “encouraging antitotalitarian [sic] changes” within 
the USSR itself was stressed by Clark in his presentation of the policy to Reagan and the 
National Security Council.
75
 However, this goal went beyond the State Department‟s 
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previous agreement, contained in Haig‟s memo to the President of March 1982, that support 
for democratic forces in the Soviet bloc could assist the containment of Soviet power by 
focussing Soviet attention on domestic stability rather than expansion.
76
 The study recognised 
its goal of fostering change in the USSR to be a long-term project which would interact with 
internal Soviet factors rather than a goal which the US could achieve alone and over a short 
span.
77
 However, the Department still attempted to limit this goal by objecting to the more 
extreme provisions for economic pressure
78
 and demanding changes to water down the goal 
of democratic transformation of the Soviet Union
79
 in the document.
80
 This goal was summed 
up in the second objective listed for the administration‟s Soviet policy in the policy document 
which resulted from the study, NSDD-75:  
To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the 
Soviet Union towards a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the 
power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The US recognizes that 
Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system…81 
 
Pipes‟ original draft had been more radical and had not included the phrase “within 
the narrow limits available to us”, which had been inserted at the insistence of the State 
Department after a hard-fought battle between the two agencies.
82
 CIA officials even feared 
that State would resist the implementation of the policy completely.
83
 Pipes regarded State‟s 
editing of his document as “timorous”,84 while NSC hard-liner Norman Bailey complained 
that the policies contained in NSDD-75 were “bitterly opposed by other high-level 
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administration figures and by whole bureaucracies in the Departments of State and 
Commerce.”85 While both the State Department and the NSC favoured mounting a 
political/ideological campaign for democracy against the Soviet bloc, they were divided over 
how this campaign was connected to US grand strategy towards the Soviet Union, how far to 
prosecute it and what its end-goals should be. The result was a compromise document which 
was not as hard-hitting as Pipes had hoped. However, the rough consensus over operations 
enabled the policy to move forward within the existing broad framework, even though 
problems of consensus over grand strategy remained.  
A framework for democracy promotion operations in the Third World was also 
difficult to negotiate due to Reaganite fears that attempts to spread democracy in pro-US 
dictatorships would lead to their collapse and replacement by Communist regimes. To build 
consensus on political operations in the Third World, the administration held a public 
Conference on Free Elections at the beginning of November, several days after the 
Conference on the Democratization of Communist Countries. In contrast to the anti-
communist event of October, which was held behind closed doors, this event was public and 
was attended by representatives from 34 countries,
86
 many of them newly-returned to 
democracy or from Latin America.
87
  
There was a clear role for private groups in the emerging campaign, as the conference 
took as its starting point an idea that had been generated by the private democracy promoters 
democracy promoters in the 1970s and early 80s and agreed that a process of democratisation 
of Third World dictatorships could begin by forging links between exiles, parties, labour 
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groups, foundations and their US counterparts.
88
 US private groups would have to take the 
lead in these initiatives, as only they would have the necessary credibility to liaise directly 
with foreign democrats. This decision again widened the room for manoeuvre which the 
private democracy promoters had been provided by Reagan‟s June speech. However, it did 
not resolve the issue of whether the targets should be pro-US dictatorships threatened with 
communist revolution, Third World communist states such as Nicaragua and Grenada, or all 
non-democratic Third World states. 
This fuzziness was shown in the remarks addressed to the conference by the President 
and Secretary of State George Shultz. The opening address given by Reagan stressed a non-
partisan democratic idealism and avoided the sweeping denunciations of the USSR contained 
in the President‟s London speech in favour of putting forward a more inclusive and 
acceptable vision.
89
 This approach was also followed by Shultz who chose to stress the 
democracy campaign‟s positive aspects, stating that “We are not here to challenge other 
countries but to offer our expertise”.90 Shultz made no reference at all to the USSR, 
Communism or Marxism-Leninism during his speech. Elliott Abrams, the administration‟s 
Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Human Rights, took a more focussed 
approach, arguing that “democracies tend to have the best human rights practices, Communist 
regimes and military dictatorships tend to have the worst.”91 However, Abrams did not stress 
the need for US authoritarian allies to reform and thus did not engage with the continuing 
strategic debate. 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, on the other hand, took a clear position in her speech and 
advocated a strategy of anti-Soviet particularism. Kirkpatrick couched the promotion of 
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democracy as an anti-Communist project and inveighed strongly against Communism and 
Leninism in her speech, stating that  
The idea that the will of the people can be better expressed through a revolutionary 
elite than through free elections is, of course, a fundamental tenet of Leninism. It is 
incompatible with democratic elections and democratic government…92 
 
Kirkpatrick devoted much of the second half of her speech to criticism of the Marxist 
FMLN for opposing the March 1982 elections in El Salvador and of the Sandinistas for as yet 
failing to hold elections in Nicaragua.
93
 The speech was focussed very much on existing US 
security concerns in Central America and on the US‟ leftist enemies, not its rightist friends. 
In Kirkpatrick‟s formulation the enemies of democracy and the enemies of the US were one 
and the same. The outcome of the conference was general agreement on a gradualist policy of 
building up foreign civil society organisations such as unions and parties; however, as the 
targets of this initiative were not specified, each administration faction could read into it an 
affirmation of its own agenda.  
By December 1982, the administration had moved into a rough internal convergence 
on a strategic framework and the role of private groups within this design. Rather than an 
independent effort which subsumed anti-communist operations in the Soviet bloc and efforts 
to build democratic movements in Third World dictatorships under the banner of promoting 
democracy, it envisaged a larger Project Truth which would go beyond Western Europe to 
launch a political and ideological assault on Soviet Communism. Although this agreement 
was sufficient to allow the program to move forward, there were still areas of tension over the 
strategic objectives of the campaign which had not been fully resolved, such as whether 
actions against the Soviet bloc were to be aimed at the containment of Soviet power through 
stirring up internal dissent or a promoting gradual change in the bloc countries‟ societies. In 
                                                 
92
 Ibid, 4. 
93
 See ibid 3-4. 
177 
 
the Third World, the option of prosecuting a wider campaign which aimed at fostering the 
emergence of democratic systems in all Third World countries, including pro-US 
authoritarian governments, had not been adequately examined. While some officials spoke of 
a more even-handed campaign, others remained fixed on attempts to undermine Third World 
Marxist states opposed to the US, such as Nicaragua. However, despite this strategic 
fuzziness in regard to both regions, there was enough general agreement within the 
administration that programs should be mounted in them to allow the project to move 
forward. What the administration also required was an organisational structure to carry it out. 
Bureaucratic consensus and the organisational structure for democracy promotion 
Concurrently with the debates over strategy discussed above, the administration turned its 
attention to creating an organisational structure to implement its democracy campaign. This 
structure would need to be able to co-ordinate state and private programs aimed at both 
public diplomacy and political action. It would also need to be able to supervise any 
programs which emerged from the APF‟s study of democracy promotion methods. The 
administration‟s clear preference was for a governmental structure to co-ordinate government 
and private programs in the interests of US national security. This solution would limit the 
autonomy of private groups involved in the project and allow the administration to manage 
any strategic tensions between it and these groups which arose, much as CIA funding and co-
ordination of state-private network organisations had done before 1967.  
The outcome of the 1967 crisis indicated that in operational terms an overt structure 
would be more acceptable domestically than a covert one and more durable, as it could not be 
destroyed by public exposure. However, the decision to pursue an overt, governmental 
structure to co-ordinate and fund the democracy campaign opened up a number of problems 
which the CIA had not had to face when co-opting private groups. Firstly, the decision to 
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locate the co-ordinating centre within the government made the process hostage to problems 
such as bureaucratic manoeuvring or non-co-operation which had previously been mitigated 
by giving responsibility for such operations to a covert agency. Secondly, an overt program 
would need to be acceptable to Congress in order to be voted the appropriations it needed to 
function. The CIA‟s covert program had not faced such a requirement.  
Finally, there was an issue of credibility involved in disbursing US government 
money overtly to US private groups who would then channel these funds to private groups 
overseas. Before 1967 private groups had been able to secure co-operation from their 
counterparts overseas more easily than government agencies because their receipt of 
government funds had been covert. The shift to overt funding in this case might make foreign 
private groups less willing to accept funding which they knew had ultimately originated in 
the US government. Overt funding of private groups overseas could also affect relationships 
with foreign governments. This tension was further complicated by the fact that several of the 
programs under consideration went beyond the pre-1967 state-private network‟s aim of 
projecting democratic ideology to focus on the more controversial objectives of training 
foreign opposition movements and providing groups and individuals overseas with the 
support and skills needed to alter foreign political structures.  
The administration‟s need to take note of Congressional opinion had an immediate 
effect on its choice of implementing structures for the campaign. The CIA‟s involvement was 
seen to be unacceptable to Congress due to the lingering effects of the 1967 crisis and the 
Agency was ruled out as an implementing structure for the campaign by Lawrence 
Eagleburger, State Department Undersecretary for Political Affairs and Robert C. McFarlane 
the Deputy National Security Advisor at the end of August 1982, with the rationale that “if 
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we have the C.I.A. in this we can call it off right off the bat”.94 The obvious solution was to 
pass responsibility for supervision to another component of the bureaucracy; however, this 
opened up bureaucratic problems which the original decision to vest control of state-private 
operations in the CIA had side-stepped.  
A key difficulty in carrying out an overt global campaign embracing political 
programs was that the geographical operating mandates for other national security agencies 
did not allow for this. In the wake of the CIA‟s exit from the program, one possible option 
might have been to fund and co-ordinate the programs through AID, the Agency for 
International Development, which had conduited funding to the AFL-CIO‟s foreign 
operations after and to an extent a few years before the 1967 collapse of the state-private 
network. However, AID was not a sufficiently flexible conduit to channel funds to private 
groups operating globally. If private groups accepted AID funding they would only be able to 
operate in countries which agreed to host AID programs. This meant that, for example, the 
conduit could not be used by the AFL-CIO in either Nigeria or South Africa, which the union 
saw as the key African countries for its strategy, as neither hosted AID programs at that 
time.
95
 In addition, AID‟s mandate to provide funds for developing countries meant that the 
organisation could not be used to conduit funds to any European programs, whether in the 
West or the East. Thus, funding the Solidarity Co-ordinating Committee, would have been 
ruled illegal under AID‟s mandate. This would also apply to any other private groups 
attempting to fund operations outside the Third World with AID money, such as the APF. 
These problems appeared before any operations had been specified, in relation to the 
APF‟s democracy study, which was supposed to be funded from AID‟s human rights budget. 
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In August George Agree had sent an outline and proposed budget for the study,
96
 however, 
no contract was signed until the beginning of December 1982, due to conflicts with AID‟s 
geographical mandate and mission. The APF proposed language in the contract which would 
legitimate funding for a study into methods for promoting democracy in “other countries”, 
however, AID proposed the language “developing countries” or “non-developed countries”,97 
in conformity with its mandate. This distinction was crucial, as the APF‟s study was not 
focussed only on the Third World, 
98
 and would include the Soviet bloc as well. Thus, the 
basic problem was that the AID funding conduit was not flexible enough to implement either 
the expansive campaign favoured by the democracy promoters and the State Department or 
the more narrowly anti-communist strategy favoured by the Reaganites.  
A further problem was that no national security agency had an operating mandate 
which allowed it to fund programs aimed at the political transformation of other countries. 
AID‟s mandate authorised it to conduct programs related to social and economic 
development, not political engineering which meant that such political programs would not 
be legally fundable by AID. In addition, many State Department officials believed that their 
organisation did not have sufficient legal authorisation to house or pass funding to political 
programs.
99
 This applied especially to those elements of the campaign which went beyond 
promoting the idea of democracy to encompass the support and training of political forces, 
such as the proposed Institute for Democracy in Central America, a key part of the 
government‟s strategy. In early November Walter Raymond, the NSC‟s Director of 
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International Communications and a member of the Working Group charged with co-
ordinating the emerging campaign, argued that 
Part of this [implementation and funding] will be based on ensuring that the items 
selected are consistent with the authorization that comes with the money that will be 
available…We may have difficulty creating democracy institutes in Central 
America…if there is no existing authorization to which this can be tied.100  
 
Added to this problem of legal authorisation was bureaucratic resistance by national 
security agencies to taking on more responsibility outside their key functions. A further 
concern for AID, as with the AFL-CIO programs mentioned above, was that funding political 
programs would take it too far outside its core mission. Raymond commented that “Part of 
AID‟s concern is that a grant to the American Political Foundation would be somewhat „out 
of character‟ for AID.”101 AID‟s obstructionism and attempts to limit the scope of the study 
and control the disbursement of funding continued into December, when Raymond 
intervened:  
…I suggested dumping AID and turning to State to fund the study. When this view 
was known in State, they pushed AID to complete the contract work.
102
 
 
Most agencies also feared that taking on some responsibility for democracy 
promotion would force them to fund the programs out of their own budgets, at least initially. 
The State Department was reluctant to extend its mission to democracy promotion, due to 
concerns “about the impact on its budget if there is heavy pressure for resources.”103 The 
NSC acknowledged that all other bureaucratic agencies were likely to make the same 
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argument.
104
  However, even if a solution to this problem of mandates had been found, such a 
solution would not have resolved the credibility problem which stemmed from funding such 
initiatives overtly through the government. 
One possibility for resolving problems of bureaucratic management and credibility, 
particularly with the more explicitly political programs, was private funding, which had been 
mentioned by William Clark in the meeting after Reagan‟s speech.105 This idea was fleshed 
out into a “Fund for Democracy”, to be created through donations from prominent 
industrialists and foundations, by Gerald Helman of the State Department, a member of the 
Working Group organising the democracy project, towards the end of November. Helman 
argued that government funds should go largely to government-sponsored and controlled 
projects, but that a private “Fund for Democracy” could be used to fund non-governmental 
groups. The Fund should be created using a fund-raising campaign headed by the President, 
with letters distributed to potential donors. Once a core group had been formed, there would 
be a conference at the White House.
106
  
This option was supported by USIA, which believed that it provided a way to get 
around the problem of bureaucratic mandates and solve the credibility issue. USIA argued 
that the Fund should be used for programs which would be “legally ambiguous” if executed 
by the US government. In addition, the arrangement would serve to boost the credibility of 
more controversial projects by minimising their connection to the US government; USIA 
stated that any connection between the government and these projects should be avoided “for 
obvious credibility reasons.”107 A lack of direct funding links to the US government would 
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enhance the credibility of several of the more controversial programs listed for financing 
under the private fund, including the Free Market Institutes which would later become the 
NED‟s Centre for International Private Enterprise and the ever-problematic Institute for 
Democracy in Central America,
108
 eventually incarnated as the NED‟s School for Democracy 
in Venezuela.
109
 
In the end the initiative turned out to be ineffective, as private donations were 
insufficient. This is clear from the fact that many of these contentious programs were 
eventually included in the administration‟s list of programs requiring government funding, 
discussed below. The administration was unable to avoid the bureaucratic strictures on the 
deployment of more controversial programs and had to place them under government 
supervision for the lack of a better option. This opened the door to legal problems and 
involved a loss of credibility for the programs due to their clear links to a government project. 
By the end of 1982 the administration had run out of time to adequately resolve the 
problems of bureaucratic mandates, bureaucratic resistance and credibility issues which the 
interagency process had thrown up.  Its decision to include the appropriation for democracy 
promotion programs in its 1984 budget, to be submitted to Congress in early 1983, was 
almost certainly taken because the administration calculated that the program was more likely 
to be approved by Congress in an off-election year.
110
 The campaign was to be presented as a 
bipartisan initiative, and this strategy had more chance of succeeding before campaigning for 
the 1984 Congressional elections began in earnest. It thus decided to forward the programs it 
had already decided on to Congress for an appropriation vote, placed in one package: Project 
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Democracy. This decision tied the project to the administration‟s relations with Congress and 
had an impact on the management structure chosen for the campaign as the choice of a “lead 
agency” to manage the Congressional appropriation would determine the strategy the 
administration chose to present the initiative to Congress.
111
 
This timetable meant that the administration needed to quickly decide on a “lead 
agency” to manage the appropriation for Project Democracy.112 The administration chose to 
channel Project Democracy funding through the USIA to solve the problems of legal 
mandates encountered with other bureaucratic agencies, as it was believed that the 
administration could argue that the bulk of Project Democracy fell under USIA‟s existing 
mandate.
113
 Although USIA did not have a mandate to conduct political activities, it did have 
one to conduct public diplomacy, which the administration defined extremely widely as being 
“comprised of those actions of the US government designed to generate support for our 
national security objectives”.114 This definition was vague and could have incorporated 
activities from propaganda programs to training of political figures abroad.
115
 A further 
reason for placing the program under USIA supervision was USIA Director Charles Wick‟s 
close relationship with the President.
116
 
USIA, in turn, would be supervised by a multiagency Special Planning Group under 
the chairmanship of the National Security Advisor, which had been created by NSDD-77, 
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signed by the President in January 1983.
117
 The SPG was designed to co-ordinate all aspects 
of the US government ideological campaign through four subcommittees,  including: 
activities carried out to support INF missile deployments in Western Europe and against the 
nuclear freeze movement in the US, to be co-ordinated through the Public Affairs 
Committee;
118
 management of international radio broadcasting, an important component of 
the administration‟s anti-Soviet campaign, which would be overseen by the International 
Broadcasting Committee;
119
 and the International Information Committee, which formalised 
the Project Truth Working Group.
120
 The committee designated to manage Project 
Democracy was the International Political Committee, chaired by the State Department, with 
USIA as vice-chair.
121
 The IPC was to be responsible for “planning, co-ordinating and 
implementing international political activities” and countering “totalitarian ideologies and 
aggressive political action moves undertaken by the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates”.122 
The committee was also authorised to co-ordinate “aid, training and organisational support 
for foreign governments and private groups to encourage the growth of democratic political 
institutions and practices”123 through “close relationship[s] with those sectors of the 
American society – labor, business, universities, philanthropy, political parties, the press – 
that are or could be more engaged in parallel efforts overseas.”124  This placed both 
governmental and private programs under the supervision of the International Political 
Committee and ultimately the Special Planning Group.  
This command structure, which linked Project Democracy to efforts to persuade 
Western Europeans to accept INF deployments and the administration‟s broadcasting assault 
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on the USSR, was clearly designed to implement an anti-communist agenda shaped by 
immediate national security crises rather than one tied to either an expansive strategy 
connected to national security or a global campaign to build democracy. It also placed the 
democracy campaign under government supervision. It remained to be seen whether this 
arrangement would be acceptable to Congress. 
Executive-Congressional Consensus 
The program of democracy promotion placed before Congress by the Reagan administration 
in February 1983 contained many of the initiatives discussed during this time, such as a 
stepped-up book publishing program and an Institute for Democracy in Central America,
125
 
and was described as an effort to promote democracy through “leadership training, education, 
building of democratic institutions, informational programs and bolstering ties between 
American individuals and organizations and their foreign counterparts”126 in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America and to promote an “‟evolution...toward democracy‟ in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe”.127  
The program included participation by private organisations; however, rather than 
distributing block grants to private groups who would then work autonomously, the 
administration had created a government command centre for the program and proposed to 
dole out money for specific projects in fixed amounts. This mode of control was similar to 
that employed by the CIA to manage its private partners before 1967. To obtain the funds to 
begin the campaign there was a need for convergence between the administration‟s vision 
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and that of elements of the legislature which favoured a privately-implemented universal 
campaign and were deeply suspicious of the administration‟s hard-line anti-communism. An 
examination of the Project Democracy programs indicates the disjuncture between the 
Executive‟s proposals and what these elements in Congress might find acceptable.  
While Project Democracy represented the significant strengthening of US political 
action capability sought by NSDD-75, it did not constitute a coherent strategy for promoting 
the growth of democratic parties and political structures overseas. The concept of democracy 
deployed in the Project was an abstract one and its programs were a compendium of 
propaganda and exchange programs, connected haphazardly with more political initiatives 
such as the Institute for Democracy in Central America, which was primarily targeted on the 
US‟ particular national security interest: combating communism. These programs were 
largely geared at using democratic ideology as an abstract concept to wage a “battle of ideas” 
with Soviet Communism, rather than building democratic systems overseas on a global basis. 
This was clear from the geographical targeting of the project, which included 
programs focussed on Western Europe, a region that was already democratic. In terms of the 
administration‟s stated rationale for Project Democracy, activities in Western Europe had no 
justification; the only purpose of such activities could be to counter Soviet propaganda and 
support the strategic goals of the United States, not to promote democratic forms of 
government. The “Full Cycle” program in which European students were invited to the US 
on exchange visits and then encouraged to form committees to recommend participants for 
the next cycle of exchanges, and the proposal for teacher-training workshops and secondary 
school materials to create more support for NATO, which was effectively contracted out to a 
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British educational institution,
128
 were aimed at drumming up support in Western European 
civil society for the US rather than a campaign for democracy.
129
 
The Project‟s activities focussed on the Third World were also largely geared towards 
a vision of democracy promotion focussed on contesting communist ideology. An example of 
this was the Central American Media Program which consisted of a newspaper and radio 
facilities targeted at rural populations, i.e., those social sectors most likely to support the 
insurgents the US was fighting against.
130
 This activity was clearly aimed at indoctrinating 
Central American peasants against Communism, not empowering them as democratic 
citizens. The exchanges proposed in the program were also directed at Marxist ideology and 
seemed to equate democracy with the United States. The rationale advanced for African-US 
scholar exchanges was that, while African universities were rapidly becoming foci for 
political thought and debate was based on anti-communism rather than democracy 
promotion:  
…African faculties and significant segments of the student population tend to view 
the world through Marxist lenses and have little understanding or sympathy for 
democratic values and processes.
131
  
 
Funding for AFL-CIO operations was included within the program, but with the 
purely anti-communist rationale that 
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A strengthened national and international labor movement would bolster democracy 
both in countries where the Soviets are engaged in overt and covert political action 
programs in the labor sector to shift the balance of power (e.g., Western Europe and 
Oceania), as well as those regions where the Soviets are supporting communist and 
radical insurgents in an effort to undermine stability and the democratic labor 
movement (e.g., Central America and southern Africa).
132
 
 
In contrast to this focus on anti-communism, Project Democracy presented no clear 
plan to transition pro-US right-wing dictatorships to democracy and had few concrete 
programs aimed at building democratic successor movements capable of taking power in 
these states. One of the few concessions to the danger of right-wing authoritarianism in the 
clutch of propaganda initiatives was a program of seminars on democracy for military 
leaders, based on the idea that  
Military-led interruptions of the political process can retard the development of a 
democratic form of government. Democratization often depends on building positive 
attitudes towards democracy in present and future military leaders.
133
 
 
Project Democracy would also contribute $1.7 million to the government of Samuel 
Doe in Liberia for an election to return to civilian rule
134
 and the problematic Institute for 
Democracy in Central America,
135
 which was now to be funded directly by the US 
government despite the legal ambiguity of this. However, the Liberian program was an 
isolated case, not an example of a grand strategy at work, and the Institutes for Democracy 
mentioned for other areas of the world were discussed only as future possibilities, not 
concrete realities.
136
 These programs were ad hoc responses to current problems and were not 
tied to a wider or more strategic approach. The administration needed to exercise caution 
when presenting this package to Congress due to the disjuncture between its narrow focus on 
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anti-Sovietism and Congress‟ vision of a democracy initiative which would work for 
democratic change on an expansive basis.  
Project Democracy ran into immediate problems in Congress during hearings held by 
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organisations and Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee due to the lack of strategic and organisational consensus between the 
administration and the legislature. While both Republican and Democrat legislators criticised 
the project in organisational terms, many of the harshest strategic criticisms came from the 
Democrats. The core disagreement between the administration and Congressional Democrats 
was over whether the campaign should be a focussed on at combatting Soviet ideological and 
political influence, mainly through the type of public diplomacy initiatives which had been 
conducted earlier in the Cold War through USIA and the CIA, or whether it should be a  
universalist one focussed on promoting changes in political structures in enemy and allied 
dictatorships through new forms of political intervention. The fact that programs were to be 
conducted in Western Europe, a region which was already democratic, made no sense in 
terms of the stated rationale for Project Democracy and so was clearly aimed at combating 
either communism or the European peace movement; Democratic Party Senator Christopher 
Dodd summed up the incongruity of launching programs to promote democracy in Western 
Europe by commenting that “If [the Western Europeans] don‟t believe in democracy, we‟re 
in real trouble”.137 
Congressmen on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International 
Organisations were concerned about the larger issue of “how US national interests and the 
even-handed spreading of democratic ideology might be reconciled in the conduct of the 
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project”.138 The fact that the administration had put forward a number of anti-communist 
proposals but few initiatives focussed on building democracy in right-wing dictatorships was 
also a serious stumbling block to the acceptance of the plan by Democrats on the House and 
Senate Committees. Democrat Congressman Stephen Solarz questioned Shultz over whether 
the US would limit democracy promotion to unfriendly governments or whether it would 
promote democracy in allied dictatorships such as the Philippines, Chile, Taiwan and South 
Korea during his Congressional testimony in support of the program,
139
 arguing that a policy 
of selective democracy promotion would destroy the credibility of the whole effort.
140
 Shultz 
attempted to sidestep the issue, which was controversial within the administration as well as 
in the legislature, by stating that the aim of the campaign was not to support dissidents but to 
support democracy in general.
141
 However, his answer was unsatisfactory to some, and the 
project began to be tagged as “Project Right-wing Democracy”142 by Senator Paul Tsongas 
and as a “conservative ideological crusade” by Congressional Democrats.143  
In contrast, conservative Republican senators complained that the right-wing private 
organisations they favoured were not slated to receive funding,
144
 while a Republican 
Representative feared that friendly regimes in Asia, Africa and the Middle East would see the 
program as being aimed at destabilising their governments.
145
 These objections were a direct 
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consequence of the administration‟s decision to create an overt network, as under the pre-
1967 model of covert funding provided by the CIA the national security bureaucracy had not 
had to make a case to Congress for the targeting of its programs or the groups that would 
receive support. 
These objections indicated a lack of strategic consensus between the Reagan 
administration and some committee members, Democrats in particular. This lack of strategic 
consensus led to a lack of organisational consensus. Some concerns over the organisational 
model for the program were connected to disapproval of its anti-communist strategic bias. 
The problem was that the program was to be managed by a close collaborator of the President 
and a man famed for his anti-communist pronouncements: Charles Wick.  Wick could be 
expected to focus on anti-communism to the detriment of a more universal approach and was 
unpopular with many legislators due to their perception of his conservative bias.
146
 Walter 
Raymond frankly admitted this problem in a memo to William Clark on Congressional 
strategy: 
There is deep suspicion over the direction of USIA. Part of this stems from the 
Director and his approach to propaganda…in terms of the “democracy project” 
[Congress] do[es] not see either the Director or his staff as being sufficiently 
politically nuanced to manage this intricate program.
147
  
 
Congressmen believed that Wick, with his black and white view of a world divided 
into communist enemies and US friends, would prosecute the project in a strident and 
propagandistic manner. This stemmed from Congressional discomfort with previous USIA 
propaganda operations such as Project Truth and the agency‟s “multi-media blitz „Let Poland 
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Be Poland‟”.148 Wick‟s description of the project as aimed at waging “a war of ideas with the 
Soviet Union” clearly did not dispel this impression.149  
This problem extended beyond Wick, however, as legislators were also unhappy 
about the co-ordinating role of the NSDD-77 committees and the degree of government 
control of the project this implied. Both Republicans and Democrats feared that government 
involvement could damage the credibility of the enterprise and of US information and 
exchange programs in general.
150
 This management of democracy promotion by the national 
security bureaucracy also heightened concern that the program represented a resurrection of 
the previous state-private network, rather than a new approach completely divorced from 
covert operations. Wick was questioned closely on whether the CIA was involved in Project 
Democracy and, if so, to what extent.
151
 The USIA Director stated that the CIA had 
participated in initial discussions on Project Democracy, but would not be involved in the 
program itself.
152
   
Wick was also questioned over a plan by USIA, as part of Project Democracy, to 
“funnel $50,000 through an intermediary organization to the Inter-American Press 
Association because that group's rules prohibit funding by governments.” As far as one 
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was concerned, "This would appear to be 
a rather indelicate attempt to launder $50000," meaning that funds were to be transferred 
illegally and covertly.
153
 This action fuelled suspicions that the administration was attempting 
to resurrect the secretive and illegal actions which the CIA had pursued through its alliances 
with private groups before 1967. Such actions would lead to a gap between the democratic 
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message of the Project and its operating principles, similar to the ideological gap which had 
destroyed the state-private network in 1967.  
Rather than a serious effort to build democracy in other countries, legislators began to 
see Project Democracy as simply a multimillion dollar propaganda campaign that was “sure 
to give us trouble” or that other countries would merely consider it “mischief making”, with 
these criticisms emerging from both parties.
154
 Several Congressmen argued that it would be 
better to administer the democracy campaign through a “semi-autonomous non-governmental 
organization” rather than the national security bureaucracy,155 with Representative 
Kastenmeier opining that “[Project Democracy] may have legitimate functions if it were in 
private, non-governmental agencies”.156 At the end of the Senate hearing, Wick had to 
decline the offer of a shredder for his organisational charts from its Republican Chairman.
157
 
 From this point onward Project Democracy seemed unlikely to be approved by 
Congress. The opposition to it expressed by legislators derived from the failure to solve the 
tension between the promotion of democracy and US national interests by the administration. 
This failure was partly due to the bureaucratic constraints faced by the administration in its 
attempts to resurrect a state-private network previously run through the CIA and to 
implement it overtly through bureaucratic structures which had not been designed to manage 
such a program. The unwieldy structure of a lead agency distributing funding to other 
participating agencies under the supervision of two committees at different levels led to 
Congressional feeling that such an organisational framework simply could not work. The 
government funding and co-ordination of the project also risked destroying the credibility of 
the project as a serious attempt to promote democracy, rather than a propaganda effort 
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directed at achieving US interests. There was no guarantee that private groups or political 
movements overseas would be willing to accept government funding dispensed by an 
initiative managed and co-ordinated by the US national security bureaucracy.  
However, the overarching reason for the failure of Project Democracy was a lack of 
consensus between the Executive and Congressmen, especially Democrats, over how 
democracy promotion was related to US national security objectives. The campaign presented 
by the Reagan administration used the concept of democracy promotion to combat the spread 
of Soviet communism and to legitimate propaganda and political initiatives which had little 
connection to creating democratic systems in dictatorial countries, such as the programs 
focussed on Western Europe. The narrow nature of this campaign required the command 
centre within the government, which was proving so detrimental to the project‟s credibility, 
to supervise and limit the actions of the private groups mobilised by it to conform to these 
priorities. In contrast, Congress favoured an expansive campaign aimed at creating 
democracy in dictatorial regimes friendly to the United States as well as enemy dictatorships, 
and believed that this campaign would be best implemented by removing day-to-day control 
from the Reagan administration and vesting it in private groups. The problems experienced 
by Project Democracy opened a space for the private democracy promoters to put forward 
their own implementing structure – the National Endowment for Democracy – which was 
tied to a wider campaign of democracy promotion.  
After the problems caused by the Committee hearings in February and March 1983 
the NSC attempted to secure the support of leading figures involved in private democracy 
promotion by contacting Frank Fahrenkopf, then Chairman of the Republican National 
Committee and a co-chair of the Democracy Program study board, and asked him to secure 
the support of Charles Manatt, Lane Kirkland and Michael Samuels, the leaders of the study 
project, for Project Democracy. The Council offered $10 million of the $65 million 
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appropriation to help launch the National Endowment for Democracy.
158
 This could smooth 
the passage of the program through Congress, as key critics of the administration‟s vision 
such as Dante Fascell and Senator Christopher Dodd were members of the APF study 
board.
159
 This explicit linking of the private democracy promoters‟ initiative, which many in 
Congress supported, to Project Democracy could be expected to increase the credibility of the 
administration‟s effort with the legislature. It would also tie the private foundation more 
securely to Project Democracy through funding linkages and the command and control 
structures created by NSDD-77. It remained to be seen whether the private democracy 
promoters would accept this linkage. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 
The lack of consensus over Project Democracy threw the campaign for democracy into 
disarray. Congress‟ objections to a government-supervised program aimed largely at 
combatting Soviet Communism spurred a re-thinking of the effort which created an 
opportunity for the private groups associated with the APF study to present their own vision 
to Congress. 
 The private coalition responsible for the Democracy Program study had broadened 
beyond the two parties in the wake of Reagan‟s speech, when the Republicans and Democrats 
had been joined in their project by the AFL-CIO. These three were then joined by 
representatives of the US Chamber of Commerce in January 1983, after Michael Samuels had 
sold the idea of a role for US business in democracy promotion to the Project Democracy 
Working Group.
1
 In order for this group to make its vision reality it would have to engineer 
consensus both with the administration and the legislature over its private solution to 
democracy promotion.  
This private study group was successful where the national security bureaucracy had 
failed; it produced an organisation capable of carrying out political operations abroad which 
would be acceptable to private groups, the administration and Congress. The study group‟s 
concept of a global campaign for democracy, coupled with the time pressure facing the study, 
meant that rather than investigating and promoting a strategic framework for democracy 
promotion, it concentrated on an organisational solution to the problem. The fact that the 
ideological concept of global democracy promotion de-emphasised debates centred on 
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whether to pursue a particularist anti-Soviet strategy or a more universalist one also focussed 
on friendly dictatorships meant that all groups could see the program as acceptable in terms 
of their own priorities, while the private nature of the initiative served to defuse the 
bureaucratic problems which had complicated Project Democracy. Through this approach, 
the study group was successful in convincing both the administration and Congress to support 
the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy.  
However, the organisational solution which emerged differed from the previous state-
private network and the administration‟s vision in important ways. The vesting of the 
campaign in a private body to be funded by Congressional appropriations replaced the pre-
1967 organisational model, in which funds proceeded from the CIA to the private groups, 
with a triangular model including the Executive, Congress and the private groups, giving the 
legislature influence over the overt campaign which had not been present in the covert 
funding model. In addition, the vesting of the command and control function which was to 
have been carried out by the International Political Committee in a private body which had 
been shaped by partisan manoeuvrings by the private groups within the democracy promotion 
increased the danger that democracy promotion would prove to be a fragmented enterprise 
driven by a mix of democratic ideology, private interests and private perceptions of US 
interests. 
The private conception of Democracy Promotion 
The Democracy Program study proceeded concurrently with the administration‟s planning for 
Project Democracy. Although the idea for the study had emerged from the APF, it was 
overseen by an Executive Board consisting of, among others, private sector democracy 
promoters such as William Brock, Charles Manatt and Michael Samuels along with former 
NSA Richard Allen and legislators Dante Fascell and Christopher Dodd.  The study was 
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directed by Professor Allen Weinstein of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a 
respected historian. Weinstein was also Executive editor of the Washington Quarterly, which 
had published William Douglas‟ and Michael Samuels‟ article, “Promoting Democracy”. 
 The study was predominantly an instrument for building consensus in the Executive 
and Congress to support the creation of a private democracy promotion foundation. In this, it 
closely resembled the study which Michael Samuels had called for in 1980 to foster 
consensus for a new policy of political intervention in the Executive and the Legislature.
2
 The 
group began from a conception of a campaign for democracy which was not anchored in a 
specific strategic framework but aimed at building democratic structures globally, in contrast 
to the administration‟s concept of a propaganda campaign which used democracy primarily 
as an ideological weapon to combat Soviet communism. This inclusiveness minimised debate 
over the strategic aspect of democracy promotion. Its primary tasks were to generate program 
plans for the beginning of the campaign and create a private structure to implement the 
concept which would subsume the partisan interests of the four core groups in a wider 
program of democracy promotion.  
 Due to the time constraints under which the study was operating
3
 and the substitution 
of the goal of promoting democracy for a specific strategy, the study group de-emphasised 
consideration of specific targets and tactics in favour of generating an organisational 
blueprint. It spent little time considering how democratic successor groups could be built up 
in authoritarian regimes, although, according to the program‟s leaders, it did consider how 
such movements could be helped in totalitarian states. This information was omitted from the 
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interim and final reports presented to Congress in April 1983,
4
 presumably so as not to re-
open the strategic question with legislators and thus jeopardise the organisation‟s funding. 
The study also recommended the organisational structure of the NED – an umbrella 
group sheltering four separate core foundations, to be run by the Democrats, Republicans, 
AFL-CIO and US Chamber of Commerce – based on the previous preconceptions of the 
democracy promoters, rather than basing it on a strategic concept or an assessment of what 
structure would be most effective in promoting democracy. By the time that 
recommendations on the NED‟s structure had been submitted to the study board on March 
16
th
,
5
 none of the regional reports on prospects for democracy promotion in Africa, East Asia, 
South Asia, Latin America and the Middle East had been completed and the group had done 
no more than cursory research on the US government agencies and programs already 
functioning in its areas of interest or consider whether the new endowment might end up 
duplicating one of these programs.
6
 In addition to this the taskforce reports on the roles of 
business and labour in democracy promotion were also uncompleted, along with the report on 
elections. Reports on the role of the Democratic and Republican parties in democracy 
promotion had not even been begun.
7
 The NED was recommended with no clear strategy 
underpinning it, no cognisance of how it would fit organisationally with governmental 
efforts, no clear understanding of what programs it would follow to promote democracy on a 
regional basis and no clear conception of the role the four core groups would play in 
promoting democracy. 
This inattention to strategic and practical questions was because the outcome of the 
study – a private group allying the parties, unions and business in foreign programs to 
                                                 
4
 Ibid, Appendix IV, 50. 
5
 Ibid, 11. 
6
 General Accounting Office, 12. 
7
 Ibid, 11-12. 
201 
 
promote democracy - was pre-determined by the concepts that private democracy promoters 
had elaborated before June 1982.
8
 This tendency to see the study as purely a vehicle for the 
creation of a political action capability for the four core groups was reinforced by its 
domination by staffers linked to these groups. Aside from Weinstein, the only full-time 
staffers on the study were four Assistant Directors, each of whom had been chosen by and 
owed allegiance to one of the four core groups. These four Assistant Directors were: 
Republican Keith B. Schuette, a former aide to Alexander Haig; Democrat politician John P. 
Loiello; John D. Sullivan of the US Chamber of Commerce; and AFL-CIO designee Eugenia 
Kemble, assistant to Albert Shanker of the American Federation of Teachers.
9
 These staffers 
“were nominated by, and intended to represent the interests of, these four groups”10 and later 
stated that the study: 
was not a feasibility study in the academic sense but instead was a study to work out a 
mechanism by which labor, business, and the two political parties could conduct 
programs abroad promoting democratic institutions and processes.
11
 
Given the dominance of the four core groups within the study, the key issue was 
whether the organisational structure which resulted from it would be determined by the 
participants‟ perception of what was best for democracy promotion, or the interests of these 
groups. This tension erupted in disagreements over whether two party foundations should be 
created, or whether the Republicans and Democrats should work together in one bipartisan 
foundation.
12
 This disagreement had first emerged in a low-key fashion at the APF‟s meeting 
of April 1982, when George Agree and State Department official Mark Palmer had argued 
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that the interests of both democracy promotion and US security pointed to the creation of a 
bipartisan foundation which would be able to overcome partisan differences between the 
parties by focussing on the common goal of promoting democracy, whereas Charles Manatt, 
the APF‟s Democrat Vice-chairman, had argued in favour of partisan foundations.13 
The initial agreement over a bipartisan party foundation began to change in February 
1983, as the prospect of creating organisations which would receive government funding 
grew more apparent. Agree, who was no longer connected with the day-to-day running of the 
study, became concerned about the direction it was heading in. In a letter to Brock and 
Manatt, he raised a series of questions about what type of structure would be most 
appropriate for conducting party-related activities through the NED. Although Agree 
proposed three possible organisational options - partisan institutes, one bipartisan institute or 
some combination of these two options
14
 - it is clear that he favoured one bipartisan institute. 
This supposition is confirmed by a later letter to the APF Board of Directors in which he 
argued 
…the preponderant considerations in terms of the interests of democratic forces in 
foreign countries, American national interests, the continuity and bipartisanship of 
American foreign policy, tempering factional disputes within the parties, etc, strongly 
favour the bipartisan approach.
15
 
 
Agree had been a supporter of a bipartisan institute since the foundation of the APF, which 
was itself a bipartisan organisation, and he offered a series of arguments for the creation of a 
bipartisan NED party institute connected to the operational effectiveness and credibility of 
the NED. A bipartisan structure would minimise factionalism within the parties by joining 
both together in a common goal – promoting democracy. It would also enable a long-range, 
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consistent policy to be pursued through alternations of party control of the Executive and 
Congress. In addition to this, it would enhance the operational effectiveness and credibility of 
the institute for democracy; the party of the administration could not be seen as its agent and 
would not, in fact, be able to undertake rogue actions dictated by the short-term policy of the 
administration represented by it. At the same time, a bipartisan institute meant that there was 
less chance of the parties drifting into embarrassing ideological alliances overseas, or of their 
actions being used as campaign issues. Thus, a bipartisan institute would serve the wider 
cause of democracy promotion and hopefully be more credible, both inside and outside the 
US.  Finally, Agree warned his opponents that partisan party foundations might prove 
unacceptable to Congress and damage the chances of creating the NED.
16
 
In February, Agree only recommended that competing structural models be placed 
before the Executive Board, which would then be able to make an informed choice.
17
 This 
was the limit of his power as a merely ex-officio member of the Executive Board; however, 
he was supported by Board members such as Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, and 
William Brock.
18
 These structural suggestions provoked a rift between Agree and Charles 
Manatt. The issue was not the respective operational merits of a bipartisan versus partisan 
party foundations for promoting democracy. Instead, Agree‟s opponents were most 
concerned that under his scheme their own party foundation would be unable to act alone to 
pursue its partisan interests. Agree‟s perception of this issue is clear from the compromise 
solution he suggested; the creation of international departments for the two parties through 
which they could pursue these interests, leaving the democracy institute untainted by partisan 
operations.
19
 It is also clear from the interim report to Congress of April 1983, discussed 
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more fully below, which argued for the creation of partisan party foundations and stated that 
the conduct of political exchanges would enable the parties to promote their own interests 
abroad.
20
  
Despite Agree‟s efforts the two competing models were never put before the 
Executive Board of the Study or the APF Board in order to enable board members to make an 
informed choice, as he had asked. 
21
 Neither were the arguments for bipartisan versus partisan 
foundations ever put to Congress, as the question was omitted from the interim report. 
Instead, the decision on the matter was made behind closed doors “through unofficial 
dealings among a few leaders”.22 The supporters of partisan political institutes, chiefly 
Democrat leader Charles Manatt, carried the day. The study board reacted to the threat to its 
consensus over organisation by removing the most strident proponents of a bipartisan 
foundation. Several months later Agree was fired as President of the APF by a small group of 
directors, which included Manatt,
23
 while a Republican APF director who had supported his 
ideas was also pressured into resigning by RNC Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf. He did so, 
while commenting that the APF had “drift[ed]…far from its original mission” and followed a 
“policy of secretness and stealth”; the organisation was “clearly being used as a vehicle for a 
few rather than as a champion of a cause.”24 It was clear that the wider project of promoting 
democracy was being diluted by more partisan considerations, even if, as Agree had warned, 
this placed the approval of the organisation by Congress in jeopardy. 
The dominance of the interests of the four core groups was further shown by the 
legislative framework for the National Endowment for Democracy itself, which was designed 
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to reduce structural constraints on the operations of these four groups. The legislation which 
created the NED prohibited no activities to its constituent groups, gave the Endowment no 
control over the money which would be disbursed to the four cores and provided no 
safeguards against misuse of its funds by them.
25
 The four groups were not accountable to the 
NED, or to Congress, and did not have to either obtain advance approval for their activities or 
report them after the fact; unlike the West German party foundations which the NED‟s 
Republican and Democratic Party institutes claimed to have modelled themselves on.
26
 In 
addition, although there was a requirement for the NED itself to be audited, there was no such 
requirement for the four groups.
27
 One critic pronounced “the Endowment is a toothless 
tiger”, “merely a pass-through with no control whatsoever over the use of funds by the party 
institutes, or the business and labour institutes for that matter.”28 Clearly the power lay with 
the four core groups, who would gain funding, autonomy and credibility through the 
Endowment. 
The guiding consideration of the Democracy Program study was not the creation of a 
strategic framework connecting private democracy promotion and US national security, or 
the organisational requirements for democracy promotion itself, for the study group largely 
ignored these questions.  Instead, the core groups were most focussed on creating an 
instrumentality which would offer them the maximum amount of operational independence to 
pursue their own interests under the umbrella of democracy promotion. This course was 
pursued even when it impeded the creation of a functional organisation, or the prospect that 
the privates‟ blueprint would be acceptable to Congress. These actions on the part of the 
dominant groups blocked the creation of an organisation which would meld the interests of 
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the four core groups together in a campaign to promote democracy and instead resulted in a 
weak umbrella organisation which would pass funds to instrumentalities controlled by these 
groups. The weakness of the supervisory powers granted to the National Endowment for 
Democracy increased the likelihood that rogue actions unrelated to the promotion of 
democracy would be undertaken by one or more core groups. However, in the rush to create 
the organisation the private groups failed to consider the possible outcomes of their decisions 
on the Endowment‟s structure, particularly Agree‟s warning that partisan party foundations 
might be unacceptable to Congress. 
Consensus between the private sector and the administration 
The Reagan administration, particularly its Reaganite faction, had previously shown 
reservations about allowing democracy promotion operations to be carried out by private 
groups without government supervision due to fear that these groups would carry out rogue 
actions which did not contribute to US national security. However, when the study group 
submitted its findings to Congress, it was able to include a letter from William Clark, dated 
14
th
 March, which stated that the effort to create the NED was strongly approved by 
Reagan.
29
 In addition, when the NED legislation later came under fire in Congress dissenting 
legislators received phone calls from Reagan administration officials urging them to change 
their minds.
30
  
 The administration‟s strong support for the Endowment was largely a pragmatic 
response to its need for an organisation which could carry out political programs overseas. 
With Project Democracy in trouble on the Hill, the administration needed another option, and 
the Reagan administration may have seen the National Endowment for Democracy as a more 
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Congress-friendly channel for political operations. This impression is strengthened by the 
NSC‟s offer of funding from the Project Democracy budget to set up the National 
Endowment for Democracy after Wick‟s ineffective testimony to Congress in March 1983.31 
However, the administration envisaged the creation of both programs using the same pot of 
funding and the same command and control structure: the International Political Committee. 
In contrast, the private democracy promoters subsumed elements of Project Democracy 
within their own organisation. The interim report presented to Congress on private 
democracy promotion as part of the effort to create the NED in April 1983 makes this plain 
by arguing that:  
Several of the bipartisan programs previously recommended in the Reagan 
Administration‟s “Project Democracy” initiative, for example, could be administered 
and overseen by each instrumentality while still being co-ordinated through the 
Endowment.
32
 
 
The administration could have accepted this as the only realistic way in which certain 
programs could be implemented, given Congressional opposition to Project Democracy. 
Thus, the government and the private democracy promoters reached consensus primarily over 
an organisational framework, rather than a strategic focus or specific tactics. 
 
Beyond this general picture, the design for the NED mobilised many of the same 
sectors which the administration had included within the framework of Project Democracy. 
For the Reagan administration the ideological promotion of free enterprise was part of the 
“battle of ideas” against Marxist ideology, and the Reagan administration had included 
“Regional Free Market Institutes” in Project Democracy. Such a focus on the anti-communist 
uses of pro-free enterprise propaganda seemed to dove-tail well with the core mission of the 
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Centre for International Private Enterprise, NED‟s business foundation,33 which aimed to 
strengthen the organisational capabilities of business organisations abroad and expose 
“political leaders to private enterprise economics”.34 
This overlap between the two programs also existed in regard to labour, as AFL-CIO 
activities had been a prominent part of the programs to be carried out under Project 
Democracy. The union had submitted detailed proposals for operations to be carried out in 
Poland, Grenada and other enemy dictatorships to the Reagan administration in August 
1982,
35
 and the final program list for the Project had contained a multimillion dollar lump 
sum appropriation to be given to the AFL-CIO to carry out such programs.
36
  
This convergence between the administration and the union was also facilitated by the 
ideological anti-communism which both shared. Many of the proposed activities for the 
FTUI, the AFL-CIO‟s democracy promotion foundation, were described in the report to 
Congress in anti-communist terms; for example, the case for expansion of labor exchanges 
was made by stating that “The size and scope of the Soviet bloc operation in this field should 
offer a clear incentive.”37 FTUI planned to go on the offensive with “Efforts to counter the 
WFTU”38 and, most importantly, “Aid to efforts to organize independent unions in 
communist countries”39 because “the Solidarity experience may foreshadow possible future 
events elsewhere in the communist world”.40 When supporting the proposal of the NED to 
Congress the administration displayed a clear bias towards the FTUI. When the NED 
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legislation was introduced to Congress it already contained budget amounts earmarked for the 
use of the four foundations and, at the Reagan administration‟s insistence, FTUI was given 
the lion‟s share of the money41 - $13,800,000, as compared to $5,000,000 each for the 
Republican and Democrat party foundations and $2.5 million for CIPE.
42
  
The party institutes could also help to achieve foreign policy goals, as they would 
serve to staff some version of the regional institutes for democracy the administration had 
included in its proposal for Project Democracy. They would be of particular importance in 
Central America, where the whole administration supported a strategy of promoting 
democratic reform in allied dictatorships  This particular strategic rationale for democracy 
promotion represented an enduring convergence between the government and the private 
sector: it had been cited in Alexander Haig‟s first proposal for a private democracy promotion 
instrumentality in March 1982, in Thomas O. Enders‟ speech on Central American policy of 
July 1981 and in Douglas‟ and Samuels‟ article of several months before.  
In fact, the State Department and the APF study group did co-operate over a program 
aimed at democracy promotion in Central America. This initiative, “Inter-American 
Leadership Development”, consisted of “seminars and training for politicians and staffs of 
democratic political parties and other democratic organizations in the respective regions”43 on 
democratic party organisation, fund raising, fiscal management, and campaign planning, 
organisation and execution,
44
 all of which would clearly strengthen the organisations whose 
representatives attended them, giving them an advantage in the struggle to take power in their 
home countries. It had been developed by State Department officials in the Bureau of Inter-
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American Affairs from a program proposed by ARA in March 1983.
45
 The project seems to 
have shifted from governmental to private sponsorship between March and May 1983; 
whereas at the end of March it was discussed at an International Political Committee meeting 
as a governmental/State Department initiative,
46
 on May 21
st
 the project was being formally 
discussed in Caracas by a state-private delegation consisting of State Department officials,  
Allen Weinstein and Congressmen Barnes and Lagomarsino, who were enthusiastic 
supporters of the NED in the House vote later on that year.
47
 The Central American program 
indicated that there was a basis for co-operation between the administration and the NED.  
However, the program had been generated in the State Department, not by the study 
board, which had not created a list of specific democracy promotion programs. More than 
convergence over one program or core foundation, this lack of specifics worked to the 
advantage of the privates, who were able to offer wide statements about continuing Project 
Democracy, promoting free enterprise and opposing Communism but not specifics on 
strategy or programs which the administration could disagree with. The fact that the study 
group had ignored the strategic question and its failure to produce proposals for specific 
programs in specific countries minimised flashpoints for disagreement between it and the 
Reagan administration. While uncertainty about what the private components of the nascent 
democracy promotion network would do had contributed to administration reservations about 
the project previously, the atmosphere created by Congressional reluctance to support Project 
Democracy over-rode these concerns and transformed the private groups‟ strategic fuzziness 
into a strength. 
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Selling the National Endowment for Democracy to Congress 
After reaching agreement among themselves and with the administration, the private groups 
had to engineer consensus with Congress over their concept to receive funding; an action that 
private groups receiving covert government funding before 1967 had never had to undertake. 
This was the point at which Project Democracy had failed, due to its links to the state, which 
had made Democrats wary that it would pursue a strategy determined by the Reagan 
administration‟s strategic preoccupations rather than broader American interests.  There was 
also concern that these links would damage the project‟s credibility and effectiveness by 
making it appear to be the puppet of the national security bureaucracy to foreign populations. 
In order to foster Congressional approval for their design, the private democracy promoters 
had to de-link the NED from the state and the Reagan administration as far as possible, while 
portraying the organisation, which had been designed first and foremost to accommodate 
their own sectional interests, as a vehicle for the pursuit of America‟s mission to promote 
democracy.  
The vehicle used to persuade Congress to agree to government funding of the NED 
was an interim report of the Democracy Program study group, “The Commitment to 
Democracy”, which was presented to Congress on April 18th after being hurriedly drafted the 
preceding weekend by the Democracy Program staff. The document was created at the 
insistence of Dante Fascell,
48
 a key supporter of private democracy promotion who was a 
member of the Executive Board overseeing the Democracy Program study and also the 
Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Organisations.
49
 
The democracy promoters managed to guide their proposal through the minefield which had 
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swallowed Project Democracy by using this report to foster a consensus over their own vision 
of democracy promotion.  
The interim report was able to generate a consensus in favour of the creation of the 
NED through an appeal to the US sense of a democratic mission shared by Congress. This 
ideology served as the basis for the bipartisan consensus necessary both among US elites and 
between elites and the population for new strategic commitments and/or new policies to be 
pursued during the pre-Vietnam period of the Cold War. It was also a concept which could be 
readily deployed in the absence of hard data on specific programs and on the role of the four 
cores, an outcome of the time pressure on the study group. 
To forge such a consensus, the interim report opened with a collection of five quotes 
on the subject of democracy and the promotion of democracy overseas by the US, beginning 
with Abraham Lincoln, progressing to President Truman, 1940s Republican Senate leader 
Arthur Vandenburg, then moving on to a quote from Reagan‟s June 8th speech expressing his 
support for the study and Democratic Speaker of the House Thomas O‟Neill, who also 
expressed his support for the Democracy Program study.
50
 These quotes portrayed a 
continuum of US thought on democracy stretching from the Gettysburg address to the foreign 
policy problems of the 1980s, while the choice of quotes from both Republicans and 
Democrats conveyed an impression of bipartisanship. The introduction to the report also 
deployed this ideological tactic, linking the democracy promotion organisation proposed by 
the study group to the US‟ historic mission to promote democracy: 
Throughout our national experience, Americans have rarely asked whether they 
should assist democracies elsewhere in the world, only how such support could be 
provided most effectively. …From the early years of the American nation to its recent 
decades of global involvement, the United States has honoured a commitment to 
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supporting the democratic ideal and those who uphold it, first in Europe, and more 
recently throughout the world.
51
  
 
This deployment of democratic idealism appealed to the view of the US possessed by 
members of the legislature and also performed an important function in providing an 
alternative rallying point to agreement over a list of specific programs. This was of key 
importance because questions surrounding the targeting of Project Democracy programs had 
been responsible for a great deal of Congress‟ unhappiness with the program, due to the 
suspicions of Democrats that the program was primarily aimed at Soviet Communism, not a 
universalist one aimed at all dictatorial regimes. It had also led to Congressmen engaging in 
criticism of the whole project based on the fact that they disagreed with particular programs 
to be run under it, such as the democracy promotion programs to be run in Western Europe. 
The report avoided this problem almost completely by including no specifics on the strategy 
or programs the NED would pursue. As noted above, the only substantive strategic issue 
which the study discussed was how to foster democratic forces in totalitarian states, meaning 
the USSR and its clients and allies. However, discussion of these issues was omitted from the 
report presented to Congress, as it was felt to be “inadvisable”.52  
The proposal of a number of democratic tasks for the NED rather than a strategic 
framework or specific programs also de-emphasised strategic or tactical disagreements. 
These tasks were “to encourage free and democratic institutions throughout the world through 
private sector initiatives”, “to facilitate exchanges”, “to promote United States 
nongovernmental participation...in democratic training programs”, “to strengthen democratic 
electoral processes abroad” and “to encourage the establishment and growth of democratic 
development in a manner consistent with the broad concerns of United States national 
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interests”.53 These broad missions gave little clue as to where the Endowment would focus its 
efforts, what type of regimes it would target and what programs it would run to promote 
democracy. The missions could be interpreted in a number of ways and represented broad 
goals rather than ways of achieving them, giving a hazy picture of what the endowment 
would actually do in practice.  
Similarly, the organisation of the report into sections dealing with the structure of the 
Endowment itself and that of each of its four core foundations, rather than other possible 
organising frameworks such as a discussion of the prospects for democracy promotion by 
region, served to focus Congressional attention on organisational structures rather than 
strategy or programs. The NED‟s vagueness on this score meant that Congressmen and 
Senators could read their own strategic preferences into the organisation‟s list of missions 
and rhetoric. This vagueness helped to generate consensus over the basic organisational 
concept of a private umbrella foundation linked to institutes staffed by officials of the four 
core groups. The report also de-linked the proposed Endowment from the foreign policy of 
the Reagan administration and the national security bureaucracy organisationally. The report 
argued that the organisational structure of the NED would guard against its co-optation into a 
particularist campaign by the state, arguing that:  
The independent nature of the Endowment will insure that the programs it funds 
promote the long-term, bipartisan interests of the United States rather than short-term 
partisan ends.
54
  
 
This public de-linking of democracy promotion from the Reagan administration 
organisationally was necessary to ensure that Congress would not block the proposal for fear 
that it would be used to pursue the administration‟s particularist policy goals. 
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For the NED to be credible both with foreign democrats and with the legislators who 
were to vote on its funding appropriation, the study group also needed to avoid linking 
democracy promotion with the discredited CIA covert operations carried out before 1967. 
This was extremely important as the method by which democracy promotion was to be 
funded - government money disbursed to a private umbrella foundation, which would then 
distribute the money to private groups - could have seemed remarkably similar to previous 
state funding of private groups through foundations manipulated by the CIA. Project 
Democracy‟s model of government funding being disbursed to private groups who would be 
overseen by a committee within the national security apparatus had also drawn this parallel. 
This organisational problem had been responsible for many of the problems which the 
government-run program had faced; NED would need to side-step this problem if it were to 
succeed. 
The report was careful to not discuss previous covert funding of US private groups at 
length. Although the document included a short history of previous private sector efforts to 
promote democracy abroad, the question of CIA funding of these initiatives was never raised, 
not even to criticise it as being morally incorrect or operationally inadequate.
55
 The only time 
the CIA and the collapse of the previous state-private network is even mentioned in the report 
is in the context of explaining Dante Fascell‟s motivations for proposing the creation of an 
“Institute for International Affairs” in early 1967, in a section dealing with the background to 
the study; the reference was fleeting and the point was not enlarged upon.
56
 Although the 
report also contained a short history of the AFL-CIO‟s democracy promotion efforts, the 
question of CIA funding was not raised.
57
 The picture produced in the report was that of a 
citizen group committed to a project of democracy promotion which had no immediate links 
with specific US national security goals or the national security bureaucracy. 
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Beyond producing domestic credibility with Congress, the report also had to argue 
that the organisational model which it put forward for democracy promotion would be both 
credible overseas and effective in the task of building up democratic systems. The report 
disposed of the problem of the credibility of the effort overseas by stressing the autonomy of 
the NED from the national security bureaucracy:  
If aid came from a foundation with genuine autonomy, supervised by a board of 
respected American and foreign figures,” The New York Times editorialized shortly 
after the President‟s London speech, “it could be as uncontroversial as that already 
provided by private foundations…Change “foundation” to “Endowment”, provide for 
an American board but one which would work in “cooperation with foreign figures” 
on jointly agreed upon programs, and the description matches the proposal before 
us.
58
 
 
Clearly a private instrumentality would be more credible than actions undertaken by 
government agencies and would be more likely to gain the co-operation of foreign democrats:  
Within the political climate which characterizes a number of Third World 
countries…the existence of a National Endowment for Democracy – openly receiving 
and dispensing public funds to its grantees – might be perceived as a more 
recognizable, and hence more acceptable, source of funding than, for example, a 
political foundation functioning as a State Department, USIA, or AID grantee.
59
 
 
Such a private arrangement would also serve to defuse accusations of neo-colonial behaviour 
which could accompany efforts by a US government agency to promote US values or alter 
foreign political systems in the Third World. To make the NED‟s private status more 
credible, it was set up by the private groups themselves rather than by Congress, with 
legislation only being required to provide funding for it.
60
 The four core groups also set up 
their own democracy foundations, which would shelter under the NED umbrella, 
independently of Congress. Both the National Republican Institute (NRI) and the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) were set up in April 1983,
61
 while the Centre for International 
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Private Enterprise (CIPE) was set up in June of that year.
62
 The AFL-CIO‟s Free Trade Union 
Institute (FTUI) pre-existed the NED, having been set up during World War Two to channel 
funding to European trade unionists, firstly from the AFL-CIO and then from the CIA in the 
early years of the Cold War.
63
 The FTUI was resurrected in 1978 but had been troubled by a 
lack of funds, which  it had become largely dormant due to lack of funding,
 64
  a problem 
which the NED could solve. Thus, all of NED‟s constituent foundations had been set up 
before the Endowment was passed into law at the end of 1983. 
The creation of the NED and its core groups by private forces rather than the 
American government was done to avoid accusations that the NED was a government 
instrumentality. This organisational model removed the International Political Committee, 
and the command and control function it was to exercise on behalf of the national security 
bureaucracy, from the equation, a change which could be expected to enhance the credibility 
of the organisation both with US legislators and with private groups and movements 
overseas. However, this credibility was built on the argument that government money which 
first passed openly through the NED and then either directly to foreign groups or indirectly, 
to one of the Endowment‟s four core groups and then to a foreign group, would cease to be 
government money on this journey. One of the key functions of the National Endowment for 
Democracy itself was to serve as a “pass-through” which put another private structure 
between the government and the private groups which received funding. 
The report also omitted debate over whether one bipartisan or two party foundations 
would be more credible and effective at promoting democracy overseas. The report attempted 
to head off this question, which had created such division within the democracy promotion 
community, by stating that: 
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This proposal for creating two political foundations under the National Endowment 
for Democracy umbrella, therefore, rejects the question – “Why have a Democratic 
and a Republican foundation?” – in favour of another query: “Why were they not 
created long ago, considering their utility in our own political system?”65 
 
The recommendation to create two partisan party foundations could have seemed out of place 
in a report which spent much of its time appealing to bipartisanship in order to create a 
Congressional consensus in favour of the Endowment.
66
 However, the invocation of 
democracy as an abstract concept de-emphasised difficult questions about whose interests the 
proposed NED would act in. The report proposed a particular organisational structure which 
had been designed to cater to the needs of the four core groups as the obvious way to promote 
democracy, subsuming sectional interests within the universal ideal of democracy promotion. 
 The status of the NED as a private foundation, while serving to render the effort 
credible overseas, would also solve the bureaucratic problems which the government had 
experienced when trying to devise a method of funding more political programs such as the 
Free Market Institutes and the Institute for Democracy in Central America, such as the lack of 
legal authorisation for national security agencies to implement such programs. The problem 
was that: 
Questions of perception aside, such direct government grantees would probably be 
precluded by State, USIA or AID enabling legislation from engaging in many of the 
political exchange, training and democratic institution-building programs called for by 
the charter of the National Endowment for Democracy…67 
 
The study group solved this problem by simply recommending that all funds appropriated for 
the Endowment and disbursed by it to other private groups be exempt from legislative 
restrictions and limitations existing in the charters of the State Department, USIA or AID 
which would impair the ability of the Endowment or its four core groups to achieve their 
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objectives.
68
 The hiving off of such programs to a private instrumentality solved the 
bureaucratic problems which had bedevilled attempts to institute new state-private network 
relationships which had occurred both in the aftermath of the 1967 scandal and the Reagan 
administration‟s more recent attempts to design an effective operating framework for Project 
Democracy.  
 The report‟s contextualisation of the NED as being devoted to democracy promotion, 
together with the de-linking of the Endowment from the state machinery, connected the 
NED‟s organisational blueprint to enduring US ideological concerns about spreading 
democracy. This obscured weaknesses in the organisation of the project. The NED‟s 
organisational structure had been determined more by partisan negotiations between the four 
cores than the needs of democracy promotion, while the fact that the NED was to receive 
government funding meant that it was still linked to the state and vulnerable to attacks on its 
credibility. However, this approach was successful in shaping the Congressional debates over 
whether to approve funding for the National Endowment for Democracy which took place in 
the second half of 1983, when the administration introduced NED funding legislation as part 
of a more general bill to appropriate funds for the remaining programs and institutions of its 
public diplomacy campaign.  
While Congressional supporters of the NED such as Dante Fascell and Congressmen 
Barnes and Lagomarsino referred to the Endowment as a modification of Project Democracy, 
Congressmen possessed almost no information on the concrete programs it would run. 
According to various Congressmen involved in the debate on the National Endowment for 
Democracy Act in the House of Representative in June, the targets of the NED were, 
variously, “authoritarian governments”, “totalitarianism”, “Marxism” and “international 
communism”, and various examples of the utility of private groups in promoting democracy 
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were advanced in regard to El Salvador and Poland.
69
 Without program data legislators could 
not be sure of this and were merely making assumptions.  
This vagueness served a positive function, as without detailed information regarding 
what the NED would do, there was little for strategic critics to challenge. Concrete issues 
such as the strategic framework and the programs the organisation would implement were 
subsumed under the concept of democracy promotion. Clement Zablocki, the Chairman of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, argued that if Congressmen supported an amendment 
to the bill tabled by a critic of the Endowment, “they will be supporting totalitarian, 
undemocratic, nondemocratic countries.”70 This vague terminology, which could have 
referred to the USSR or to Chile, or both, framed the debate as a simple question of whether 
Congressmen were in favour of or opposed to the promotion of democracy. Thus, democratic 
ideology minimised discussions over strategy and provided a focal point for the generation of 
consensus in support of the Endowment.  
 While ideology was successful in securing Congressional consensus on the basic idea 
of a foundation to spread democracy, it failed to silence debate over the NED‟s organisational 
structure. Jack Kemp, a conservative Republican Congressman, feared the NED would be too 
independent of government supervision, arguing that: 
USIA is the natural existing organisation, fully staffed and qualified, to manage 
Project Democracy…the committee bill would remove Project Democracy form [sic] 
USIA control….I do not think that the creation of an autonomous bureaucracy serves 
the purposes of the project.
71
 
 
However, the NED‟s key weak point was its funding by the US government, which 
called its independence and credibility into question. It was this issue of government funding 
for US democratic civil society groups, and the state control and direction of these groups 
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which such funding implied, which had made the continuation of covertly-funded state-
private network operations unacceptable in 1967. Similar accusations were now made by 
Republican Congressman Hank Brown, who argued that while he supported private attempts 
to promote democracy overseas with private money, “there is a real problem on making 
[democratic civil society groups] dependent upon…and…answerable to the Government”.72 
In Brown‟s judgement the government funding of private groups, especially the political 
parties, posed “a real danger to the whole concept of democracy itself”.73  
As well as the threat to democratic institutions, there was also the danger that 
government funding would “destroy [the groups‟] effectiveness”74 at promoting democracy 
overseas. This point was enlarged upon by another opponent of the Endowment, who argued 
that such government-funded institutes linked to the parties, AFL-CIO and Chamber of 
Commerce “will be viewed…as an extension…of the Federal Government.”75 Despite the 
study group‟s attempt to create a new approach to overseas political operations that was more 
credible than previous covert approaches, the issue of government funding remained the 
weak point of its design and could not be disposed of unless the private democracy promoters 
were willing to rely completely on private donations.  These objections to the NED‟s general 
organisational principle were supplemented with more specific criticisms of the political 
parties, which were seen as lacking in foreign party expertise and liable to take partisan 
positions in overseas elections.
76
 The structure chosen by the study group over George 
Agree‟s objections meant that this was theoretically possible, whereas choosing to found a 
bipartisan democracy promotion institute would have avoided this difficulty.  
                                                 
72
 Ibid, H3812. 
73
 Ibid, H3812. 
74
Congressional Record – House, H3812. 
75
 Ibid, H3818. 
76
 Ibid, H3816. 
222 
 
 These criticisms led to the tabling of amendments by the NED‟s opponents to excise it 
from the measures proposed in the same legislative package. The first amendment, aimed at 
striking the NED completely from the law, was defeated due to legislators‟ acceptance of the 
goal of promoting democracy overseas.
77
  However, support for the amendment had been 
broadly bipartisan, and it was defeated by only 19 votes.
78
 Amendments were then tabled to 
accomplish the same goal by striking the funds earmarked by the Reagan administration for 
each of the four core institutes under the NED umbrella. The amendment to terminate the 
earmarking for CIPE and FTUI failed due to the prestige the AFL-CIO enjoyed on the Hill 
for effective conduct of foreign political operations.
79
 However, the amendment to eliminate 
the earmarking for the party institutes, NDI and NRI, was passed rapidly.
80
 Brown‟s 
amendment to de-fund the parties was supported by liberals, moderates and conservatives, 
rather than being supported by one political current only.
81
 Although this funding was 
subsequently restored by the Senate, it was deleted again by the House just before the NED 
Act was signed into law.
82
 
 The NED‟s opponents had aimed at eradicating the Endowment as a whole, not 
merely its funding for the party institutes. However, the parties proved to be the soft 
underbelly of the Endowment due to Congressional concerns about whether they would 
institute partisan programs abroad. George Agree had been correct in arguing that a bipartisan 
party institute would be more acceptable to Congress. This decision cut the financial ground 
out from underneath the parties and strengthened the position of the AFL-CIO within the 
democracy promotion apparatus as the group with the largest amount of funding.  
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 Although funding for the party institutes had been deleted, the private groups had 
succeeded in creating a democracy promotion organisation where Project Democracy had 
failed. The concept of democracy promotion helped to produce the necessary consensus 
between the private groups, the administration and Congress by subsuming the debate over 
whether to follow a policy of containing the USSR or promoting a gradual change towards 
democracy within it, and replaced them with a global campaign to promote democracy with 
no clear strategic focus, while the fact that the study group had not generated specific 
programs served to minimise areas of specific disagreement. This fuzziness over targeting 
allowed the privates to secure administration backing for their chosen organisation as a 
pragmatic alternative to Project Democracy and also de-emphasised the strategic debate in 
Congress. Consensus developed around the concept and the NED itself, rather than around a 
clear strategic framework for democracy promotion.  
The creation of the NED allowed the reconstitution of the bipartisan consensus 
necessary to underpin US intervention in foreign political structures which had been missing 
since Vietnam and provided a vehicle for it to be implemented through. However, this did not 
amount to a resurrection of previous CIA capabilities disguised by more appealing rhetoric, 
as the shift from   a covert to an overt state-private relationship fundamentally changed the 
dynamic for the management of political operations overseas in two key ways.  Firstly, the 
decision to create a Congressionally-funded foundation brought the legislature into a new, 
more open process for the management of political operations overseas and provided it with a 
share of the leverage over the funding of operations which had been exercised only by the 
state under the covert model of funding proceeding covertly from the CIA to its private 
partners. Congress had already shown it could wield this power by deleting funds for the 
party institutes, and could use it in the future to police NED operations. Secondly, whereas in 
the pre-1967 network the national security bureaucracy had exercised the supervision 
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necessary to harness private efforts into a coherent campaign in support of national security 
interests, political operations were now to be overseen by a private body, the NED itself, with 
extremely weak powers to carry out such a co-ordinating function. This weak command and 
control risked producing a disjointed private campaign in which the core groups pursued their 
own interests in a way which did not accord with either US national security objectives, or 
the promotion of democracy, or either. It remained to be seen whether this new organisational 
model would produce a campaign focussed primarily on US national security, the promotion 
of democracy, or the achievement of the interests of the private groups themselves.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY 
The foundation of the NED in 1983 had created an organisation for democracy promotion 
operations but had not generated a strategic framework for it. This left unresolved whether 
the targeting of these operations would be most influenced by democratic ideology, national 
security objectives, or private, partisan interests. It also left open the larger question of 
whether the effect of democracy promotion operations would be to foster popular 
empowerment and development, or whether democratic change would be limited by the need 
to safeguard US interests in societies in which the Endowment chose to intervene. The record 
of the initial operations from 1984 to 1986 shows that while democratic ideology had an 
impact on the NED in terms of legitimating, limiting, and shaping its tactics, and while 
private groups sometimes supported foreign civil society organisations based on partisan 
reasoning or ideological affinity,
1
  the key driver behind its operations was national security.  
The concept  of democracy promotion  allowed the private groups, the administration 
and Congress to converge over the creation of an overt organisational structure for 
democracy promotion operations, whereas Project Democracy‟s had failed due to its focus on 
anti-communism and national security.  The organisational outcome was a new structure for 
the management of overt state-private operations in which Congress played a role, as the 
provider of funding, which it had not played in the pre-1967 covert organisational structure. 
This role gave Congress leverage which it could use to enforce its understanding of 
democracy promotion as the support of democratic forces in dictatorships through democratic 
methods. Elements of the private coalition who had paid lip-service to democracy promotion 
to gain funding soon found that operations which were rooted in national security but lacked 
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a clear democracy promotion rationale could result in Congressional sanctions which 
constrained the NED within the pro-democratic framework which had legitimised its 
creation. Such sanctions laid down a marker that legitimising operations through an abstract 
democratic ideology was insufficient; such operations should genuinely aim at strengthening 
democratic forces through democratic methods. 
However, these Congressional sanctions did not lead to a policy of pursuing 
operations based solely on the imperative of promoting democracy overseas.  Instead, the list 
of countries where the NED carried out politically significant interventions - Grenada, 
Guatemala, Poland and the Philippines - tallies with the national security concerns of the 
Reagan administration and points to a clear subordination of democracy promotion 
operations to US security interests. This subordination was partly due to the fact that, 
organisationally, the Endowment relied on support from the US state to secure funding from 
Congress and to conduct large-scale operations aimed at altering political structures.  It was 
eased and rationalised by the fact that, rather than seeing democracy promotion and US 
national security as contradictory the Endowment‟s leadership conflated the universal 
ideology of democracy promotion with the particularist national security interests of the 
United States and so tended to pursue their operations within the overall framework of 
national security priorities which had been set by the state.  
The outcome of the double limitation of the Endowment‟s freedom of operation by 
Congress and the administration and the ideological conflation of democracy and national 
security was the pursuit of political operations overseas through democratic methods on a 
tactical basis in situations where the promotion of democracy was believed to enhance US 
national security. The effort to create democratic regimes in friendly dictatorships was driven 
by the perception that such regimes would be less vulnerable to anti-US revolutions and 
could provide the stability which US interests required. Similarly, the effort to build 
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democratic movements in enemy dictatorships was driven by the perception that transitions to 
democracy would remove the threat to the US that such regimes posed. Thus, the extension 
of democracy and the interests of the United States were seen to be intertwined. 
This conflation of the interests of the United States as a nation-state with those of 
democracy also had an effect on the selection of foreign groups for NED support. In friendly 
dictatorships the overall goal of securing stability, coupled with the perception of the 
Endowment‟s leadership that groups focussed on radical democratic restructuring of their 
societies were undemocratic and thus undeserving of support, meant that the groups 
supported were elite-led forces friendly to the United States. The outcome of the NED‟s 
actions was a form of democracy run by pro-US elites who enacted surface reforms to 
dampen down popular unrest but did not embark on the fundamental restructuring of their 
societies required to resolve the injustices which had given rise to political instability in the 
first place. In enemy dictatorships such as Soviet bloc states, the Endowment supported 
groups who advocated the transformation of their societies in ways which followed Western 
political and economic models and meshed with US interests rather than challenging them.  
Democracy promotion was a conservative project arising from a fusion of ideology 
and national security concerns which allowed the United States to mould pro-US successor 
elites in both friendly and enemy states to preserve or extend its strategic position. This tactic 
was pursued on a case-by-case basis rather than in accordance with a grand design. In no case 
were these national security goals subordinated to the goal of promoting democratic 
revolutions, especially where change might damage US interests. 
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Democracy promotion and the national security bureaucracy 
Although the administration had supported the creation of the NED in 1983 as the best 
possible organisation for implementing a campaign for democracy at that time, the 
Endowment‟s relationship with the national security bureaucracy was ill-defined.  
 The question of control surfaced soon after the creation of the Endowment, in a 
struggle over the terms of the grant agreement which the Endowment needed to sign with the 
USIA to access the $18 million which had been awarded to it by Congress. The grant 
agreement produced by USIA clearly aimed at tightening the agency‟s control over the NED. 
In January 1984, as the grant negotiations were breaking down, NED‟s lawyers charged that 
USIA‟s draft grant agreement “contains at least nineteen explicit instances of attempts to 
change the NED‟s independent, private-sector status through unauthorized governmental 
control”.2 Among these nineteen objectionable proposals were stipulations that the NED be 
subject to USIA‟s normal conditions for other private sector grantees, that USIA have powers 
of oversight and inspection over the Endowment, that the agreement of a USIA officer be 
required for funding transfers and that USIA have the right to terminate any grants which it 
believed were not in the interests of the US government.
3
 
These provisions were clearly aimed at regaining the control over democracy 
promotion which USIA had lost when the NED replaced Project Democracy as the 
organisational framework for the campaign. As the NED was effectively a pass-through 
which was taking money from USIA and then handing the bulk of it to four non-
governmental organisations, who would then hand funding over to other groups, who could 
then hand it over to other groups if they wished, it was possible that the money would be 
diverted to groups which did not serve the interests of the United States as USIA saw them; 
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these provisions for inspection and grant termination could be used to minimise such 
problems.  
The Endowment and its supporters within the administration recognised the agenda 
behind the provisions in the grant agreement, with Acting President Allen Weinstein noting 
that “[s]imply put, the issue is one of control”.4 The NSC‟s Director of International 
Communications, Walter Raymond, echoed this analysis: “I am afraid the key issue here is a 
matter of control.”5 USIA‟s demands effectively usurped the freedom of the NED board to 
manage the operations of the Endowment. This posed a threat to the board‟s conception of 
how democracy promotion should work, as the Endowment‟s leaders had gone to a great deal 
of trouble to design a structure which could avoid such governmental micro-management 
during the Democracy Program study, for reasons of both private autonomy and to safeguard 
the credibility of private democracy promotion operations by de-linking them from the state. 
The Endowment and those administration officials who held to a wider vision of 
democracy promotion moved swiftly to advance arguments for a more autonomous model of 
democracy promotion. Idealistic democracy promoters such as William Brock argued that too 
close a degree of government control would be damaging to both the US government and the 
Endowment and recalled that 
the National Endowment Board and its charter were structured to be independent of 
any government agency for the simple and obvious reason that those of us involved in 
its genesis felt an urgent need to insulate any Administration from its activities, and 
vice versa, in order that the larger goal of building democratic institutions could 
proceed as quickly and effectively as possible.
6
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The long-range effort to build democratic structures abroad would be more effective if it were 
de-linked from the immediate national security concerns and diplomatic considerations of the 
US government, which sometimes needed to co-operate with dictators or at least avoid 
offending them for pragmatic reasons.  
 However, this sophisticated argument was unlikely to impress national security 
officials working on a shorter time-scale. Instead, the NED‟s Acting President, Allen 
Weinstein, chose to focus on an immediate national security concern, the upcoming 
Presidential elections in El Salvador, to break funding loose:  
[t]ime is running out. Without a grant agreement in hand within the next few days, for 
example, it will be impossible for the Endowment and the four Institutes to send 
representatives to El Salvador…to consider President Magana‟s request that we take a 
leading role in the observer process during the elections.
7
 
 
According to the Acting President preparations for the mission would have to be at least put 
on hold, as the Board had ordered him to close down the Endowment within a few days if no 
satisfactory grant agreement were reached.
8
 
 This program was of key importance to all of the actors, as both the Reaganites, State 
Department and more moderate NSC officials and the NED itself agreed that the Endowment 
should intervene in the Salvadoran elections. The certification of the upcoming elections as 
free and fair would remove an obstacle to moving military aid through a Congress which was 
concerned about the Human Rights situation in El Salvador. Furthermore, this certification 
would be far more credible if it were made by private observers rather than administration 
officials.  
 This argument was successful in motivating sympathetic NSC officials
9
 to support the 
Endowment against USIA, and in resolving the larger question of relations between the 
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Endowment and the administration. The NSC informed USIA that “This is a Presidential 
program which we must get implemented as soon as possible. We need it not only in Central 
America but elsewhere.” The organisation also stated that “[We] do not want the negotiations 
to break down over the question of control; that should not be the issue.”10 
 The course of this debate has several implications for understanding the NED‟s 
relationship to the Reagan administration and its national security objectives. Firstly, 
although sections of the administration wished to secure a level of control over the 
administration that went beyond the “light” control proposed by the State Department in 
April 1982
11
 they were unable to secure it. Secondly, Reaganite fears that the NED would 
pursue an ideological project which undermined national security interests were clearly 
overblown. While idealistic democracy promoters such as Brock had advanced arguments for 
NED autonomy based on the organisation‟s long range mission, it was the arguments based 
on a short-term national security interest – El Salvador – which galvanised the Endowment‟s 
supporters within the administration. This position may have been advanced tactically, as the 
best rationale for securing the Endowment‟s autonomy at that time. However, the fact that the 
NED‟s highest priority and that of the administration coincided showed the importance of US 
national security considerations as a key driver of Endowment strategy.  
There were both practical and ideological reasons for this. The Endowment‟s status as 
a government–backed organisation meant that it would be extremely difficult for it to take 
actions which contradicted the policies of those who made funding requests to Congress on 
its behalf. In addition, the fact that the NED was already working on a program which aimed 
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to resolve one of the key national security difficulties faced by the administration showed that 
the Endowment‟s leaders identified democracy promotion and national security rather than 
seeing a conflict between them. This was to be expected, as the leaders of the Endowment 
and the national security apparatus were both drawn from the same narrow elite and tended to 
share the same assumptions about US interests.  
In addition, many of the idealists who could have been expected to diverge further 
from US national security policy, such as George Agree, were no longer connected with the 
project at this point, having given way to former US government personnel such as John 
Richardson and Keith Schuette, and functionaries of the two political parties such as John 
Loiello.
12
 Thus, the chances of the Endowment launching a rogue action which would 
undermine national security policy in the name of promoting democracy were low. This is 
clearly the strategic calculation which the NSC had based its decision to support NED 
autonomy on. Government influence over the Endowment could be wielded, but it would be a 
subtle matter of manipulating funding and assuring that leadership positions were held by 
those who could be trusted, rather than corralling the Endowment into a legal framework 
which would hamper its operational effectiveness on the ground by making it appear to be 
too close to the US government. 
 This did not mean that no further scope for conflict between the imperatives of 
democracy promotion and national security which could lead to disagreements between the 
Reagan administration and the private democracy promoters existed. Rather, any conflicts 
which arose between these two actors would turn on discussion of whether promoting 
democracy in a particular case would serve to enhance US national security aims or detract 
from them, not on whether to prioritise one over the other.  However, the question of whether 
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covert or undemocratic methods were a permissible element of democracy promotion was 
still to be resolved.  
National Security versus Democracy  
Congress‟ power to approve or deny funding appropriations for the National Endowment for 
Democracy provided it with a degree of leverage over the new overt political operations 
which it had not possessed over the previous covert state-private network. The Endowment 
quickly discovered that Congress was prepared to use this power to ensure that its operations 
did not merely deploy democracy promotion as a legitimating concept for operations rooted 
in national security priorities with little democratic content. The limits of the NED‟s remit to 
act in support of national security objectives when these clashed with democracy promotion 
ideologically were illustrated by Congressional reaction to the Endowment‟s early operations 
in Panama, the UK and France. These operations were all funded by FTUI, the AFL-CIO‟s 
democracy promotion foundation, and in each case they appeared to be driven by national 
security concerns and sectional interests rather than the NED‟s mission to promote 
democracy.  
The fact that these cases involved either democracy promotion in countries which 
were already democratic and had been so for some time, or support of political forces whose 
commitment to democracy was questionable, was not in line with Congress‟ understanding 
that the NED‟s operations would be genuinely aimed at supporting democratic movements 
and structures rather than merely acting to support US national security objectives which had 
little connection with this goal. When these cases became public, they led to Congressional 
sanctions which limited the NED‟s operations to situations in which support for democracy 
and the achievement of national security objectives at least appeared to be related and 
mutually reinforcing.  
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The first of these problematic cases involved an early AFL-CIO operation in Panama 
clearly motivated more by union and US interests than democracy promotion. During this 
operation FTUI passed $20,000 of its Endowment funding to a Panamanian union which then 
used it to hold a rally in support of Nicolas Ardito Barletta, one of the candidates in the 
Presidential election;
13
 Panama‟s first since Omar Torrijos had seized power in 1968. Barletta 
was the favoured candidate of Colonel Noriega, who wanted to put a civilian face on his 
dictatorial rule; his main opponent was Arnulfo Arias, a charismatic conservative nationalist 
and populist who had been President on three previous occasions and had been overthrown 
by the army each time.
14
 There was a clear US national interest in an election victory by 
Barletta, a candidate who was seen as “friendly to Washington”15, as the CIA predicted that 
“a Barletta victory would be characterized by continuing strong relations with the United 
States [and] support for US policy in Central America and the Caribbean…”16 US bases in 
the Canal Zone played a role in supporting US policy in El Salvador and in channelling aid 
and intelligence to the Contras,
17
 although these actions were illegal under the terms of the 
Carter-Torrijos canal treaty.
18
 This co-operation could be expected to continue under a 
President linked to Noriega, while Arias had built his political career on opposition to the US 
role in Panama
19
 and was likely to take a different attitude. The fact that both the AFL-CIO
20
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and the administration supported the Contras thus led to support for Barletta‟s campaign, 
despite the fact that he would be little more than a front for the military. The AFL-CIO‟s 
funding of Barletta was linked more to anti-communism than a strictly pro-democratic policy. 
The FTUI‟s funding operation in Britain was also led by anti-communism. Soon after 
the NED began to receive its grant money from USIA in March, FTUI forwarded a grant of 
$49,000 to the Labour Committee for Transatlantic Understanding in Britain, which was used 
to send a delegation to a NATO defence seminar in Brussels. The Committee was a section of 
the British Atlantic Committee, an organisation lobbying for NATO positions in Europe, 
rather than an organisation concerned with promoting democratic processes. The Committee 
had long-standing connections with both the US government and the AFL-CIO, having been 
founded in 1976 by Joseph Godson, a former US labour attaché to Britain and a senior 
consultant on the Democracy Program study which had recommended the creation of the 
NED.
21
 It had been funded secretly by NATO until 1980, when the British government 
admitted the source of the funding. The Committee also had strong links to the AFL-CIO, as 
AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland was one of its vice-presidents.
22
 This program was 
undoubtedly directed at the same ends as parallel but unconnected US government efforts, 
which included exchanges organised by the  USIA and the State Department; to propagandise 
the British centre-left in favour of US nuclear policy in Western Europe, especially in the 
                                                 
21
 The Democracy Program, “The Commitment to Democracy: A Bipartisan Approach,”  Appendix C: 
Democracy Program Staff and Consultants, 18
th
 April 1983, National Endowment for Democracy [accessed 10
th
 
March 2010] www.ned.org/documents 
22The Guardian, “Britons get cash from US 'slush fund' / British organisations receiving money from US sources 
to 'promote democracy',” The Guardian,  9th December 1985, Nexis UK, http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis. 
See Hugh Wilford, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune? (London, Portland Oregon: 
Frank Cass, 2003), 176-181 for information on Joseph Godson‟s work as a labour attaché in the UK from 1952-
59 and his connections to the AFL-CIO. These connections, together with the fact that Godson had worked as a 
consultant on the Democracy Program study, make it unlikely that he was unaware of the source of these funds, 
as he initially claimed. See The Democracy Program, “The Commitment to Democracy: A Bipartisan 
Approach,” Appendix C: Democracy Program Staff and Consultants, 18th April 1983, National Endowment for 
Democracy, www.ned.org/documents for a list of Democracy Program consultants. 
236 
 
wake of the Labour Party‟s 1983 anti-nuclear manifesto commitments.23 The Labour 
Committee for Transatlantic Understanding was mentioned in the Project Democracy 
program list, under the heading “Foreign and Defence Information”, as one of a number of 
AFL-CIO-connected committees important in countries “whose democratic labour 
movements and parties…have drifted apart from the United States on security issues.”24 This, 
coupled with the Committee‟s connections to the Labour Party‟s right-wing,25 makes it likely 
that the aim of the program was to generate Labour party support for US strategic initiatives 
in Western Europe such as INF deployment by countering pacifism and perceived Soviet 
propaganda. Although this program was in line with US national security interests, it could 
not be justified as a contribution to the cause of democracy promotion. 
FTUI‟s two operations in France followed a similar pattern. These operations were on 
a much larger scale than the program in Britain; taken together, they involved grants of over 
$1 million over 1984-1985. The first set of grants, totalling $830,000, went to the AFL-CIO‟s 
long-standing ally, Force Ouvriere,
26
 an anti-communist union which the AFL had helped to 
create and finance at the beginning of the Cold War. The fact that the purpose of the funding 
was uncertain made the operation seem even more questionable. Irving Brown was quoted in 
a French newspaper as saying that Force Ouvriere did not need the money for its domestic 
operations in France; rather, “The funds that we send are used outside the regular trade union 
work. Bergeron (FO leader) explained to me that it was used to help the refugees, the Polish 
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trade unionists and the immigrants.”27 However, in the same article Brown stated that Force 
Ouvriere had to be supported “[b]ecause the apparatus of the CGT [a left-wing French trade 
union confederation] is still here and it can destroy France…”28 Brown had also requested 
support for FO to allow the union to wage a domestic political campaign against the 
Communist-dominated CGT in elections linked to the French social security system as part of 
his submission of programs for Project Democracy in August 1982.
29
 This put the NED in the 
position of being seen to interfere in the domestic politics of an already-democratic country 
and a US ally. 
The destination of the second set of grants was even more problematic. Instead of 
being used to support a democratic organisation, this money went to a group which had 
questionable democratic credentials. The organisation, funded to the tune of $575,000, was 
the UNI (Inter-University Union),
30
 a small but rabidly anti-communist sect of French 
university professors and students. The UNI had run propaganda campaigns highlighting 
Soviet forced labour and Human Rights violations and also published a magazine, “Solidarite 
Atlantique”, devoted to exposing Soviet disinformation and human rights abuses.31 These 
actions were clearly in line with US interests. Irving Brown, the AFL-CIO‟s foreign policy 
chief, was a keen supporter of the group; referring to an anti-Gorbachev rally the organisation 
had participated in Paris while the Soviet leader was visiting, he stated, “I think that what 
UNI did in Paris against Gorbachev and the Gulag was a positive thing; we have to help 
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democratic forces that are fighting against them.”32 He had also asked the US government for 
$250,000 to finance UNI in his list of proposed Project Democracy programs for Western 
Europe of August 1982 and praised the organisation‟s anti-Soviet propaganda.33  
In terms of simple anti-communism support for the UNI may have represented a 
worthwhile investment. However, the organisation also had an anti-democratic reputation 
within France; it had dubious links to the Service d‟Action Civique, a Gaullist paramilitary 
group which had been dissolved in 1982 by order of the French Parliament after a number of 
its activists had been executed gangland-style during factional struggles within the 
organisation, and its leaders also had ties to the fascist Front National.
34
  
FTUI‟s hard-line anti-communist approach was enabled by the NED‟s new President, 
Carl Gershman.
35
 Gershman joined the NED from a position in the Reagan administration‟s 
mission to the United Nations under Jeane Kirkpatrick, which had become “a centre for lots 
of these ideas on the ideological confrontation with communist totalitarianism”36 and 
espoused a tough anti-communist world view. The new NED President owed his position to 
the AFL-CIO. According to Madison, the deletion of the earmarking of funding for the 
political parties by Congress in 1983 gave Lane Kirkland a strong hold over the organisation, 
as the AFL-CIO now had the lion‟s share of the funding, while NDI and NRI had nothing. 
Kirkland proposed to divert some of labour‟s funding to the party institutes if they would 
allow him the final choice of President. Gershman would have been acceptable to the AFL-
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CIO, since he also had strong ties to the labour movement.
37
 While Dante Fascell and the 
AFL-CIO denied that such a deal had ever taken place, others connected with the NED 
confirmed it.
38
  
Once in power the ideologically anti-communist and AFL-CIO-friendly new 
President agreed not only to allow FTUI to pursue the anti-communist operations described 
above; he also agreed to allow the foundation to keep these operations secret from 
Congress.
39
 The rationale for this secrecy, as explained by FTUI‟s Director, Eugenia Kemble 
in a memo to Gershman, was that  
The beneficiaries of these funds would be in danger or in trouble if the financing was 
made public ... because repressive governments or groups of communists could use 
this information against the individuals or the unions that we want to help.
40
 
 
Kemble also argued that some of the organisations FTUI intended to dispense funding to had 
already been promised secrecy by the AFL-CIO, which could not now go back on this 
agreement.
41
 France was on the list of 13 countries where grants were to be kept secret, along 
with Poland and various Latin American countries.
42
 In FTUI‟s first report to the NED the 
foundation stated what type of programs it was funding through what type of organisations –
e.g. trade union, foundation – but did not give the names of any of its partner organisations.43  
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These actions, and the rationale for conducting them covertly, made sense in terms of 
the CIA-funded operations which the AFL-CIO had conducted before 1967. These operations 
had been guided fundamentally by the objective of combatting Communism, not promoting 
democratic forms of government, and Western Europe had been a key battleground in this 
campaign. They would also have been an acceptable element of the Reagan administration‟s 
more nakedly anti-communist Project Democracy: indeed, several of them had initially been 
proposed for inclusion in this program by the union in August 1982.
44
 However, they made 
little sense in terms of the pro-democratic campaign which Congress believed it had approved 
in preference to Project Democracy.  
Kemble‟s rationale for secrecy made a mockery of the idea of democracy promotion 
as a transparent alternative to the covert operations of the past and indicated that the AFL-
CIO had not integrated the concept of democracy promotion into the conduct of its foreign 
operations. Instead, it seemed to view democracy promotion as a convenient formulation 
which allowed it to extract funding from Congress to pursue anti-communist covert 
operations, just as it had done in partnership with the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s. The AFL-
CIO‟s failure to fold its own interests into a coherent program to promote democracy was due 
to the fact this problem had not been considered adequately during the planning for the 
Endowment, which had focussed purely on creating an organisation which would be able to 
channel funding to the four core groups. 
The union soon discovered that the new, more open mode of management for state-
private operations, which took in Congress, effectively ruled out such operations. Congress‟ 
role in appropriating funding for the NED provided it with influence which it had lacked 
under the previous, Executive-managed, covert framework, and when the operations became 
public the Congressional response was swift and punitive. Details of the Panama operation 
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were the first to leak out when US ambassador to Panama Everett Briggs sent Washington a 
cable accusing the AFL-CIO of meddling in the 1984 election. "The embassy," he said, 
"requests that this harebrained project be abandoned before it hits the fan."
45
 This cable 
leaked to Congress, triggering a funding crisis for the Endowment.
46
 On 31
st
 May 1984, the 
House voted to remove all Congressional funding from the NED,
47
 resulting in a fevered 
attempt by both the Endowment and the Reagan administration to lobby senators to vote 
against the motion.
48
 This effort included direct intervention from the President, who wrote to 
key senators that “At a time when the opponents of democracy lavishly support their allies, 
we cannot abandon the field of political competition. The cause is too important. The stakes 
are too great.”49  
The Senate restored the NED funding; however, it was clear that a catastrophe had 
been narrowly averted. This danger was underlined by the exposure of the grants made to 
French organisations by the French daily Liberation in November 1985. Although the general 
problem was that Congress could not understand why the NED was promoting democracy in 
a country which was already democratic,
50
 it was the funding of the UNI, which was 
perceived as an extremist neo-fascist group, which did the most harm to the Endowment‟s 
credibility as a supporter of democracy. This event forced a reassessment of the secrecy 
policy by Gershman, who ruled that the practice of making secret payments had to be 
abandoned.
51
 However, by this point the damage had been done, as Congress had already 
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voted to reduce the AFL-CIO‟s disproportionate share of the NED‟s funding due to its 
“uncertainty about Endowment operations”.52 In late 1985, the Endowment limited the 
amount of funding any NED grantee could receive to 25% of the total in response to a 
suggestion from Congress, ending the disproportionate influence the AFL-CIO had wielded 
within the organisation.
53
 
Congressional anger resulted from the fact that the operations in Panama, the UK and 
France strayed outside the consensus position that had allowed the NED to be created in 
1983. This consensus position, which had allowed the administration, Congress and the 
private groups to converge, was that while democracy promotion would enhance the long-
term national security of the US, it would do so through democratic methods aimed at 
building democratic governments abroad. In contrast, the AFL-CIO‟s actions were based on 
the idea that democracy promotion was primarily a battle against Soviet Communism and 
that operations could be prosecuted covertly. Congress had dismissed this framework for 
democracy promotion when it favoured the NED over Project Democracy. It was only by 
appealing to Congress using arguments based on democracy rather than anti-communism that 
the administration was able to avoid the complete de-funding of the Endowment. Even so, the 
most anti-communist component of the NED – the AFL-CIO – emerged from these 
controversies with its power reduced.  
Congress‟ response to these operations laid down a clear marker that future operations 
would need to be pro-democratic not only in terms of rhetoric but also in terms of intent and 
form. Congress had also proven that while it was unwilling to remove funding from the NED 
as a whole, it was willing to punish individual foundations which did not follow this line. In 
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this way the legislature set out clear limits to NED operations and showed that it had the 
power to enforce these limits. Thus, while the Reagan administration and elements within the 
Endowment prioritised national security over democracy, the influence of Congress 
reinforced the idea that democracy promotion should attempt to achieve national security 
objectives through democratic methods.  
Operating within the Consensus 
While a strategy blending political operations justified as democracy promotion with national 
security considerations was ideologically unjustifiable in Western Europe, democracy 
promotion operations in Central America and the Caribbean, and those directed against the 
Soviet Empire, proved to be relatively uncontroversial. In both of these theatres democracy 
promotion and national security were seen to be mutually reinforcing frameworks for policy 
rather than antagonistic ones. In addition, there was a degree of consensus between the 
administration, Congress and the NED over strategy and tactics which translated into a lack 
of friction between these actors. 
 In 1984 and 1985 the NED played a role in transitions to democracy in two countries 
within the Central American and Caribbean region: Grenada and Guatemala. In both cases 
the Endowment worked alongside the administration in programs aimed at the creation of 
governments which would be stable enough to fend off challenges from the left and 
legitimate enough to dampen down dissent within the respective societies. In Guatemala, a 
further objective was to create a government legitimate enough to expedite the passage of 
economic and military aid through a Congress which remained concerned about Human 
Rights abuses in the country. In neither case were national security interests subsumed by the 
objective of creating participatory democracies aimed at fundamental reform of society.  
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The US invasion of Grenada, a long-standing target of the Reagan administration,
54
 
was a response to a perceived opportunity to take advantage of political confusion and 
instability on the island caused by the hard-line coup against the Marxist Bishop government 
to roll back Communism in the Caribbean. While a small number of US troops continued to 
occupy the island after the initial victory, plans were laid by the Reagan administration for 
elections which would result in a pro-US democratic government. The danger in pursuing this 
course was that an election could be won by Grenada‟s corrupt and unstable former Prime 
Minister, Eric Gairy, which it was believed might trigger a leftist coup attempt by remaining 
elements of the revolutionary New Jewel Movement.
55
  
Rather than being at loggerheads over the priority to accord national security 
objectives versus democracy promotion in this situation, the NED and the US government co-
operated in an effort to produce a pre-determined outcome by supporting the campaign of 
Herbert Blaize, a candidate thought to be moderate and pro-US. Two NED foundations, the 
NRI and FTUI, which channelled funding to AIFLD, the AFL-CIO‟s Latin American labour 
foundation, acted as part of a political program co-ordinated by the State Department and the 
NSC which included US government agencies, other US private groups and political 
consultants from other Caribbean nations, worked successfully to influence achieve this 
outcome.
56
 
 The US Government clearly supported Blaize‟s party, the NNP. An NSC memo 
written in the run-up to the December 1984 election notes that “Careful coordination and 
selective polling is underway to ensure that the best NNP candidate is selected for each of the 
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15 [electoral] districts”,57 with the “political operation” being co-ordinated with the NNP‟s 
Jamaican political consultants, and predicted that “a coordinated, well managed and 
effectively funded political campaign can be successful in Grenada.”  The NRI and AIFLD 
were key players in the political process and were linked to the Reagan administration 
through an additional State Department officer who had been sent to Grenada “with the 
explicit purpose of facilitating co-ordination” of the political program.58 The NSC also 
brought in solidly Republican private citizens such as Clifford White, a former Republican 
campaign manager, and Joe Canzeri, a former White House aide, to raise further election 
funds for the NNP coalition.
59
 Sections of the NED coalition had a pre-existing commitment 
to political action in Grenada, as the AFL-CIO had proposed operations in support of anti-
communist Grenadian unions to the administration in August 1982;
60
 however, in 1984 the 
two NED foundations involved were clearly acting as a part of a wider effort co-ordinated by 
the administration. 
 Congress raised few objections to these NED programs, which seemed to be geared at 
the creation of a democratic government through democratic processes. This was complacent, 
as rather than acting in an even-handed manner to ensure that democratic processes were 
observed by all sides in the election, the NRI and AIFLD carried out a “get-out-the-vote” 
campaign which benefitted only Blaize. NRI and AIFLD ran programs to encourage a heavy 
turnout in the election, with NRI granting $20,000 to a supposedly non-partisan organisation, 
the Grenada Civic Awareness Organisation,
61
 and AIFLD disbursing $80,000 to the 
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Grenadian labour movement.
62
 The AIFLD money was spent on “get-out-the-vote” publicity, 
posters and bumper stickers,
63
 while the NRI-funded Grenada Civic Awareness Organisation 
ferried potential NNP voters to the polls in taxis.
64
  
This campaign worked against the other serious contender, Gairy, who was more 
likely to win if turnout was low. The NNP‟s secretary, Keith Mitchell, commented, “If we get 
a heavy turnout he, Gairy, is in trouble. For him to win, there has to be a light turnout.”65 
Although Gairy‟s potential support base was small, it was hardcore and more likely to 
actually vote on election day.
66
 The actions of the NED were aimed at securing victory for 
Blaize rather than Gairy and thus securing US national security objectives in Grenada. The 
US effort as a whole, which NED participated in, was aimed at securing the election of a 
specific candidate who it was believed would provide stable and pro-US government, not at 
ensuring an electoral process in which all groups had an equal chance to compete. 
The NED‟s operations were criticised by ever-persistent Congressional critic Hank 
Brown, who charged that the NED foundations had carried out “a „get-out-the-vote‟ effort on 
behalf of one side in Grenada”, “…in spite of a NED policy prohibiting funds from going to 
election campaigns in other countries.”67 However, the fact that this effort had been carried 
out within a framework of democratic processes muted Congressional criticism, in contrast to 
the serious disagreements over operations in Panama and in Western Europe.  
The following year the NED carried out an important electoral program in Guatemala 
which also had a direct bearing on US national security interests. The political and military 
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situation shaping policy towards Guatemala was similar to that of El Salvador; a civil war 
between a military junta and a Marxist insurgency was raging, while the Reagan 
administration pushed for greater support for the military and Congress held up aid due to 
concerns about Human Rights abuses by the Guatemalan army and death squads linked to it. 
As in El Salvador, the Guatemalan junta decided to engineer a transition to civilian rule as 
part of its counter-insurgency campaign, an effort that the US government supported. US 
policy towards democratisation in Guatemala fitted into the consensus which had emerged 
from debates between the administration factions and Congress over El Salvador and then 
generalised into a framework for Central America in early 1982. The State Department saw 
such transitions as strengthening containment by replacing unpopular and therefore possibly 
unstable dictatorships with democratic governments which would have more internal 
legitimacy. Reaganites calculated that the problems they had experienced getting military aid 
through Congress would disappear once democratic governments acceptable to the legislature 
had been installed.  
In Guatemala there was little need to support a specific candidate, as in contrast to 
Grenada there was little chance that anti-US forces would triumph. None of the guerrilla 
parties or organisations were allowed to take part in the elections, with the PSD being the 
most leftist party allowed to field a candidate.
68
 The State Department described both of the 
front-runners, Vinicio Cerezo of the Christian Democrats and Jorge Carpio of the UCN, as 
“political moderates with whom we could work.”69 An electoral victory by either would not 
threaten US objectives. 
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While the US government had no need to support a specific candidate to guard its 
national security interests, it did require the elections to be, and to be seen to be, as legitimate 
as possible to guarantee Congressional approval of aid for the Guatemalan government. This 
calculation was highlighted in a July 1985 State Department paper which stated that “our 
ability to get Congress to accept increased economic and military aid levels depends on 
successful elections.”70 The same argument was made in other policy memoranda and in a 
letter from President Reagan to Guatemalan President General Oscar Mejia, which had been 
prepared by the National Security Council staff.
71
 Robert McFarlane also reminded Reagan in 
October that “the successful conduct of the elections is vital for the credibility of our policy 
of supporting democratic governments in Central America.”72 The NED also had its own 
reasons for becoming involved in Guatemala, as the country had been listed by Michael 
Samuels and William Douglas in their 1981 article, “Promoting Democracy”, as a place 
where a transition from a right-wing military junta to a democratic regime would serve US 
national security interests by creating a more stable government. 
NED programs were used in Guatemala to ensure that the elections were procedurally 
clean and technically well-organised to elect a government which would be acceptable to 
Congress. The administration requested NED assistance in July 1985, with the NSC 
proposing that “The State Department and AID should encourage the National Endowment 
for Democracy to fund projects related to the upcoming elections” such as the training of poll 
watchers.
73
 Several weeks later the State Department reported that the Endowment was to 
disburse $152,450 to Caribbean/Central American Action, a private organisation founded at 
President Carter‟s request to combat revolution in the region, to be spent on polls and get-out-
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the-vote activities.
74
 A grant of $100,000 in NED funding was also channelled through FTUI 
to AIFLD and then to the Study Centre of the CUSG, a key Guatemalan union, for get-out-
the-vote and voter mobilisation activities in the run-up to the 1985 election.
75
 These NED 
projects meshed with US government initiatives such as the provision of ballot paper and the 
training of Electoral Tribunal officials and poll-watchers through US and Latin American 
organisations financed by AID, as well as a raft of economic support measures designed to 
keep the Guatemalan government afloat during the elections.
76
 
While the NED programs served US national security interests, they also served to 
safeguard the interests of the private groups involved. AIFLD‟s funding of the CUSG 
allowed the AFL-CIO to channel support to a client union. The CUSG had strong links to the 
AFL-CIO; it had been set up by AIFLD before the creation of the NED
77
 with some of the 
$300,000 which the organisation received annually for operations in the country from AID.
78
 
The CUSG had been initially set up as a pro-government union; both the US ambassador and 
the Guatemalan President at that time, Efraim Rios Montt, spoke at its inaugural conference 
in 1983.
79
 Thus, while supporting broad US national security objectives in the country, FTUI 
was also able to channel its funding in such a way as to increase the influence of its 
Guatemalan partner organisation. 
 These expenditures prompted no Congressional criticism, and the elections were seen 
in the US as legitimate. NED President Carl Gershman proclaimed in 1986 that “Guatemala 
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has moved from a transitional to a post-transitional situation of democracy under Cerezo”.80 
However, there were several problems with portraying the Guatemalan elections as fully 
democratic. Firstly, the elections were not aimed at empowering the population. Instead, they 
constituted a phase in the army‟s counter-insurgency strategy81 and had been carried out to 
stabilise the country politically and increase the government‟s international legitimacy so as 
to secure economic and military aid from the US and other potential donors.
82
 The 1985 
constitution, under which the elections were conducted, enshrined into law the military‟s 
powers to run the “self-defense patrols” and “model villages” which had allowed the army to 
regiment rural populations and led to Human Rights abuses.
83
 No candidate in the election 
criticised the military for Human Rights abuses, suggested investigations of such abuses, 
advocated reducing the power of the military or called for negotiations with the insurgents,
84
 
placing important issues outside the scope of the political debate. Secondly, the elections did 
not address the socioeconomic inequalities which had first given rise to both the power of the 
oligarchy and the insurgency; all candidates pledged not to pursue socioeconomic reforms, 
such as land reform.
85
 Finally, the fact that participation in the elections was restricted to 
forces within a political range which included the extreme right but excluded the extreme left, 
coupled with the fact that political executions and disappearances continued throughout the 
process,
86
 meant that the range of political options on offer was limited and undoubtedly 
contributed to the candidates‟ compliant attitude towards the military and the oligarchy.  
The transition left the military with substantial powers to prosecute the war against 
the insurgents and did not end Human Rights abuses by the army, which continued under the 
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elected Cerezo government, and even increased.
87
 Thus, while an important goal of 
supporting the electoral process for the Guatemalan military and for sections of the Reagan 
administration was to increase political stability, the process also functioned as a 
“demonstration election”88 to increase the legitimacy of the Guatemalan government and thus 
the administration‟s ability to expedite aid through Congress. The NED programs associated 
with the election fitted into this framework, rather than challenging it. However, outwardly 
the NED had acted to support a democratic transition away from a military government. 
This equation of democracy promotion with national security also characterised the 
anti-Soviet democracy promotion operations carried out in this period. In terms of democratic 
ideology, there was little ambiguity to negotiate in the targeting of the Soviet empire, where 
the enemies of democracy were also America‟s enemies, and America‟s friends were 
generally democrats. The NED pursued operations within the tactical consensus which had 
been generated by the Conference on the Democratization of Communist Countries, which 
had been held by the administration in October 1982 and attended by AFL-CIO 
representatives and by John Richardson, who was now NED Chairman. This approach 
differentiated between communist countries based on their degree of openness to Western 
influence and agreed that the government should follow a dual policy of launching 
propaganda measures against the USSR, some through NGOs, to increase the flow of 
information to Soviet citizens while using private groups to support movements in the more 
vulnerable countries such as Poland. In line with this approach, the NED pursued the 
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political/ideological offensive aimed at the Soviet bloc called for in NSDD-75 to promote 
gradual democratisation,
89
 in concert with propaganda campaigns by semi-autonomous 
instrumentalities such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and a US government policy 
of conditioning aid for Eastern bloc countries on their willingness to protect and implement 
political and economic reforms.
90
  
NED‟s operations against the Soviet Union were mainly aimed at supporting émigré 
groups based in other countries and assisting them to smuggle written propaganda into the 
USSR. One of the NED‟s first grants was made to a group of Russian émigrés called the 
Sakharov Institute based at the Hoover Institute in Stanford University. The Institute was 
named after Andrei Sakharov, the dissident Soviet physicist who had helped to found the 
Moscow Human Rights Committee, although Sakharov had no connection with it. The 
Institute held a conference in September 1984 aimed at generating support for the 
establishment of a "Center for the Democratization of the Soviet Union”.91 The NED sent a 
representative to the conference, which was also attended by Richard Pipes, then retired from 
the NSC, and Soviet émigré Vladimir Bukovsky, who had also spoken at the Conference for 
the Democratization of Communist countries.
92
  The Sakharov Institute conference discussed 
ways to democratise the USSR, with Pipes commenting that "Radio broadcasting is the most 
obvious vehicle, as well as smuggling in books to Soviet citizens".
93
 The Institute 
subsequently received NED funding.
94
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The Endowment also put this plan directly into operation itself by channelling funds 
to US private groups which used them to finance the publication of books and journals by 
émigrés based in the West which were then smuggled into the USSR. These materials were 
concerned with history, politics and culture and many were targeted at the Soviet elite. One 
example of this type of material was Syntaxis, a Russian language quarterly edited by the 
dissident Andrei Sinyavsky and funded by grants passed through a group called “The 
American Friends of Free Speech Abroad”. Syntaxis “seeks to encourage alternative political, 
social and economic thought in the Soviet Union” and was distributed there through 
unofficial channels.
95
 Another such journal was “Internal Contradictions in the USSR”, a 
quarterly published by émigrés using funding passed through Freedom House which was 
aimed at “higher levels of the Soviet bureaucracy”.96 The Endowment even financed the 
publication of a new Russian translation of Animal Farm.
97
 
The NED also financed propaganda projects targeted at specific demographic groups 
within the USSR, consistent with Alexander Haig‟s original vision of sending aid to 
nationalist groups within the Soviet Union to create instability and disruption. Money was 
passed to the Joint Baltic American National Committee, an umbrella organisation for 
Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian émigrés based in the US, which passed the money to groups 
based in Sweden which distributed books and films on the period of Estonian independence 
and current news to young Estonians.
98
 The Baltic States had a stronger sense of nationalism 
than some of the other Soviet republics, so feeding nationalist feeling there might have served 
to aggravate centripetal tendencies within the USSR. Soviet workers were also not neglected; 
a grant of $129,000 was made to finance the publication of “Soviet Labour Review”, an anti-
communist newsletter containing information on Soviet labour law and working conditions. 
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The newsletter was published in London by the NTS,
99
 a right-wing émigré organisation 
which had previously participated in some of the CIA‟s operations at the beginning of the 
Cold War.
100
 Although the NTS‟ democratic credentials were as questionable as those of 
UNI, this seems to have passed unremarked on by the Endowment‟s critics. Thus, the goals 
and tools which had been agreed at the state-private conference in 1982 to be carried out by 
Project Democracy and codified in NSDD-75, after an interagency struggle which left their 
parameters vague, were now transferred to a private body being funded by the NED, which 
used them to pursue an evolutionary approach to democratisation of the USSR which alarmed 
neither the State Department nor the Soviets. 
In the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe, the Endowment‟s programs went 
beyond distributing propaganda to include the support of dissident groups. This was 
particularly true of Poland, which had been a Reaganite priority for several years. From 1981 
onwards, the President and hard-line policy-makers such as William Casey had seen Poland 
as the weak link in the chain of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, and Solidarity as a 
movement capable not only of destabilising the Polish communist regime but also of spurring 
the growth of similar movements in other Eastern European countries.
101
  
 The Endowment‟s aid to Solidarity was aimed at allowing the organisation to 
continue to spread its message. To do this, NED money was channelled through the AFL-
CIO to the Solidarity Co-ordinating Office Abroad in Brussels to buy printing equipment and 
computers.
102
 The NED also provided legal and material assistance to Polish political 
prisoners through the Aurora Foundation and the Polish American Congress Charitable 
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Foundation,
103
 with the clear political rationale that if activists knew that they or their 
families would be supported in the event of imprisonment, the deterrent effect of repression 
on the movement would be lessened. The Endowment also passed money to other US private 
groups such as Freedom House to be spent on publications to be distributed within Poland
104
 
and also carried out programs aimed at publicizing Solidarity and Human Rights violations 
by the Polish government in the West through grants from FTUI to the Committee in Support 
of Solidarity,
105
 a US organisation which had been set up by the AFL-CIO in 1981 to 
propagandise in favour of the Polish union. According to a US House Intelligence Committee 
Member speaking after the end of the Cold War: 
In Poland we did all of the things that are done in countries where you want to 
destabilize a communist government and strengthen resistance to that. We provided 
the supplies and technical assistance in terms of clandestine newspapers, 
broadcasting, propaganda, money, organizational help and advice.
106
 
 
In Grenada, Guatemala, Poland and the USSR, programs carried out by the NED 
remained within the consensus negotiated by the NED groups, Congress and the 
administration. All occurred in dictatorships or countries emerging from dictatorship, none 
were covert and none channelled funding to non-democratic forces. In addition, none caused 
damage to a regime allied with the US, while the Soviet bloc programs helped to undermine 
enemy states. On the surface, the national security interests of the United States and the 
promotion of democracy meshed perfectly. This was not necessarily the case in Grenada, 
where the US interest in supporting the election of a pro-US candidate led to a partisan 
campaign of support for that candidate, or in Guatemala, where the imperatives of 
legitimating and stabilising the regime led to support of a democratic process which was 
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flawed and limited. These facts indicate that at bottom the process was being driven by 
national security, not democratic imperatives. However, there was wide agreement on the 
operations within the US elite. This was not to be the case with the NED‟s next significant 
program. 
Democracy Promotion versus the Kirkpatrick Doctrine 
In contrast to the consensus displayed over previous operations, US policy towards the 
Philippines was riven by disagreement over whether the promotion of democracy would 
enhance or undermine US national security interests. In this case the US elite confronted one 
of the most important foreign policy issues of the Carter and Reagan Presidencies: the 
question of what policy to follow towards a pro-US dictator whose misrule was damaging US 
national security interests. 
 Although this debate was conducted in terms of whether or not to push for democratic 
reform in the Philippines, the substantive issue was not democratic idealism or hostility to 
democracy; it was fear of the damage a seizure of power by the Marxist New People‟s Army 
guerillas, who were becoming stronger due to Marcos‟ corruption and misrule, would do to 
US economic and geopolitical interests in the Philippines. The most important of these were 
the US naval base at Subic Bay and air base at Clark Field, which allowed the US to project 
its geopolitical power into Asia. The growing power of the NPA led to a split both within the 
administration and between policy-makers, Congress and the NED. Hard-line administration 
officials still blamed the Carter administration‟s policy of pressuring pro-US dictators to 
reform for the success of the anti-American revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua in 1979 and 
believed that the best course of action was to follow the Kirkpatrick Doctrine by supporting 
Marcos against the Communists. However, an alternate policy to this had been proposed by 
the democracy promoters in 1980 and 1981; the use of US private groups to nurture 
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democratic successor movements and then the fostering of a transition to democracy which 
would create more stable and legitimate regimes, robbing insurgencies of their target and 
popular support. Such a transition to democracy was advocated by mid-level policy-makers 
in the State Department and NSC and by liberal Congressmen. This policy was complicated 
by the fact that, unlike the military dictatorship in Guatemala, Marcos was not prepared to 
foster such a transition, which would have to be carried out over his opposition. 
 The NED became involved in this situation in 1984 due to a request from Michael 
Armacost, the US ambassador to the Philippines. Armacost proposed that the NED provide 
$1 million to a Filipino organisation called NAMFREL which trained and organised poll-
watchers to guarantee a “fairly-conducted Philippine parliamentary election” in May 1984. 
When proposing this program, Armacost asked a careful question: 
Is the Endowment likely to look with favor upon a proposal for financial support to a 
non-partisan civic effort to ensure free and fair elections in a friendly/allied 
country?
107
 
 Armacost‟s 1984 request was not motivated by an ideological faith in democracy 
promotion, but was a result of growing fears among mid-level State Department officials that 
the Marcos dictatorship was becoming a liability to the United States. This was a shift from 
the policy put in place at the beginning of Reagan‟s first term, when President Marcos was 
thought to be a pro-US dictator who the administration should support rather than tear down 
because of liberal sensitivities about Human Rights.
108
  
 The aftermath of the assassination of Marcos‟ most popular and threatening political 
opponent, Benigno Aquino, in 1983 had a significant impact on these calculations. The 
Marcos regime was already facing a well-organised and dynamic insurgency prosecuted by 
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the New People‟s Army and faring poorly against it. Aquino‟s death was followed by popular 
protests against the regime which extended far beyond the alienated urban and rural poor to 
sectors which the administration had considered loyal to Marcos. The following month saw 
an anti-regime march through Makati, the financial district of Manila, by 100,000 
businessmen and office workers.
109
 This opposition from the general public and the business 
community, coupled with the expanding NPA insurgency in the countryside and the fact that 
around 20% of the population already supported the National Democratic Front, the left‟s 
political umbrella group, conjured up fears in the State Department that a centre-left 
revolutionary alliance of the same type as that which had toppled Somoza in 1979 was being 
formed.
110
  
 Fear that the Philippines was in a pre-revolutionary situation prompted a reassessment 
of the policy of uncritical support for Marcos by embassy personnel on the ground in Manila 
and mid-level officials in Washington. In Manila, Armacost began to meet with 
representatives of the opposition and in November gave a speech at the Makati Rotary Club 
praising Aquino‟s commitment to free elections.111 In Washington the administration created 
an interagency group to monitor the situation in the Philippines. This group was dominated 
by mid-level officials such as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul 
Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage, and mid-
level conservative NSC Asian specialists such as Gaston Sigur and Richard Childress. 
Although this did not represent a removal of US government support for Marcos, it did 
indicate that mid-level officials were now carefully considering the US‟ options and waiting 
to see how the situation developed.  
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In addition to this subtle shift in attitude in the bureaucracy, more liberal 
Congressmen also began to query the basic assumptions of US policy towards the 
Philippines; in October Congressman Stephen Solarz, who had proposed greater US support 
for democratisation in the Philippines and other friendly dictatorships during the Project 
Democracy hearings, shepherded a “Sense of the House” resolution through the lower 
chamber which called for an investigation of Aquino‟s killing and “genuine, free and fair 
elections to the National Assembly”.112 In contrast to this, the upper level of the 
administration drew the opposite lesson from the previous US experience in Nicaragua and 
maintained its support for the Marcos regime. On October 6
th
 the Vice-President stated that 
the US would not “cut away from a person who, imperfect though he may be on human 
rights, has worked with us.”113 
The NED was brought into this policy controversy by Armacost‟s request for electoral 
assistance for the democratic opposition. This was hardly the first US electoral intervention in 
the Philippines. The poll-watching organisation which Armacost wanted the NED to fund, 
NAMFREL, had first been formed by the CIA in the 1950s to prevent the corrupt and 
ineffective President Quirino from stealing the 1953 elections and to secure the election of 
the pro-US Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay, who Washington believed would be more 
effective at combatting the Marxist Huk insurgency.
114
 The organisation was now being 
reactivated. Armacost feared that if steps were not taken to ensure a fair election, there was a 
possibility of a “widespread election boycott and then increased confrontation and 
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polarisation.”115 If the population believed there was no way to change the government 
through the political system, they might abandon it, and the NPA would benefit from this.  
Armacost‟s invitation was accepted by the Endowment.116 This was unsurprising, as 
the Philippines had been listed as an authoritarian regime which would benefit from 
democracy promotion programs in Douglas and Samuels‟ article of 1981. The AFL-CIO was 
already involved in giving aid to the TUCP (Trade Union Congress of the Philippines), a 
conservative union which had originally been set up by the Marcos regime,
117
  and the 
Endowment as a whole began to broaden its political work in the Philippines beyond trade 
unionism by beginning to focus on election monitoring. The subsequent legislative elections 
may be counted as a defeat for Marcos, due to the fact that despite serious fraud around 60 
opposition delegates were elected to the National Assembly.  
 Neither mid-level officials nor the NED were at this point committed to removing 
Marcos from power; however, the growing disquiet over the policy of supporting Marcos in 
the bureaucracy, Congress and now the NED was given a further boost in June 1984 by 
further evidence of the threat posed by the Filipino Left. According to a report written by 
Manila embassy political officer James Nach the NPA was becoming a serious threat; in fact, 
in some areas of the Philippines the communists had effectively replaced the central 
government. Nach argued that the insurgency was being fuelled by social and economic 
inequalities which the Marcos regime had done little to address and much to exacerbate
118
 
and so serious reforms were needed to win civilian support away from the NPA. Without 
these reforms, “ultimate defeat and a communist takeover of the Philippines” was “a very 
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possible scenario”.119 However, he had little confidence that the corrupt and ineffective 
Marcos regime would be able to implement the necessary reforms.
120
 Nach‟s conclusions 
were supported by Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who visited the 
Philippines and reached the same assessment of the situation, and by two staffers attached to 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who returned from a visit convinced that a 
dangerous communist insurgency was underway.
121
  
 Although the picture of growing communist strength was alarming, the administration 
was divided over what action to take to remedy the situation. Mid-level officials such as 
Armitage and Wolfowitz, Michael Armacost, who had been recalled from Manila to become 
the State Department‟s Undersecretary for Political and Military Affairs, and US embassy 
personnel in Manila, believed that democratic reform was necessary now to ward off 
revolution later.
122
 The new ambassador, Stephen Bosworth, explained to the Makati Rotary 
Club in October 1984 that “it is not a question of how to avoid change; it is rather a question 
of how change can be managed.”123  
In contrast, high level officials such as Casey, Weinberger and the President himself 
believed that the safest course was to stand by Marcos,
124
 with the President commenting in 
October that “there are things [in the Philippines]...that do not look good to us from the 
standpoint...of democratic rights...what is the alternative? It is a large Communist movement 
to take over the Philippines.”125 Most of the administration‟s high-level policy-makers still 
believed that stability in the Philippines could best be achieved through support for Marcos. 
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This split led to the adoption of a compromise position put forward by State 
Department officials and set out in NSDD-163 in February 1985. The document called for 
political, economic and military reform but not the immediate replacement of Marcos. 
Instead, the goal was the “revitalization of democratic institutions to assure both a smooth 
transition when President Marcos does pass from the scene and longer-term stability”.126 
However, no timetable for Marcos to leave power was given. The policy was clearly 
informed by policy-makers‟ perceptions of what had occurred in Nicaragua in 1979, as it 
stated that “Our goal is not to replace the current leadership of the Philippines” and that “We 
are not promoting the dismantling of institutions that support stability – as occurred in 
Nicaragua during the collapse of the Somoza regime”.127 This was a compromise between 
those who feared that Marcos was exacerbating an insurgency he could not defeat and thus 
should be replaced, and those who feared a repetition of Nicaragua. This stalemate continued 
throughout the first half of 1985, with US officials descending on Marcos to urge serious 
reforms, which he ignored.
128
  
The administration‟s position that Marcos should be pressured to reform dove-tailed 
with the stance towards pro-US dictatorships outlined in the original proposals for democracy 
promotion made by Samuels in 1980 and Douglas and Samuels in 1981. These proposals had 
argued that the best policy in such cases was to pursue a long-range strategy of fostering the 
growth of democratic successor groups who could be prepared to compete for power with 
radical opposition groups after a regime breakdown. The NED‟s actions in the Philippines at 
this time conformed to this strategy.  
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During this period of stalemate within the administration, the NED continued to 
expand its political operations on the ground, pouring $3.2 million into AAFLI programs in 
the Philippines in 1985.
129
 These funds went to a conservative Filipino union originally set up 
by the regime, the TUCP,
130
 and were aimed primarily at combatting the influence of the left 
and the NPA in Filipino civil society, not the Marcos government. The Executive Director of 
AAFLI, Charles Gray, made this clear in 1985, stating: "The political opposition to Marcos is 
not well organized, so the only alternative social program is that of the communists. We're 
trying to develop the TUCP to fill the void if Marcos goes."
131
 If this occurred, it was hoped 
that the TUCP would act as a bulwark against the Leftist KMU union federation, which the 
Americans believed was connected with the communist party and the NPA guerrillas.
132
  
The fact that radical unions rather than the Marcos regime were the targets of this 
program is given further backing by the comments of an AAFLI administrator in the 
Philippines, who stated: “Some of the regional labour leaders receiving AAFLI money are 
becoming powerful politically. Imagine if you have $100,000 to give out to families in $500 
chunks. Your stock goes way up, faster than the stock of any of the militant labour 
groups”.133 Thus, the NED was building up a “Third Force” of “democratic successors” who 
would be able to compete politically with the Filipino left if Marcos fell from power.  
 The fragile consensus within the administration ended in mid-1985, again due to 
increased fears of leftist/communist political strength in the Philippines rather than increasing 
ideological fervour for democracy. In July a joint study on the Philippines carried out by the 
CIA, DIA and State Department predicted a growth of left-wing military and political power 
over the next 18 months if the Marcos dictatorship remained in power until the next national 
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elections, scheduled for 1987.
134
 At the same time, it became clear to mid-level officials that 
Marcos was not prepared to reform his regime. The time frame for resolving the crisis and 
building up a possible successor regime was narrowing. 
 The situation led to a meeting of officials from the State Department, CIA, DIA and 
independent academics and businessmen at the National War College in August to discuss 
policy options. The administration remained divided, with pragmatic conservatives such as 
Wolfowitz, Armitage and Armacost called for US covert funding for key opposition 
organisations such as NAMFREL and the Reform the Armed Force Movement (RAM), a 
group of reformist officers within the Armed Forces of the Philippines headed by Defence 
Minister Enrile and General Fidel Ramos. Armacost even attempted to promote the idea of 
launching a coup against Marcos; however, this proved to be unpopular, as policy-makers 
remembered the chaos caused by the coup against President Diem in South Vietnam in 
1963.
135
 Congress also intervened in the form of a Senate amendment to the foreign aid bill 
linking aid to the Philippines to progress on Human Rights and democracy,
136
 much as the 
legislature had demanded certification of such progress before aid would be released to El 
Salvador in the early 80s.  
However, although pressure was growing within and outside the administration for 
the removal of Marcos there was still no policy consensus, as high-level Reaganite policy 
makers such as Casey, Weinberger, White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan and the 
President believed that the most prudent course to follow was to provide Marcos with US 
backing to defeat the NPA.
137
 These conservatives feared a repeat of Nicaragua, where they 
believed the Carter administration had undermined the friendly Somoza dictatorship and 
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opened the way to a Marxist seizure of power.
138
 To these policy-makers the moderate 
opposition beginning to cluster around Corazon Aquino was an unknown quantity which 
might prove unable to stand up to the communists or might call for the US to vacate its 
geopolitically-important bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field.
139
 The struggle between the 
ideologues in the upper reaches of the administration and mid-level pragmatists remained 
unresolved.
140
 
Marcos‟ own attempt to resolve the crisis, the announcement of “snap elections” in 
November 1985, pleased the Reaganites and alarmed the State Department and its allies. The 
Reaganites believed that “snap elections” would end the political crisis, as a Marcos win 
would give the Filipino President the stability he needed to deal strongly with the NPA. This 
group was more interested in such stability than the integrity of the election process. Two 
weeks before voting Donald Regan stated that even if Marcos were re-elected through 
“massive fraud” the administration would have to do business with him, pointing out that 
“[t]here are a lot of governments elected by fraud”.141 For this reason the Reaganites were 
lukewarm on the idea of a Congressional observer mission, as it would be easier to maintain 
support for Marcos if Americans did not witness the massive fraud the regime would need to 
survive.
142
 Although the White House eventually agreed to a 20-person Congressional 
observer mission to be headed by Senator Richard Lugar, it attempted to pack the delegation 
with reliable conservatives.
143
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In contrast, the State Department believed that if Marcos won through fraud only the 
NPA would benefit, as the elimination of the possibility of peaceful change would swell its 
ranks with disaffected moderates.
144
 It also feared that the moderate opposition would not be 
organised enough to seriously contest Marcos in the time available. However, this turn of 
events gave the Department and the NED the opportunity to foster the democratic transition 
which they believed would stabilise the Philippines. 
To capitalise on this opportunity the US embassy Manila and the NED both increased 
their support for the opposition on the ground, going beyond a long-term policy of preparing 
democratic successor organisations to supporting a transfer of power to opposition groups in 
the near future. US Charge d‟Affaires Philip Kaplan spurred the opposition on in its 
preparations for the elections, emphasizing to a gathering of key leaders “the need for the 
opposition to get its act together given the limited time left before a campaign starts.”145 At 
the same time, the embassy made certain that an Aquino victory would be in the interests of 
the United States by pushing her to nominate a conservative and former Marcos loyalist, 
Salvador “Doy” Laurel, as her running-mate.146 Doy was trusted by the Americans and had 
much more reliable instincts on the issues of anti-communism and US access to the bases 
than Aquino.
147
 This alliance forged a centre-right opposition ticket and warded off a key 
danger – that Aquino would make an electoral alliance with the left and be captured by it. 
Aquino‟s rightwards shift on anti-communism and the bases, under the guidance of Laurel 
and the embassy, precluded such an alliance.
148
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The NED supplemented the embassy‟s exhortation of the opposition to campaign with 
its skills of political organisation by funding NAMFREL to reprise its poll-watching role in 
the elections. Although NAMFREL was juridically a non-partisan organisation it was no 
more neutral than was COMELEC, the Marcos regimes‟ election commission. Any step 
towards effective monitoring of electoral fraud was implicitly a step away from Marcos and 
US funding for NAMFREL represented another facet of a State Department strategy 
described by Armacost after the elections as “encourage[ing] the constraints” on Marcos, 
which also included the US government observer mission.
149
 
 Altogether, NAMFREL received funding of $1 million through the NED and also 
through AID. 
150
 This funding had to be passed through smaller Filipino civil society 
organisations which made up the NAMFREL coalition to conceal it.
151
 NED money was 
channelled through FTUI, then AAFLI, then the TUCP, whose Secretary General, Ernesto 
Herrera, was a member of NAMFREL‟s Executive Council.152 7000 TUCP members also 
acted as NAMFREL poll-watchers for the February elections.
153
 NAMFREL‟s poll-watchers 
operated a “Quick Count” system which would enable them to keep their own tally of votes 
cast for each party in the elections
154
; thus, if the Marcos regime slowed or stopped the count 
to falsify results, NAMFREL or the Endowment‟s official observer delegation, sponsored by 
NRI and NDI,
155
 would be able to present accurate figures to the US government.  
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Reagan administration hard-liners accepted the funding of NAMFREL because they 
believed Marcos would win the elections, and having this victory confirmed by a watchdog 
not linked to the regime would increase its credibility.
156
 In addition, the NED had assisted in 
and certified elections in line with the conservative foreign policy viewpoint previously in 
Grenada and Guatemala, so the conservatives had little reason to believe it would diverge 
from their policy. This calculation proved to be flawed. It was the alternative vote tabulation 
system operated by NAMFREL, which produced different results to those announced by the 
regime,
157
 together with the electoral irregularities and intimidation of voters reported by the 
organisation throughout the election,
158
 which allowed the opposition to convincingly 
demonstrate the high levels of fraud which had occurred on election day.
159
 Lugar‟s election 
observation team concluded that widespread fraud had occurred, with Lugar calling 
NAMFREL “our eyes and ears.”160 The NDI/NRI sponsored observer mission also released a 
report citing fraud and intimidation.
161
 The public nature of this fraud created a crisis for 
Reaganite policy from which the only exit was acceptance of a democratic transition.  
The fact that the elections had been stolen in the glare of US media attention gave 
pro-democracy forces the opportunity to put pressure on the Reaganites to live up to their 
democratic rhetoric. In Washington, Congress threatened a cut-off of all aid to the Philippines 
unless Aquino was recognised as the new President.
162
 In the Philippines, Aquino called on 
the Reagan administration to support her, stating that “Those who are prepared to support 
armed struggles for liberation elsewhere discredit themselves if they obscure the nature of 
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what we are doing peacefully here”.163 The Secretary of State, George Shultz also swung 
definitively into the anti-Marcos camp for pragmatic reasons after deciding that “The 
protection of our strategic interest lies in the fostering of a transition to a more democratic 
government.”164 This democratic rhetoric was given force by Aquino‟s preparations to bring 
her followers out onto the streets and a mutiny by RAM, the anti-Marcos officers‟ 
organisation. However much Reaganites might invoke the spectre of Khomeini‟s seizure of 
power in Iran to argue that the US should continue to support Marcos,
165
 the game was 
clearly up and the democratic transition which the NED, Congress and the State Department 
had been pushing for followed quickly. 
As in Grenada and Guatemala this democratic transition had been carried out for 
reasons of national security, not an ideological commitment to democracy. The anti-Marcos 
faction within the US elite had fostered a transition, not because of an ideological fervour for 
democracy, but because they believed it was the best way to achieve the primary US national 
security goal; a stable and anti-communist Philippines. Each progressive hardening of the 
anti-Marcos faction‟s position, from a policy of pressuring Marcos to reform while building 
up anti-communist civil society organisations to one of supporting Aquino politically against 
the dictator, had been prompted by a growing fear of the military and political power of leftist 
Filipino groups who, if they took power, could be expected to order the US to vacate the 
bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay and to pursue an anti-American foreign policy. This 
faction‟s nightmare was a cross-class opposition alliance linking moderates and leftists, such 
as had occurred in Nicaragua in 1979 and it acted at crucial junctures to ward off this 
possibility. Armacost commented several weeks after Aquino‟s victory:  
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Our objective was to capture...to encourage the democratic forces of the centre, then 
consolidate control by the middle and also win away the soft support of the NPA. So 
far, so good.
166
  
 
It is unlikely that these officials would have become so hostile to Marcos in the absence of 
the threat they perceived from the NPA. 
 Although this transition was described by the NED as “dramatic triumph of 
democracy” in its 1986 report, its depth was limited. The opposition forces which the State 
Department and the NED supported aimed at a conservative and elite-dominated democracy 
rather than a radical transformation. These forces were successful: 5 years after the fall of 
Marcos, 85% of the 200-member House of Representatives consisted of the political clans 
who had traditionally governed the Philippines under the period of corrupt, oligarchic 
democracy from 1946-1972.
167
 US pressure on Marcos to step down was aimed at containing 
the popular mobilisation then taking place on the streets, which the policy of fostering a 
democratic transition had been designed to avoid.
168
  RAM‟s eleventh-hour rebellion against 
Marcos, whether encouraged behind the scenes by US officials or not,
169
 helped to preserve 
the military as a repressive force to be used later if necessary, rather than allowing it to be 
weakened by the fall of the dictatorship. Aquino‟s government remained under the shadow of 
this military after the transition, a factor which limited its freedom of action. 
 While many of these limiting factors were a product of Filipino political culture and 
US policy in general, the NED also acted after the transition to contain the mobilisation of 
popular forces which could have pressed for more radical socioeconomic reforms, rather than 
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to empower them. It did this by funding Filipino civil society groups to allow them to combat 
groups which it saw as dangerously radical or leftist. The FTUI continued its funding of the 
TUCP to “strengthen pro-democratic unions in the Philippines so that they will become the 
pre-eminent representatives of workers under the umbrella of the TUCP”170 and to “allow the 
TUCP to supplant the [leftist trade union federation] KMU as the spokesman for working 
men and women in the Philippines”171 This was significant because the KMU wanted the US 
to leave its bases and Clark Field and Subic Bay, and also supported stronger land reform 
measures than the TUCP. The issue of land reform was linked to the security situation, as the 
fact that in the mid-80s 20% of the population owned 80% of the land
172
 was a clear cause of 
the NPA insurgency. Aquino‟s land reform bill, drafted with the backing of a Congress 
controlled by the landed oligarchy and businessmen, exempted 75% of all land from 
redistribution. In the first 3 years of the campaign only 7% of this eligible land was 
redistributed, with agrarian reform subsequently grinding to a halt.
173
 Thus, the accession of a 
populist but conservative President, a conservative legislature and action in civil society to 
combat radical forces acted to block a key reform.  
The NED also funded other conservative civil society groups to shape the transition 
and maintain the elite in power. It combatted GABRIELA, a left-wing feminist organisation 
by funding KABATID, a conservative women‟s group dominated by members of the elite 
which it hoped would act as a counter-weight.
174
CIPE began funding the Philippines 
Chamber of Commerce (PCCI), to help it to create a nationwide organisation
175
 which would 
unify it as an interest group sector and convert it away from the “crony capitalism” of the 
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Marcos era and towards “private enterprise values”.176 Thus, rather than aiding popular forces 
the NED and the US government  acted to contain them, easing Marcos out of power to 
preserve a state and military apparatus which served US interests from the threat of 
revolution. The strategy of creating stability through a democratic transition had been proven 
effective, while the threat of more radical change from below had been warded off. 
The NED‟s operations under the Reagan administration were not conducted in 
accordance with an overarching strategic framework which prioritised democracy promotion 
over short-term national security objectives. Instead, while these operations did support 
democratic groups and did aim to create democratic systems, democracy promotion was 
deployed as a political/organisational tool to achieve pre-existing US national security 
objectives in specific cases. This double character of the NED‟s political operations, 
democratic in form but oriented towards security concerns, is partly attributable to the fact 
that several private leaders conflated the spread of democracy with US national security, an 
orientation which was reinforced after the Endowment was created by the appointment of 
NED officials who had previously held positions within the national security bureaucracy.
177
  
However, it was also a product of the limitations on the Endowment‟s freedom of 
action produced by the triangular management model for democracy promotion operations 
which provided Congress and the administration with leverage over the NED. While the 
Endowment was formally autonomous, this organisational framework constrained it in two 
ways. Firstly, Congress‟ leverage as the provider of funding ensured that operations would 
aim at the support of democratic forces, rather than groups which were simply pro-US or 
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anti-communist. Congress had not hesitated to threaten the funding of individual foundations 
which gave support to foreign groups it disapproved of. Secondly, the fact that the NED 
needed support from the administration to operate, secure funding and conduct large-scale 
operations aimed at altering political structures led to the Endowment targeting countries 
where US national security priorities were at stake and could be achieved through the use of 
democracy promotion. When the Reagan administration, or factions within it, requested NED 
assistance in Grenada, Guatemala or the Philippines, the Endowment quickly obliged. 
These ideological and organisational factors resulted in the subordination of 
democracy promotion to national security objectives and its use as a tool to achieve these 
objectives, rather than an independent strategy or element of policy. National security 
objectives were the deciding factor in the choice of which specific countries would be 
targeted for large-scale operations aimed at altering political structures. In these cases, 
democracy promotion was used as a tactic to preserve or extend strategic positions important 
to the US.  NED actions in the Soviet bloc served to delegitimise enemy governments and 
foster the growth of dissident movements, weakening Soviet power and control. In Latin 
America and Asia, democracy promotion was deployed in pro-US dictatorships suffering 
from the threat of radical revolutions as a tool for generating consent among the masses of the 
population for political arrangements shaped by domestic elites, action by the US state and 
the NED itself. Successful transitions to democracy legitimised new pro-US regimes which 
were less vulnerable to revolution and would act in US interests. While this tactic was 
contentious in the Philippines, it proved to be a more effective approach to securing US 
interests than the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. 
These political outcomes were achieved through democratic methods; however, the 
depth of reform which was pursued in these new democracies was limited by the 
subordination of democracy promotion to national security imperatives. The practical effect 
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of democracy promotion programs was to entrench pro-US elites in power rather than to 
promote democratic transitions which could have resulted in far-reaching socioeconomic 
change. Instead, popular empowerment was limited through US and NED support of forces 
who could be relied on to act in ways consonant with enduring US interests and who would 
not upset the political, economic and social structures which preserved stability and US 
access to strategic positions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The promotion of democracy has not formed an overarching theme of US foreign policy, nor 
has it formed an element in a coherent strategy fusing the export of democracy with US 
national security. Instead strategic incoherence, the use of democracy as a tool to achieve pre-
existing national security goals on a case-by-case basis, and the pursuit of a limited degree of 
democratic reform designed to place friendly political movements in power represent 
persistent patterns in the relationship between democracy promotion and US national security. 
The relationship between the export of democracy, as both an ideology and a political 
system, and US national security policy has traditionally been conceptualised through several 
frameworks which have sought to explain the relationship between the two imperatives in US 
foreign policy over a period extending from the present moment back to the beginnings of the 
Cold War, and on occasion to the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. The Liberal framework 
sees democracy as a key element in US national security policy which serves to further US 
interests, while acknowledging US support for some dictatorships and minimising these 
instances as unfortunate deviations from the mainstream of US foreign policy.
 1
  The 
Leftist/Progressive framework sees the policy pronouncements of US officials on America‟s 
commitment to democracy as a rhetorical device to obscure support for dictatorships and the 
pursuit of power and economic interests.
2
 Conservatives and Realists have either seen US 
support for democracy as a rhetorical device, in common with Leftists and Progressives, or as 
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utopianism which can serve as a dangerous distraction from the pursuit of real and tangible 
interests based on power realities.
3
 
  I have examined this debate through a case study of the creation of the National 
Endowment for Democracy in the early 1980s. These debates represent a key moment in the 
conceptualisation of the relationship between democracy promotion and US national security, 
and in its institutionalisation. Many of the assumptions about democracy promotion and 
national security which were formulated and articulated during this period have recurred in 
US foreign policy rhetoric and practice.
4
 The creation of the NED, although the Endowment 
was privately-run, also represented the beginning of a process which led to the creation of 
democracy promotion programs and offices within the state apparatus. This was the outcome 
of a policy-making process which represented an effort by the US elite to create a strategic 
framework fusing national security and democracy promotion superior to previous case-by-
case efforts; thus, examination of it enables an analysis of a conscious process of decision-
making on the relationship of democracy promotion to US national security objectives which 
can be used to inform wider conclusions on the relationship between these two key 
imperatives.  
The participants in this debate did not conceive of democracy promotion as merely a 
smokescreen for the pursuit of power by other means; instead the democratisation of other 
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violence ready for export” linked democratic reform and US security in a way similar to those democracy 
promoters and State Department officials who feared that continued US support for dictatorships in the Third 
World would lead to insurgencies and the collapse of friendly government. See George W. Bush, “Remarks by 
President George W. Bush at the 20
th
 Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy”, 6th November 
2003, accessed 31
st
 August 2012, http://ned.org/george-w-bush/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-
20th-anniversary. 
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societies was seen as a concrete US goal. However, the policy debate was riven by tensions 
between the pursuit of democracy and US national security. The result was not the generation 
of an overarching strategic framework which meshed democracy promotion and US national 
security, as the elite was divided into contending factions which proposed different strategic 
objectives and targets for democracy promotion. These divisions could not be overcome, only 
de-escalated. The outcome was a privately-managed but government-linked institution, the 
National Endowment for Democracy, which pursued projects of democratisation consistent 
with US national security objectives in both friendly and hostile dictatorships on a tactical 
basis. This was a compromise solution which left tensions between democracy and US 
national security unresolved systematically at the strategic level, at the level of organisation, 
where a private, democratic organisation remained tied to short-term state goals, and at the 
level of programs.  
The failure to resolve the contradictions which arose between national security 
interests and democracy promotion in US foreign policy during this debate indicates that a 
final resolution  of the tension at a strategic level is not possible, despite arguments put 
forward by policy-makers or academics that such a resolution has been or can be achieved.
5
 
Neither can one of these imperatives be removed from the equation.  Instead, the relationship 
between them is fluid and influenced by external geopolitical conditions and the strength of 
conflicting groups or actors within the state apparatus. Due to this continuing tension an 
                                                 
5
 George W. Bush came close to positing a complete fusion of US national security and democracy promotion, 
stating in his second inaugural that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of 
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in 
our world.” See George W. Bush, “Second Inaugural Address”, 20th January 2005, accessed 22nd August 2013, 
http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-george-w-bush-2005. Mark Palmer, the State 
Department official most closely associated with the APF, also later published a book calling for a concerted 
push by the United States and the global community to remove all dictators from office by 2025. See Mark 
Palmer, Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World’s Last Dictators by 2025 (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005). Muravchik, cited above, also take a prescriptive approach in 
advocating democracy promotion as the basis of future national security policy. 
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accommodation between the two is probable only in policy towards specific cases and 
countries.  
The strategic framework 
Private individuals and groups took the lead role in generating a framework for democracy 
promotion during the 1970s and in the first year of the Reagan administration. It was these 
actors, not the US government, who generated the concept of promoting the growth of 
democratic systems overseas through aid to foreign political parties and civil society groups 
and produced ideas for an organisational blueprint, a tactical approach, and the general 
principles for a strategic framework to achieve this. This framework was not constructed 
purely for ideological reasons, but because these individuals and groups believed the 
promotion of democracy would create more security for the US. However, far from being able 
to simply impose these ideas on “proximate policy-makers”, these private forces encountered 
pre-existing attitudes and agendas in the policy-making machinery which forced negotiation 
and modification of their original concepts.  
The process of generating a strategic framework reconciling democracy promotion 
and national security led to disagreements between factions with differing conceptions of the 
relationship between democracy and national security objectives located within the 
administration, in Congress, and within the private sphere. The state apparatus was divided 
into two groups: a Reaganite faction which  was motivated by the concept of anticommunism 
rather than a universal commitment to democracy promotion; and a State Department-based 
faction which favoured a strategy of containing the perceived rise of Soviet and Communist 
political power in friendly dictatorships such as the Philippines through pre-emptive 
democratic reform, while weakening the USSR through support for dissident and nationalist 
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groups, and propaganda broadcast through Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Each 
faction was concerned that an indiscriminate campaign to wage democracy too focussed on 
the opposing agenda could harm US national security by destabilising friendly governments 
or provoking crackdowns in enemy states which could destroy friendly groups the US sought 
to empower.  
The requirement that democracy promotion be overt, a legacy of the covert state-
private network‟s implosion in 1967, meant that such debates could not be limited to the 
national security apparatus, however. Congress‟ role in appropriating funding for such a new 
initiative provided leverage over the process to Congressmen and Senators, especially 
Democrats, who favoured a more even-handed campaign rather than the use of an abstract 
concept of democracy promotion to legitimate the pursuit of a campaign focussed primarily 
on the Soviet Empire, while the more open process also provided a platform for private 
groups to push for the adoption of their concepts. 
The concept of democracy promotion proved to be capable of generating a consensus 
among this fragmented elite which allowed political operations to be pursued such as the 
support of Solidarity in Poland, dissident groups within the USSR, and friendly democratic 
forces in the Philippines. This shift in the rationale for US political intervention overseas from 
the anti-communist conception which had characterised the pre-1967 period of the Cold War 
and the Reagan administration‟s Project Democracy to a conception focussed explicitly on 
concrete support for democracy and democratic forces provided an ideational grounding for 
these activities which was far more enduring and far more rooted in US political culture.  
However, this accommodation over democracy promotion actively led to failure to resolve the 
strategic question. A policy conceived and articulated in terms of this vision of democracy 
promotion could not be limited either to a focus solely on building democracy in the USSR 
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rather than friendly dictatorships or to pursuing operations to create political difficulties for 
the Soviet regime while failing to push for more wide-ranging democratic reforms when 
opportunities to do so arose. Instead, the concept included both containment through the 
creation of democratic systems in friendly dictatorships and attempts to transform enemy 
regimes while prioritising neither goal and subsuming both under the concept of democracy 
promotion.  
  The fact that the disagreements within the private coalition which led to the departure 
of idealists such as George Agree turned on the structure of the Endowment and its 
relationship to state and private interests rather than a division over whether to follow a policy 
of containment or the transformation of enemy regimes indicates that this strategic fuzziness 
was intrinsic to the concept of democracy promotion, rather than being imposed from the 
outside by factions in the Reagan administration or Congress in an attempt to engineer 
consensus. Instead of being used to support a clear strategic option, the concept superseded 
differing agendas and so transcended the strategic issues. This convergence led the state and 
private groups to focus on the creation of the NED as a pragmatic solution to the problem of 
how to carry out political operations abroad rather than on resolving their differences over 
strategic agendas. This resolution de-escalated policy conflicts within the elite over 
democracy promotion, but no single faction, whether the private democracy promoters or 
factions in the administration or Congress, was able to triumph completely. The result was a 
compromise which led to the creation of an organisation which could pursue democracy 
promotion on a case-by-case basis, not a coherent strategic framework. 
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Democracy promotion, autonomy and credibility  
Although the fact that the NED received government funding invites parallels with the pre-
1967 CIA-guided state-private network, the shift from a set of covert relationships based on a 
shared anticommunism to an overt relationship conceived as being aimed at the promotion of 
democracy created a new dynamic for the management of operations.  Congress‟ rejection of 
a supervisory role for the International Political Committee,
6
 necessary to secure the 
credibility of the NED under the new overt funding relationship, had removed formal 
command and control by the national security bureaucracy. This removal of a government 
command centre for the effort to promote democracy removed one possible mechanism for 
resolving the tensions between national security and democracy which remained due to the 
failure to generate a strategic framework. Instead, these tensions were resolved on a case-by-
case basis through the new, open management structure for political operations which 
provided the Executive and Congress with different methods of influence over the 
Endowment.  
 The NED‟s financial dependency on Congressional appropriations provided the 
legislature with leverage which it used to enforce the Endowment‟s compliance with its own 
vision of democracy promotion.  Congress used its “power of the purse” to ensure that the 
NED foundations did not deploy democracy promotion merely as a concept to legitimate anti-
communist operations by punishing individual foundations which engaged in this. These 
Congressional threats to the Endowment‟s funding affected the balance of forces within it, 
                                                 
6
The International Political Committee was set up and met intermittently from 1983-1986, but without a large 
program such as Project Democracy to manage, its power and influence was limited. See Thomas Carothers, In 
the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin America In the Reagan Years (Berkeley & Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1991), 205. 
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strengthening the position of those private leaders who stressed the use of democratic tactics 
and forms.      
 In contrast, the administration used its influence to strengthen the NED‟s orientation 
towards national security. This was partly a product of the interchange of personnel between 
the national security bureaucracy and the Endowment, which tended to create a leadership 
group which conceived US national security interests within the framework constructed by 
this bureaucracy.
7
 However, the administration exerted more tangible influence due to the fact 
that it recommended the funding levels which Congress voted on, generated the national 
security framework which the NED pursued its operations within, and provided the pressure 
on other states and support for NED actions on the ground needed to carry out large-scale 
regime change operations.
8
    
  This double dependency on the Executive and Congress acted to more clearly define 
and institutionalise the new mode of political intervention pursued by the NED as being 
aimed at the fostering of democratic groups and systems compatible with US national security 
interests, rather than as a resurrection of previous CIA capabilities. The shift from a covert to 
an overt operating structure helped to lock in this change, but the continued dependence of the 
NED on government funding and support meant that it did not result in complete autonomy 
for the Endowment. The result was that the NED was flexible enough to pursue a double 
mission of transforming enemy states and fostering democratic transitions in friendly 
                                                 
7
See Chapter Seven, 275. 
8
 This was apparent in the case of the Philippines, where the NED required the support of the State Department 
to prosecute its operations effectively and where the support of the Reaganites was required for the final ouster 
of Marcos. This pattern of state-private co-operation was repeated more smoothly in subsequent operations 
during the Cold War, when the US state exercised diplomatic and economic pressures on the right-wing Pinochet 
regime in Chile and the Marxist Sandinistas in Nicaragua to hold elections which were won by NED-supported 
political forces. See William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention & Hegemony 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 167-175 for discussion of US economic pressures on the 
Pinochet regime in the mid-80s and 235-239 for a discussion of the economic, military and diplomatic pressures 
applied to the Sandinista regime by the US state which acted alongside democracy promotion operations to 
remove the FSLN from power. 
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dictatorships on a case-by-case basis, and to respond rapidly to take advantage of developing 
opportunities to promote democracy, for example in Eastern Europe from 1989 onwards. 
However, this autonomy only functioned within the limits set by the national security 
bureaucracy and Congress, and much of the funding it disbursed to indigenous groups in such 
rapidly developing situations originated with Congress or government agencies such as 
USAID.
 9
  
The tension inherent in this arrangement was that while a private group had been 
preferred due to the plausible deniability and credibility which it could bring to democracy 
promotion operations, neither the Executive nor Congress proved willing to provide the NED 
with complete autonomy. This continuing tension has begun to undermine the credibility of 
democracy promotion as a politically neutral project, and that of the NED as a private 
organisation. The continuing credibility problem posed by the NED‟s links to the state10 has 
been exacerbated over the preceding decade by developments which have strengthened the 
perception of a link between democracy promotion and US interests. These include the 
                                                 
9
 According to NED annual reports, in 1988 the Endowment disbursed $2,010,000 to organisations active in or 
linked to Eastern Europe, with $1,000,000 in funding Solidarity originating from a special Congressional 
appropriation. In 1989, the year of the Polish elections which established Solidarity as a political force, the 
amount was approximately doubled to $4,065,826, with $2,000,000 of this being channelled to the Polish 
opposition from special Congressional appropriations, $308,868 from USAID, and $235,000 being channelled to 
Hungarian organisations in USAID funding. In 1990, the total amount for Eastern Europe was $11,365,720. 
$995,700 of this amount originated from Congress, while $8,467,462 was contributed by USAID. See National 
Endowment for Democracy, Annual Report 1988, 21-25 Annual Report 1989, 19-24, and Annual Report 1990, 
23-30, accessed 27
th
 July, 2013, http://ned.org/publications.  
10
 The NED board has remained linked to the national security bureaucracy through personnel interchanges. The 
interchange of personnel between the US national security apparatus and the Endowment continues to be a 
structural feature of the NED at the time of writing. The current NED board contains: Zalmay Khalilzad is a 
former George W. Bush administration ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq; Anne Marie Slaughter, former 
Director of Policy Planning in the State Department under the Obama administration; Stephen Sestanovich, a 
former policy planner in the State Department under Reagan and ambassador at large for the former Soviet 
republics under Clinton; Robert B. Zoellick, former US Trade Representative and Deputy Secretary of State 
under the George W. Bush administration; and Ellen O. Trauscher, former Undersecretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security under Obama. The current board also includes representatives of the AFL-
CIO and the political parties, along with academics with expertise in democracy promotion. See 
http://ned.org/about/board, accessed 3rd August 2013. Thus, the leaders of the Endowment and its core groups 
are often members of “the Establishment”, “the group of powerful men [and women] who know each 
other…who share assumptions so deep that they do not need to be articulated.” See Godfrey Hodgson, “The 
Establishment,” Foreign Policy 10 (1973), 4-5, for quote. 
284 
 
Endowment‟s embedding in the wider US “democracy bureaucracy”, consisting of offices and 
programs in USAID, the State Department and the Department of Defence,
11
 established after 
the Cold War, and the involvement of these agencies and the NED in highly public regime 
changes in Serbia, Venezuela, Haiti, Georgia and Ukraine.
12
 Due to this, the suspicion 
articulated in 1983 by several Congressmen that democracy promotion was s smokescreen for 
the covert pursuit of geopolitical goals has spread to authoritarian regimes, and even groups of 
democracy activists in the Third World.     
  Many authoritarian governments have become deeply suspicious that democracy 
promotion and programs to develop civil society are an instrument for the pursuit of US 
geopolitical objectives. This has led to legal restrictions such as an NGO law passed in Russia 
in 2006 which gave the government the power to close the offices of foreign NGOs working 
within the country if they were deemed to violate “Russia‟s sovereignty”.13 Furthermore, the 
legitimation of the US invasion of Iraq in terms of democracy promotion has led to the 
growing perception that the NED and other democracy promotion agencies directly serve US 
interests by some groups of democracy activists in the Middle East. Such groups may refuse 
                                                 
11
 See Thomas O. Melia, “The Democracy Bureaucracy: The Infrastructure of American Democracy Promotion” 
(Discussion paper prepared for the Princeton Project on National Security Working Group on Global Institutions 
and Foreign Policy Infrastructure, September, 2005), accessed 14
th
 September 2012, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/democracy_bureaucracy.pdf,5-6, 10,  for a discussion of the components 
of the democracy bureaucracy. 
12See Michael J. Barker, “Taking the risk out of civil society: harnessing social movements and regulating 
revolutions” (refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University 
of Newcastle, 2006), 6-7 and Gerald Sussman, Branding Democracy: US Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern 
Europe (New York: Peter Lang, 2010),  140-147, on the Serbian case; Eva Golinger (2007), The Chavez Code: 
Cracking US Intervention in Venezuela (London: Pluto Press, 2007) on the NED‟s political intervention against 
the Chavez regime; and Max Blumenthal, “The Other Regime Change,” Salon.com, 17th July 2004, accessed 4th 
February 2012, http://www.salon.com/2004/07/17/haiti_coup/, on the NED‟s opposition to Aristide. For the 
Georgian case, see Barker, 8-10 and Sussman, 147-162. For the case of the Ukraine, see Sussman, 155-163. 
13See National Endowment for Democracy, “The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance,” 8th June 2006, 
accessed 29
th
 January 2012, http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdf, 24. This trend extends far beyond Russia 
and has included harsher regulations for NGOs in a number of authoritarian states in the former Soviet Union, 
Latin America and Africa. See NED, “The Backlash,” 40-50, for details. For the Egyptian case see Ron Nixon, 
“U.S. groups helped train Arab dissenters; On a minimal budget, programs promoted democracy in region”, The 
International Herald Tribune, 16
th
 April 2011, Nexis UK, http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/ and Jordan Michael 
Smith, “The US Democracy Project,” The National Journal, May-June 2013, Nexis UK, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/. 
285 
 
NED assistance due to the fear that if they do so they will lose their credibility as independent 
actors in the eyes of their domestic constituencies or lay themselves open to accusations of 
being manipulated by the US.
14
 These developments may hamper the effectiveness of the 
NED in carrying out its projects in the future, along with that of other democracy promotion 
groups such as George Soros‟ Open Society Foundations. 
National security and political reform 
The limitation of the NED‟s autonomy through its dependence on and ideological congruence 
with the state resulted in the use of democracy promotion on a tactical basis to achieve pre-
existing US national security interests.  Through its operations, the Endowment was able to 
contribute to the resolution of two long-term tactical problems in US foreign policy by 
assisting in the transformation of hostile states and by supporting transitions in friendly 
dictatorships to more legitimate democratic governments which were less vulnerable to 
insurgencies and revolutions. Democracy promotion proved to be more effective at 
accomplishing these goals than Modernisation or the Carter administration‟s Human Rights 
campaign. This led to the promotion of democratic reform in the target states; however, the 
promotion of democracy was a means for securing US national security interests, not an end 
in itself. Furthermore, the co-optation of democracy promotion to serve national security ends 
resulted in the promotion of a form of democracy which was compatible with US interests.  
Democracy is a contested political concept, and democratic theory recognises a 
number of different models of democracy which vary from a narrow definition focussed on 
                                                 
14
Kefaya, an Egyptian pro-democracy protest movement, refused to accept assistance under the Bush 
administration partly due to disagreement with US foreign policy in the Middle East, but also because it wanted 
to preserve its legitimacy as an authentically Egyptian organisation and felt that foreign funding would 
jeopardise this. See Erin A. Snider & David M. Faris, “The Arab Spring: US Democracy Promotion in Egypt,” 
Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011): 55. On accusations of disloyalty, see the case of Egyptian activist Ahmed 
Maher, who was accused of “treason” by other activists for accepting aid and training from Freedom House. See 
Nixon, “U.S. groups helped train Arab dissenters”. 
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procedures and institutions to forms which emphasise higher degrees of direct participation 
and redistributive reform.
15
 The US and the NED have promoted a form of liberal democracy 
which is based on the US model
 
and does not embrace deeper levels of redistributive reform, 
or the welfarism associated with post-war models of liberal democracy.
16
 This outcome was 
partly a result of an ideological identification by policy-makers and democracy promoters of 
democracy with the particular system which developed in the United States. However, it was 
also a result of how national security bureaucrats and private operators conceptualised the link 
between democracy promotion and US national security interests, which in turn had an impact 
on the type and extent of reform promoted. 
 Democracy promotion‟s focus on the importance of regime types and its limiting of 
the concept of reform to remove the social and economic rights which had formed a part of 
the Carter administration‟s Human Rights approach made it a more effective tool against 
Communism. Whereas Communist states such as the Soviet Union could argue that they were 
in compliance with the social and economic aspects of Human Rights, the narrowing of the 
concept to political liberties served to delegitimate these regimes. This narrowing of the 
concept was already under way in October 1981, when the Reagan administration put forward 
a new doctrine of Human Rights which, in emphasising political liberties, was conceived as a 
                                                 
15
 See Christopher Hobson, “The Limits of Liberal-Democracy Promotion,” Alternatives 34 (2009): 399; Milja 
Kurki, “Democracy and Conceptual Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy 
Promotion,” International Studies Review 12 (2010): 372-76 for brief discussions of differing models of 
democracy. A more complete discussion and assessment of differing democratic systems can be found in David 
Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). 
16
 See Hobson, “The Limits of Liberal-Democracy Promotion”: 386; Kurki, “Democracy and Conceptual 
Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy Promotion”: 365; and Steve Smith, “US 
Democracy Promotion: Critical Questions,” in American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, Impacts, 
ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry & Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); 70 for the 
argument that the US promotes liberal democracy. Hobson, 399, notes the lack of social democratic features in 
the new democratic systems. 
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more effective weapon of ideological warfare against the Soviet bloc.
17
 This shift, more fully 
realised in the concept of democracy promotion, provided both an ideological rationale for the 
dismantling of these regimes and an end-goal to be achieved.  
This goal was pursued through the support of anti-communist dissident forces. US aid 
to Solidarity helped to preserve the movement during the period of martial law as an 
alternative political force for when the Polish United Workers‟ Party was ready to negotiate a 
transition to democracy. As political space in Eastern Europe opened up the NED supported 
other dissident forces, such as the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia and the Union of 
Democratic Forces in Bulgaria, which contested the dominance of Communist governments.
18
 
The political and economic dismantling of the Communist systems these groups conducted 
brought the Cold War to an end, not merely as a geopolitical competition but as an ideological 
one.  
In allied dictatorships in the Third World, the US supported the construction of “low 
intensity” democratic systems19 characterised by political contestation between elites, rather 
than a more populist political dynamic and redistributive socioeconomic reforms.
20
 This de-
                                                 
17
 See Chapter Three, 106-109. 
18
 See Chapter Seven, 256-257, for aid to Solidarity up to 1986. See Domber for a more complete discussion of 
NED aid to Solidarity up to and beyond this date; Gregory Domber “Supporting the Revolution: America, 
Democracy and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989” (PhD thesis, George Washington University, 
2008),  accessed 15
th
 July 2013, http://transatlantic.sais-
jhu.edu/ACES/ACES_Working_Papers/Gregory_Domber 
_Supporting_the_Revolution.pdf, 209-216, 335-350, 410-411. For support to the Civic Forum, see National 
Endowment National Endowment for Democracy, Annual Report 1990, 23-30, accessed 27
th
 July, 2013,  
http://ned.org/publications and Stephen Engelberg, “Evolution in Eastern Europe; U.S. Grant to 2 Czech Parties 
Is Called Unfair Interference,” New York Times, accessed 18th August 2013,  
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/10/world/evolution-in-europe-us-grant-to-2-czech-parties-is-called-unfair-
interference.html. For NED support to the opposition UDF coalition in Bulgaria, see Annual Report 1990, 23.24. 
Several of the grants for the Civic Forum and the UDF were supplied using AID funds. 
19
 The term “low intensity democracy” was proposed by Barry Gills and Joel Rocamora to describe the 
governments of states which had recently returned to democracy via US-supported transitions such as 
Guatemala, the Philippines and South Korea. See Barry Gills & Joel Rocamora, “Low Intensity Democracy,” 
Third World Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1992). 
20
 See Hobson, 393 and William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and 
Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 49. 
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emphasis of socioeconomic change was ideologically consistent with the promotion of liberal 
democracy. It was also a result of a shift in the concept of democracy promotion. The original 
vision of democracy promotion by Douglas in 1972 represented a continuation of the 
Modernisation paradigm of conducting socioeconomic reform but sought to implement this 
through direct political means, as the mass democratic parties which he called for were to 
carry out such deeper reform measures when in power.
21
 However, the concept was narrowed 
by Michael Samuels and then government officials such as Alexander Haig
22
 into a political 
tool for aiding pro-US groups in blocking the ascension of radical forces to create stability in 
the national security interests of the United States. This focus on building up friendly political 
forces reduced the danger of destabilisation which had accompanied Modernisation-focussed 
attempts to foster deeper reforms and the Human Rights approach of punishing pro-US 
dictators through cutting military aid, but it also de-emphasised socioeconomic objectives.  
This shift had practical consequences. It resulted in US and NED support for 
transitions which occurred within restrictive parameters set by undemocratic forces such as 
the military, as in Guatemala, or favoured right or centre-right forces uncommitted to wider 
social and economic reforms, as in the Philippines. In general the US has favoured orderly 
transitions rather than mass action, which may upset existing social and economic 
structures.
23
 The political assistance provided by the NED helped to legitimate these 
                                                 
21
William A. Douglas, Developing Democracy (Washington DC: Heldref Publications, 1972), 119-121. This is 
not to argue that Douglas‟ model was any more universally applicable to different countries and societies than 
the model eventually promoted. However, it had been designed with some consideration of the needs and 
conditions of developing states. 
22
 See Chapter One, 50-52 and Chapter Four, 126. 
23
 This was certainly the case in Chile, where the US successfully fostered a political transition from the Pinochet 
regime to a centre-right government led by the Christian Democratic Party during the 1980s. In 1986, US 
officials pressured this centre-right alliance, then in opposition, to sever all links with the strikes and street 
protests being organised by the left at that time. See Morris Morley & Chris McGillon, “Soldiering On: The 
Reagan Administration and Redemocratisation in Chile, 1983-1986,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 25, 
no. 1 (2006): 14. In the Philippines, mass protests in the wake of the fraudulent elections in 1986 strengthened 
Aquino‟s hand but went ahead against the wishes of the US, which disapproved.  More recently, mass protests 
played an important role in fostering democratic transitions in Georgia and Ukraine. However, Hobson notes that 
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transitions or impacted on their outcome. In addition the civil society groups supported by the 
NED also played a role in limiting the wider impact of such transitions by opposing other 
groups advocating more radical reform, as NED grantees such as the TUCP did in the 
Philippines. There was little attempt to support forces aiming to accomplish tasks which 
academic theorists of democracy promotion such as Carothers consider to be important in 
creating a substantively democratic system, such as “breaking down…entrenched 
antidemocratic power structures” or “reducing entrenched concentrations of economic 
power”.24 The narrower process carried out in these countries avoided the continuation of 
unstable dictatorships without destabilising the wider society or opening political systems to 
forces likely to challenge US interests.    
US democracy promotion, in practice, has favoured the export of a procedural model 
of democracy which has de-emphasised consideration of alternative types of democracy and 
redistributive reforms and has been consistent with US national security interests. In the 
Soviet bloc it provided a method of undermining and dismantling enemy regimes while 
attempting to avoid the accession of successor elites who could also threaten US national 
interests. In the Third World, democracy promotion was more tactically effective in creating 
stability than Modernisation or Human Rights, as its narrow focus on building up pro-US 
political forces allowed the US to ensure that the type of political change which occurred 
would be consistent with US national security interests. The idea of democracy promotion 
provided a way in which two different projects, the undermining of enemy regimes and the 
stabilisation of friendly states through political reform, could be integrated conceptually; 
however, the channelling of funding and support to pro-US groups which constituted 
                                                                                                                                                        
the crowds of protestors supplied pressure which political leaders could use to negotiate with the regime, rather 
than determining the shape of the transition themselves. See Hobson, 388. 
24
 Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 166, 263.  
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democracy promotion in practice tended to favour types of reform which were consistent with 
US national security interests. 
Democracy and US foreign policy: Persistent Patterns 
The policy debates over the place of democracy in US foreign policy of the early 1980s had 
consequences which extended beyond the Cold War, and the ideas concerning the relationship 
between support for the creation of democratic systems and US national security continue to 
inform US policy today. In ideological terms the outcome of these debates was the adoption 
of a rationale for US political intervention overseas, democracy promotion, which appealed 
both to liberals concerned with Human Rights and conservatives concerned with national 
security. This rationale transcended previous conceptions rooted in anticommunism and so 
survived the Cold War as an important prism for conceiving US foreign policy. However, the 
debates did not produce a coherent strategy which meshed democracy and national security, 
but a compromise between the two imperatives at an organisational and tactical level. At the 
organisational level, the NED was largely autonomous on a day-to-day basis; however, the 
orientation of its senior officials towards US national security goals and the institutional 
constraints on full autonomy ensured that its actions, especially those aimed at large-scale 
political change, were compatible with US national security interests. At the tactical level, the 
NED supported democratic groups rather providing aid to groups which were anti-communist 
but had no commitment to the creation of functioning democratic institutions. However, these 
democratic groups were committed to a type of liberal democracy consistent with US interests 
rather than wider or differing reform projects which might clash with such interests. 
 This outcome reflects the persistence of the clash between the two imperatives of 
exporting democracy and pursuing national security interests at the operational, as opposed to 
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conceptual and rhetorical, level of US foreign policy, rather than a resolution of this tension. 
The idea of the US as guardian and exporter of democracy plays an important part in policy-
makers‟ conceptualisation of America‟s role in the world and in the legitimation of an active 
US foreign policy with Congress and the American people. However, the universal export of 
democracy, which could lead to the undermining of friendly regimes or the destabilisation of 
key geopolitical areas, is not always reconcilable with particular US national security 
interests.  
This tension leads to conflicts over the relationship of democracy to US national 
security, as some policy-makers prioritise the democratisation of particular countries or 
regions, while feeling that democratisation projects in other areas are compatible with US 
interests but of lesser importance, and that in still other areas democratisation may actively 
threaten US interests by opening up the political systems of key states to hostile forces. These 
calculations are not fixed but are altered by changes in external geopolitical conditions and by 
shifting balances of power within the national security bureaucracy or other institutions, 
which are sometimes linked to these geopolitical shifts. Due to this there can be no fixed 
overarching strategy which fuses democracy and US national security. The Carter 
administration did not manage to create such a strategy for its Human Rights campaign; the 
debates of the early 1980s did not create one; and despite the greater prominence given to 
democracy promotion in the rhetoric and national security strategies of the Clinton and 
George W. Bush administrations,
25
 there is still no such overarching framework and no 
                                                 
25
 For the Clinton administration , see National Security Advisor Anthony Lake‟s speech on US foreign policy 
given in September 1993; Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement”, 21st September 1993, accessed 
27
th
 January 2012,  http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html and White House, “A National Security 
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,”  1995, accessed 11th August 2006, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf, 2. For the George W. Bush administration, see White 
House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, March 2006, accessed 11th August 
2013,  http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf, 1.  
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command centre within the government charged with developing and implementing one.
26
 
This has led to continued incoherence and turf wars.
27
 In place of a strategic approach, there 
has been a constantly evolving process of negotiation between different factions of policy-
makers and other interested parties, in which accommodation over specific countries on a 
case-by-case basis is the only realistic outcome. 
This process of calculation and negotiation means that efforts to promote democratic 
reform have not occurred on a global scale with the same level of intensity; nor have specific 
areas been targeted in line with a grand strategy or commensurate with their need for 
assistance to build democratic structures. Instead, US democratisation programs and policies 
have been concentrated in states where the US has key national security objectives which can 
be safeguarded or accomplished through such efforts. Democracy has been a policy goal in 
enemy states where policy-makers believe that the national security threat posed by the state 
is traceable to the dictatorial nature of the system, and that there is a good prospect of altering 
this system through pressure for democracy, whether external or internal. In friendly 
dictatorships, a transition to democracy has been pursued when the current government is in 
danger of collapsing and where there is a good prospect that strengthening a pre-existing 
political movement compatible with US interests can pre-empt a seizure of power by forces 
hostile to the US. In these circumstances the US support of democracy is a concrete policy 
goal, not merely a rhetorical trope. However, the fact that democracy is used as a tool for the 
pursuit of US interests means that US support is distributed only to political groups with 
                                                 
26
 See Melia, “The Democracy Bureaucracy: The Infrastructure of American Democracy Promotion,” 2, 9. The 
2007 Advance Democracy Act failed to remedy this situation, as it was largely focussed on the State Department 
and did not result in the creation of a bureaucratic structure to co-ordinate the programs of the Department, 
Department of Defence, USAID, NED and other actors. A summary of the provisions of the 2005 draft of the 
Act and the 2007 Act can be found in Eric Patterson, “Obama and Sustainable Democracy Promotion,” 
International Studies Perspectives 13 (2012): 30-31. 
27
 See Christopher Madison, “The New Democratizers”, The National Journal, 7th December 1991, Nexis UK, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/, 5 for turf problems between the NED and USAID in the early 1990s and Melia, 
16, for similar problems between USAID and the State Department under George W. Bush.  
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reform projects consistent with these interests, reproducing the strategic clash between 
democracy and US interests at the level of cases and countries.  
Beyond any surface reconciliation of democracy and national security in US foreign 
policy which occurs, the deeper tensions involved in the pursuit of both of these imperatives 
continue and cannot be resolved. Democracy cannot be abandoned as a component of foreign 
policy and replaced with a focus on pure realpolitik in terms of national security or economic 
interest, as this would be unpalatable in terms of domestic politics and would dissipate the 
measure of soft power which the US gains from its disjointed support for democracy. Equally, 
a policy focussed on the unqualified promotion of democracy as the highest and most constant 
of goal of US policy would soon encounter the reality that US national security in some cases 
or regions is dependent on relations with dictatorial regimes, and that not all foreign 
populations, if given full political autonomy, would make choices consistent with US 
interests. The tension between democracy and US national security is not one which is 
susceptible to resolution, but a recurring feature of America‟s engagement with the world.  
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